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summary
Officially, Islam does not play a role in the decision whether to accept
Turkey as a member state of the European Union (eu). Yet many people
wonder if a Muslim country such as Turkey would really fit into the Euro-
pean Union. Is Turkish Islam compatible with democracy, human rights
and the separation of state and religion? The central question of this report,
therefore, is whether the fact that the majority of its population is Muslim
forms a hindrance to Turkish accession to the European Union.
This report is a full translation of De Europese Unie, Turkije en de islam, 
that was officially presented to the Dutch government on 21 June 2004 by
the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy. The Council 
is an independent advisory body for the Dutch government which
provides sollicited and unsollicited advise on developments which may
affect society in the long term (see also: www.wrr.nl).
Reason
The question examined in this report is highly relevant, given the decision
to be taken by the eu under the Dutch Presidency in December 2004. 
It will then be decided whether candidate member state Turkey has made
sufficient progress towards meeting the so-called political Copenhagen
criterion that accession negotiations can commence. This criterion stipu-
lates a stable democracy and a constitutional state that guarantees the rule
of law, human rights and the rights of minorities.
Religion as such plays no role in this Copenhagen criterion. The fact that 
the majority of the Turkish population is Muslim, therefore, played no for-
mal role in the decision taken in 1999 to grant Turkey the status of candidate
member. However, especially since the terrorist attacks on 11 September
2001, the concerns in member states about Islam and Muslims have in-
creased. This has contributed to growing doubts over the question whether
Turkey’s Islamic character is compatible with the political achievements of
the eu and its member states. Objections to membership, on cultural and 
religious ground, have been increasingly raised, even in political circles.
Objective of  the repor t
In light of these recent discussions, the Netherlands Scientific Council 
for Government Policy (henceforth identified by the initials of its Dutch
title – the wrr) considers it important to have a separate review of the
question whether Turkish Islam is compatible with the values upon which
the Union is based. In this way, the wrr hopes to contribute to the formu-
lation of an informed judgement .
summary
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In this report, the wrr offers the government no advice on the question
whether accession negotiations should now be started with Turkey. The
decision that will have to be made in December will have to take full
account of all aspects of the membership question. This report makes no
such comprehensive assessment; it is confined exclusively to the relation-
ship between Turkish Islam and the democratic constitutional state.
Nonetheless, the wrr, at the end of this report, looks at the possible impli-
cations of Turkish membership for the deteriorating relations between the
Muslim world and the West. 
Religion in the European Union and its member states
In answering the question whether Turkish Islam forms a hindrance to eu
membership, we should first determine the position of religion in the eu
itself. Religion does not form part of the common eu values. The Union
has defined itself as a system of values and actions based on the basic prin-
ciples of freedom and democracy, as well as a recognition of human rights,
fundamental liberties and the rule of law. The freedom of thought,
conscience and religion forms an integral part of these basic rights, as does
the respect afforded by the Union to cultural and religious diversity. 
Viewed from the perspective of the principles and fundamental rights of
the Union, there is no a priori reason to exclude a country on the grounds
of its dominant religion. However, the question of the separation of church
and state is another matter altogether. Behind the principles and the politi-
cal and civil rights of the Union lies the assumption that its member states
have a constitutional state that recognises and guarantees both the auton-
omy of church and state, and freedom of religion and conscience. The prin-
ciple of autonomy implies that religious communities and the state each
have separate areas of competence. Freedom of religion and conscience
means that religious believers (including members of minority churches),
atheists and apostates face no restrictions in the exercise of their rights. It is
precisely in this area that people harbour doubts about Islam.
Looking at the autonomy of church and state, the situation among eu
member states is extremely diverse. Even though all member states are
formally secular and recognise freedom of religion, they do not always
remain neutral towards religions or religious denominations. For example,
some states have a state church and others do not. Even where there is no
state church, one denomination may in practice be privileged above others.
On the other hand, recognising a state church does not necessarily exclude
equal treatment of other churches. Each member state has its own, often
tense, history in the relationship between church, state, politics and 
society, which has resulted in specific arrangements. Thus, on the question
the europe a n union, t urkey a nd isl a m
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of the separation of church and state there is no single European model
against which to test the Turkish experience. The most that can be done is
to see whether Turkey meets certain minimum conditions.
Characteristics of  Turkish Islam
The next question is whether Turkish Islam has characteristics that stand in
the way of the country’s accession. In other words, are there developments
afoot in Turkey that would negatively influence the attitude of Turkish
Islam towards essential eu values? The wrr’s answer to this question is
negative. The Turkish state is constitutionally protected against religious
influences. In this respect the country has the same rigorous separation
between the state and religion as does France. Indeed, France’s so-called
laicism provided the model for the constitution of the Republic of Turkey.
However, unlike the French state, the Turkish state still exercises a strong
control and influence over religion. 
These characteristics have a long history. The nineteenth century was a
period of modernisation following the West European example. The French
Enlightenment greatly influenced constitutional thinking also in the
Ottoman period. Not long after West European states had done so, Turkey
established its first constitution and held elections for the first Ottoman
parliament (1876). This was followed, until the First World War, by a period
of highly religiously coloured nationalism, which was accompanied by
much government interference in the contents and the propagation of reli-
gious beliefs. The Turkish Republic was established in 1923, and it marked
the beginning of the most extreme banning of religious influences on the
state. The Kemalist movement, named after the founder of the Republic,
Mustafa Kemal Pasja (Atatürk), rigorously consigned religion to the private
sphere. It banned religious symbols from public life, abolished religious
organisations or placed them under state control, and outlawed the popular
mystical orders. This period also witnessed the replacement of the last rem-
nants of Islamic law, namely family law, by secular law. Islamic criminal law
had already been abolished in the middle of the nineteenth century. After
the Second World War, Turkey introduced a multi-party democracy and
Islam gradually became a major political factor, even in programmes of 
non-religious secular parties. In addition, from the 1960s onwards, political
parties also emerged that explicitly identified themselves as Islamic.
The wrr considers that the rise of Islam as a politically relevant phenome-
non should be seen in the context of its forced marginalisation in the previ-
ous decades. This denial of Islamic identity by the upper classes was never
shared by the population at large. At the same time, this rise was under-
pinned by important socio-economic changes in Turkey, such as the devel-
opment of a substantial middle class in rural areas and in the smaller
summary
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towns, for whom Islam constitutes a normal part of everyday life. Until
now, Islamic parties have been met by profound distrust from the estab-
lishment in and around governmental institutions, who identify strongly
with Kemalist thinking. Both the Constitutional Court and the armed
forces have intervened on several occasions and banned such parties. Since
1982, as a counterweight to the radical left and religious views, the army
institutionalised a form of ‘state-Islam’ which still enjoys a privileged
position today. This version of state religion combines a strong emphasis
on social conservatism and nationalism with a moderate version of Islam
and is propagated through mosques and through compulsory religious
education in schools. This state-Islam, which is firmly embedded in a secu-
lar state system and which reflects the beliefs of the majority of the popula-
tion and of conservative political bodies, has given recognition to the
importance attached to Islam by the broad public. 
Finally, the wrr notes that for the new Islamic political parties that were
created during the last decade, the principle of the separation of state and
religion was an important conditioning factor. However, they attached
different consequences to it. Although they accepted the secular state, they
also wanted to increase the freedom of religion and therefore opposed the
strong government controls on religion. Whilst supporting the existing
democratic system, they have fought to make it accessible to religion-based
parties. They still consider freedom of conscience and freedom of expres-
sion as the basis of democracy and human rights. They have contested
neither the secular nature of the law, nor the principle of equal rights for
men and women.
While it is possible to view this emphasis on such freedoms as a mere
effort to enlarge the legitimate scope for one’s own views, the current
government party, the Justice and Development Party (ak Party), which
itself grew from a government banned Islamic party, emphasises human
rights even more strongly from the standpoint of pluralism. The party
intrinsically values differences in religion, culture, and opinions and sees
secularism as the principle of freedom that makes their exercise and
expression possible.
Conclusion of the wrr
The wrr believes that the fact that Turkey is a country with a majority
Muslim population is no hindrance to its eu accession. This conclusion is
based on the following considerations.
First, the wrr has established, on the basis of the developments described
above and the current characteristics of Turkish Islam, that the principle of
the secular democratic state is solidly rooted in Turkish society. Moreover,
the europe a n union, t urkey a nd isl a m
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the development of the secular state in Turkey shows many parallels with
West European history and it was also more or less concomitant. The exis-
tence of Islam in Turkey did not stand in the way of these developments but
instead, right to the present day, helped to encourage them. The fact that 
the democratisation process after the Second World War should have been
accompanied by the emergence of Islam as an important political force, is a
normal phenomenon. When we see the political role still played by religion
in many European states, it is not surprising that the Kemalist movement
failed to ban religion entirely from the political and public sphere.
However, from an eu perspective the issue of Islam in Turkey is not so
much a problem of the influence of religion on the state as a problem of the
influence of the state on religion. This is because government intervention
in religion is stronger in Turkey than in eu member states, even though
some eu countries also recognise a state religion. Moreover, the consti-
tutional restrictions on the democratic process aimed at protecting the
secular state system, are incompatible with the principles of the eu. This
observation applies equally to the role of the military as a guardian of this
system. It is here that the European Parliament and the European Commis-
sion would like to see important changes implemented.
Nonetheless, the wrr considers that there is no indication that Turkish
Islam will lose its moderate character, and thus endanger the secular demo-
cratic state, if state restrictions are relaxed or if the military gradually with-
draw from politics, as advocated by the current Turkish government. The
great majority of the population wants nothing to do with fundamentalism
and religious intolerance and expresses a preference for moderate political
parties. They support the secular character of the state and reject any intro-
duction of Islamic law. For these reasons, violent Islamic fundamentalism
has few followers in Turkey.
Structure of this repor t
The first section contains the report of the wrr to the Dutch government.
Chapter 1 presents the reason for and the key question of the report. Chap-
ter 2 examines the position of religion in the eu and arrangements that
exist within member states governing the relationship between the state,
religion, politics and society. Chapter 3 describes developments in Turkey
that explain the Turkish position towards the eu’s essential values. In
chapter 4, the wrr presents its conclusions. This is followed by an
epilogue on the possible implications of Turkish membership for the diffi-
cult relationship between the Muslim world and the West. Part 2 of the
report contains the survey ‘Searching for the Fault-Line’, commissioned by
the wrr, in which prof. dr. E.J. Zürcher and H. van der Linden present
their analysis on Turkish Islam and the eu.
summary
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preface
This report has been prepared by an internal project group of the Nether-
lands Scientific Council for Government Policy (wrr) comprising
researchers dr. W. Asbeek Brusse and drs. I.J. Schoonenboom. 
The analyses in the report are based, in part, on a study conducted by prof.
dr. E.J. Zürcher and H. van der Linden at the request of the Netherlands
Scientific Council for Government Policy. The study, Searching for the
Fault-Line. A Survey of the role of Turkish Islam in Turkey’s accession to the
eu in the light of the ‘clash of civilisations’, is also published in this volume.
The wrr assumes full responsibility for its “Report to the Government”.
The authors of the commissioned study are entirely responsible for their
own views. 
preface
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1 introduction
1.1 background and motivation
The debate on Turkey
During the Dutch Presidency of the European Union (eu) in the final six
months of 2004, the eu will have to decide on whether to open member-
ship negotiations with candidate member state Turkey. Officially, that
decision depends on whether the country enjoys a stable constitutional
democracy that guarantees the rule of law, human rights and minority
rights – the so-called political Copenhagen criterion.1 In the public debate,
however, other considerations have also played a role. Besides the many
practical objections to Turkish membership (the country’s size, poverty,
rural nature or its many unstable neighbours), objections of a cultural-reli-
gious nature are increasingly being raised. In short, Turkey is alleged to
have a different cultural-religious history from that of ‘Europe’ and an
incompatible value system.2
Up to now, the national governments of the member states, the Euro-
pean Commission and the European Parliament have nearly all adopted
a wait-and-see attitude towards this debate. Insofar as issues of 
culture and religion play a role for politicians and ‘eu-watchers’, it
involves the question whether Turkey is able to guarantee religious
liberties.3 Hardly any of them have questioned outright whether an
Islamic country such as Turkey fits in with the eu’s ‘Judeo-Christian
value system’. This reticence is perhaps understandable. After Turkey
became an associate eu partner in 1963, European heads of government
elevated its status to an ‘eu candidate country’ at the end of 1999 
(see also text box 1.1). In doing so, they have already committed them-
selves in principle to a possible Turkish membership. Moreover, one
would expect representatives of secular states especially to maintain
some distance from making substantive judgements on religious issues
(see sect. 2.3).
Even so, Turkey’s Islamic character will inevitably become entwined in 
the political decision-making process. The German Christian-Democrats,
for example, have already stated that they will make the question of Turk-
ish accession a core issue in debates on the eu’s future. Should accession
negotiations with Turkey indeed begin and be successfully concluded, 
the issue will again become politically relevant in the not too distant
future. This is because the accession treaty with the Union will have to 
be ratified by all member states either through referenda, or by the
approval of national parliaments. The perception of Turkish Islam and
introduction
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Muslims among parliamentarians and the electorate will, therefore,
inevitably play a role in the accession debates. 
Turkey,  Islam and Muslims
The poor integration of some groups of Muslims in the eu member states,
the growing assertiveness of second-generation Muslims, and the world-
wide rise of fundamentalism and Islamic terrorism, have placed ‘Islam’ and
‘Muslims’ in an increasingly controversial position. In 1999, when the
European Council, in the wake of the historic decision on the eu’s east-
ward expansion, also decided to grant Turkey candidate-membership
status, ‘9-11’ had yet to happen. The attacks dramatically changed the social
and political climate and awoke dormant feelings of deep unease. Subse-
quently, much of the discourse on relations between Western and Muslim
states was cast in the mould of the ‘clash of civilisations’, to use the phrase
coined by Samuel Huntington (Huntington 1993 and 1996). Ethnic violence
became more quickly associated with Islam and visible communities of
religious Muslims more quickly labelled as dangerous fundamentalists.
The March 2004 attacks in Madrid have strengthened this tendency.
It is too easy to trivialise this fear of Islam. It is not only in the Netherlands
and the other member states, but also in Turkey itself, that public and
political manifestations of Islam raise controversy. Evidence for this can be
found in the countless ‘headscarf incidents’ in Turkey, as well as in the
periodic interventions by the Turkish army against democratically elected
leaders with overt religious affiliations. Many supporters of Turkish
nationalist and secular parties fear that it is precisely the religious funda-
mentalists who would be given free rein should the military, as a result of
eu pressure, be forced to withdraw completely from politics. They are
wary of demands by the European Parliament that Turkey should adopt a
‘more relaxed position’ towards Islam in particular and religion in general.
Other groups, too, such as emancipated young women, atheists and gays,
distrust the current government of the moderately religious ak Party, and
expect that, at any moment, it will show its ‘true anti-secularist’ colours.
Examples from Dutch, European and Turkish contexts reveal a huge gulf
between the broad public debate on ‘Islam’ and Muslim fundamentalism,
on the one hand, and the discussion among European experts and 
academics on the authoritarian-secular character of the Turkish state, on
the other. The former usually gets mired in platitudes about Islam,
Muslims, violence and fundamentalism, that do scant justice to the charac-
teristics of Turkish Islam, culture and society. The second debate brings
together two different perspectives: one stressing the partiality of the guar-
antees that Turkey offers for the protection of individuals and (religious)
minority groups; the other emphasising the opportunity afforded for the
the europe a n union, t urkey a nd isl a m
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eu, via Turkish membership, to build a bridge to the Islamic world. Both
debates form parts of a wider and more complex issue, namely Turkey’s
search for a new balance between religion, state and society in a rapidly
changing environment. How this search develops, and more particularly
which opportunities and threats Turkey will meet en route, are directly
relevant to the question whether Islamic Turkey is compatible with
membership of the eu. Indirectly, the question is also relevant for Europe’s
relationship with the Islamic world.
1.2 aims, core question and limitations
Aims and core question
This report intends to contribute to an informed discussion on Turkish
Islam. In light of the recent discussions, the wrr considers it important to
pose this question separately. The core question is:
Does the fact that the majority of Turkey’s population is Muslim, form an
impediment to Turkey’s accession to the European Union?
The following subquestions provide a guideline for answering this core
question:
1 How do the eu and its member states deal with religion?
2 What (implicit) requirements does the eu have towards the position of
religion in the member states?
3 What do these requirements imply for Turkish Islam and its role in
Turkey?
4 To what conclusion do answers to these questions lead on the issue of
Turkey’s accession to the eu?
The core question of the report could easily give rise to the impression that
we are in favour of an additional test for Turkish membership by adding a
new, ‘religious’, component to the political Copenhagen criterion. This is
emphatically not the case. Rather, we are concerned to make explicit the
underlying assumptions on religion implied in the political Copenhagen
criterion. The formal requirement for a democratic constitutional state
assumes, in the current European context, that church and state are
autonomous (this is also referred to as secularism), and that the state guar-
antees religious freedoms and rights.4 In this light, the position of religion
in relation to state and society in Turkey is relevant as one component of the
existing political Copenhagen criterion, but certainly not as a supplement
to it. By studying Turkish Islam separately and explicitly, in the light of the
legitimate requirements of a secular, democratic constitutional state, we
hope to forestall a situation whereby the decision on Turkish membership
introduction
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would be overshadowed by vague feelings of unease, implicit arguments 
or unstated, religiously-coloured expectations which the country could
never reasonably be expected to fulfil. Unlike the European Commission,
we pay extensive attention to the development of the relationship between
Turkish Islam and the secular state, as well as to its historical foundations.
Further, we examine the rapidly changing relationship between religion,
state and society in Turkey. In short, we focus on Turkish Islam by placing
it in both its historical and its local contexts. From this perspective, we
offer an answer to the question whether Turkish Islam constitutes an
impediment to Turkish membership of the eu.
Limitations
We are aware that an assessment of the position of religion in Turkey is
only one aspect of the considerations involved in Turkey’s membership.
No overall judgement is made in this Report. We will thus make no recom-
mendation on the issue if, and when, membership negotiations should
start. Such a recommendation requires a political judgement based on a
close assessment of Turkey’s progress with respect to all the Copenhagen
criteria. In the autumn of 2004, this will be provided by a new report by
the European Commission. Nor do we offer an opinion on the advantages
and disadvantages of Turkish membership. Such an opinion would involve
numerous other factors as the decision-making capacity of an enlarged eu,
the geopolitical, economic and financial consequences of membership, 
the anticipated flows of migration etc., all important in themselves but all
outside the framework of this report. What we do want to explore, how-
ever, is the question of Turkish eu membership in light of the growing
international importance of political Islam since the 1970s. We will refer to
this issue briefly, in the epilogue. 
1.3 research approach and structure of the report
The question whether the fact that the majority of the Turkish population
is Muslim forms an impediment to eu membership, requires first a view of
the Union itself. What is clear is that there exist widely divergent views on
what the Union is and how it should develop in the future. Each viewpoint
would apply different criteria to assess whether Turkey and Turkish Islam
are consistent with eu membership. For example, those who see the 
Union as a community defined by Christian values, will employ different
criteria in their assessment from those who view it as a union of culturally
widely divergent states which take decisions jointly. For this reason, in
chapter 2 we first present the Union’s values as they have been developed
in recent years by the member states themselves (section 2.2). The union 
is one based on shared values and objectives which grants rights to, and
imposes obligations upon member states, and from which individual citi-
the europe a n union, t urkey a nd isl a m
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zens also derive supplementary rights. The community of values rests not
so much on a shared historical legacy of specific cultural-religious values,
as on the minimum political and civic values institutionally anchored in
the democratic constitutional state. These minimum values contain two
crucial assumptions, relating to the position of religion in (future) member
states: the separation of the state and religion and the guarantee of religious
freedoms and rights. Defining exactly what this entails, is much less easy,
given widely divergent relations between state, religion and society among
member states. There is no agreed European standard that goes beyond
these minimum values, and no model that the eu could offer Turkey
(section 2.3). 
Against this background, chapter 3 explores the core questions relevant for
assessing Turkish Islam and Turkey as a Muslim country – how firmly
rooted is the secular state in Turkey; how do Turkish Islam and the demo-
cratic constitutional state relate each to the other? Thus, the chapter starts
with an exploration of the historical foundations of secular state (section
3.2). Next, separate thematic paragraphs investigate the current position of
Turkish Islam in Turkey. One looks at the way in which the Turkish state has
dealt with the rise of political islam (political movements based explicitly on
Islamic principles) since the 1950s (section 3.3) and another examines the
way in which Turkish State-Islam has dealt with freedom of religion (sec-
tion 3.4). Finally, the chapter explores the relationship between political
Islam and, in turn, democracy, human rights and violence (sections 3.5, 3.6,
and 3.7 respectively). Chapter 4 will link these findings to the core question
of the report and will formulate some final conclusions.
As indicated above, the subject of this report is in part dictated by the
increased importance of political Islam world-wide since the 1970s. In this
context, the question arises what influence Turkey’s eventual eu member-
ship could have on the Islamic world. Although this question is not central
to the present report, we will return to it in the epilogue. 
We have invited prof. dr. E.J. Zürcher, professor of Turkish languages and
cultures, as part of this report to investigate the core question, also in light
of the discussion on the ‘clash of civilisations’. His results and the findings
of the wrr are published together in this volume.
introduction
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Text box 1.1 Turkey and Europe: recent chronology
1948: -Membership of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (oeec)
1949: -Membership of the Council of Europe.
1952: -Membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (nato).
1953: -Signing of a defensive Balkan Pact with Greece and Yugoslavia.
1954: -Signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights (echr).
1955: -Signing of the defensive Baghdad Pact with Iraq. Pakistan, England and Iran join
later.
1959: -Discussions with the eec on possible membership.
1963: -Signing of the association agreement with the eec, which offered the prospect of
membership after seventeen years.
1975: -Signing of the Helsinki Final Act establishing the Conference on Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (csce), precursor of the Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (osce) founded in 1995.
1987: -eec rejects Turkey’s membership application, but offers the prospect of a customs
union.
1995: -Associate member of the Western European Union (weu). Signatory (together
with eleven other Mediterranean non-member states) to the Barcelona Declaration
on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.
1996: - Start of the customs union with the eu.
1999: -eu grants Turkey status of candidate member during the European Council of
Helsinki. The Council concludes that Turkey must meet the same accession criteria
as apply to other candidates, and that it will be eligible for pre-accession aid to
support the reforms required for membership. The European Commission starts
the preparations for a Partnership agreement for Turkey’s accession.
2001: - Acceptance of the Accession Partnership and presentation by Turkey to the Euro-
pean Commission of the National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis, in
which Turkey’s short and medium-term priorities are established, with a view to
accession.
the europe a n union, t urkey a nd isl a m
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2002: - European Council of Copenhagen decides to grant membership to eight of the ten
candidate member states from Central and Eastern Europe on 1 May 2004. 
It decides that, “if the European Council decides, in 2004, on the basis of a report
and a recommendation of the Commission, that Turkey fulfils the political criteria
of Copenhagen, the European Union will commence accession negotiations with
Turkey without delay.”
2004: - Decision expected by the European Council in December, under Dutch eu Presi-
dency, on whether to start accession negotiations.
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notes
1 None of the official standpoints of the European Councils on Turkish
accession, nor the regular reports which have been and continue to be
composed by the European Commission on Turkey’s progress towards 
the Copenhagen criteria, makes any mention of Islam. This comes as no
surprise, since religion as such is not a part of the formal political criteria,
which concentrate on constitutional and governance aspects of the
member states. Representatives of the European Commission usually 
react to such inquiries by claiming that “our Heads of State and Govern-
ment, the European Parliament, all official bodies of the European Union
have always made absolutely clear that the European Union is based on
common values, common principles and not on a particular culture or a
particular religion” (quoted in the House of Commons 2001: 4).
2 One of the better-known and more recent statements in this vein was
made by Valérie Giscard d’Estaing, the chairman of the now concluded
European Convention for the drafting of a European constitution (which
Turkey, incidentally, attended as an observer). At the end of 2002, he stated
that an unbridgeable cultural divide existed between Turkey and Europe,
that Turkey was not a European country and that its membership would
bring about the end of the eu. He added that many European government
leaders shared his standpoint, but dared not publicly to say so. Similar
objections have been voiced earlier in the circles of the European People’s
Party (evp) and the German Christian-Democratic parties, the cdu and
csu, and they were repeated recently in the context of the Convention. In
their view, European cooperation is based on a system of common Chris-
tian values, which has few points of contact with (Turkish) Islamic values. 
3 The report presented to the European Parliament in May 2003 by the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and
Defence Policy, compiled by Arie Oostlander, focused attention on the
status of the religious minorities in Turkey. Oostlander, an mep, expressed
his concerns thus: “As a Protestant, I should have the same rights in the
eastern Turkish town of Diyarbakir as a Muslim in Rotterdam. If this is not
the case, and you still allow Turkey to become a member of the eu, then
you’re pulling the wool over our eyes” (‘eu moet hard zijn voor Turkije’,
nrc Handelsblad, 11 February 2004. See also Oostlander’s website:
www.oostlander.net).
4 The terms ‘secularism’ and ‘secular’ evoke many associations, such as 
the decline in church membership, the disappearance of religion from 
the public realm, the banning by the state of religious expressions to the
private domain and the (institutional) separation of church (religious
groupings) and state. In this report, the term ‘secular state’ is employed to
indicate that both the state’s and the religious community’s realms of
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authority, remain autonomous. Secularisation is interpreted as a process in
which the state acquires a greater autonomy in relation to the religious
community.
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2 the european union and religion
2.1 introduction
This chapter explores the main characteristics of the eu and examines how
the Union and its member states deal with religion. It observes that the eu
has evolved into a union of values and objectives that rests on the institu-
tionally anchored political and civic values of the democratic constitutional
state, that guarantee the autonomy of church and state and religious free-
doms and rights (section 2.2). After this, the chapter contains a brief survey
of the different ways in which the member states, both pro forma and de
facto, realise these basic values (section 2.3).
2.2 the values of the union
According to the Treaty of the European Union (teu, article 49), “any
European state” may apply for eu membership. But what is ‘European’,
and what binds European states together? This question is increasingly
being asked now that the number of (potential) member states is growing
and the Union’s list of tasks also grows longer (wrr 2003a). In its report
Towards a pan-European Union, the wrr concluded that geographical and
cultural-historical approaches often used to define Europe take insufficient
account of its dynamic and malleable nature. After all, Europe has a long
history of fragmentation, conflict and, especially, shifting political borders
that were all legitimised in various ways.1 What remains is not a fixed
entity, but a dynamic social construct, an imagined community that can
change according to circumstance and political leadership (wrr 2001: 
32-36). The developments of the 20th century confirm this. During the
1950s and 1960s the then political leaders of the ‘Europe of the Six’ saw
their experiences of destructive warfare and genocide as the foundation 
for joint economic action. Since the end of the Cold War, the aims of tran-
scending national differences, and of consolidating peace, democracy and
prosperity, have certainly lost none of their relevance. However the
prospect of an eu of 25 members means that Europe is no longer seen as
synonymous with ‘Western’ Europe. Hence, most eu member states, as
well as the European Commission, have refrained from static cultural-reli-
gious, historical or geographical definitions of the Union. They recognise
that a degree of solidarity and some geographical limitation is essential for
communal action, without feeling the need for a blueprint with geographi-
cal borders or exclusionary non-universal values. 
Realising that fundamental principles and objectives offer both grip and
flexibility, the eu typifies itself as an union of values and objectives (wrr
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2001: 36). It is essential that (future) members subscribe to the fundamen-
tal principles, standards, rules and procedures of the Union (the union of
values) and are also willing and able to pursue the concrete objectives of 
the Union (the union of objectives). In the treatment of candidate members
this translates into a system of rights and obligations, in which the politi-
cal-civic principles and values of the Union form the pre-essential condi-
tions for membership. Only if these countries comply, may they submit 
a membership application. Both the Treaty of Maastricht (which became
operational in November 1993) and the Treaty of Amsterdam (1 May 1999)
extensively codify these principles and values. Article 6, par. 1, teu, 
states:
“The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the
Member States.”
The European Convention on the future of Europe (2002-2003) stimulated
further reflection on the normative foundations and points of departure of
the Union, partly with the aim of bringing the European project closer to
its citizens. The European Constitution, which was subsequently adopted
by the heads of government in June 2004, underlines the importance of the
union of values. The preamble states:
“Drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe,
from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of
the human person, democracy, equality, freedom and the rule of law, 
Believing that Europe, reunited after bitter experiences, intends to continue along the path
of civilisation, progress and prosperity, for the good of all its inhabitants, including the
weakest and most deprived; that it wishes to remain a continent open to culture, learning
and social progress; and that it wishes to deepen the democratic and transparent nature of
its public life, and to strive for peace, justice and solidarity throughout the world” (Provi-
sional consolidated version of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe,
2004). 
Article I-2 of the Treaty, entitled ‘The Union’s values’ also states:
“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy,
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons
belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in 
which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between 
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men and women prevail” (Provisional consolidated version of the draft Treaty establishing
a Constitution for Europe, 2004).
The reference to religion in the preamble is the result of a debate on whether
Christianity deserves to be mentioned explicitly. Instead of the existing ref-
erence to the ‘cultural, religious and humanist inheritance’ as a source of
inspiration, some demanded the inclusion of a more explicit reference to the
‘Judeo-Christian tradition’. Still others went even further by defining the
current eu as a ‘Christian community of values’. This would allow them to
disqualify Turkey from membership in advance. The discussions in the
Convention and the subsequent intergovernmental conference have con-
vinced most participants in this debate that the value-question is a difficult
one. After all, it would be strange if the member states of a Union based on
universal values, would appeal to Christian values to deny a country mem-
bership. Moreover, it would conflict with their plea to cherish (religious)
pluralism and diversity (article I-2 of the draft European constitution), and
with the eu’s efforts to bridge historical differences.
Religion is thus not included among the values on which the Union,
according to the treaties and the draft constitution, rests. Naturally, reli-
gion does appear in the European Convention on Human Rights (echr),
which is annexed to the new constitution. Article II-10-1 provides for free-
dom of thought, conscience, and religion, and article II-21-1 prohibits
discrimination inter alia on grounds of religion or conviction. In addition,
article II-22 states that the Union respects cultural, religious and linguistic
diversity. Although these articles represent positive Union law, they do no
more than define the minimum values and fundamental rights listed
above. 
The definition of the eu as a political-civic union of values and actions,
based on “respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality and
respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to
minorities”, prevents the use of cultural, religious or historical characteris-
tics and values to exclude potential members. However, a consensus over
basic values does not mean that exclusion, division or conflicts can always
be avoided. Precisely in concrete situations there will always be disagree-
ments and tensions over the hierarchy of values or their application (wrr
2003b: 47-53). Concrete judgements will always entail more refined
considerations of what is valued, in which context, and in relation to which
other values, by whom and for whom. This holds true whether the subject
is the interactions among individuals, among groups or among member
states. A good illustration of this is afforded by the ‘conflict of values’
between Austria and the other fourteen eu member states, that arose after
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the 2000 electoral victory by the fpö, whose leader, Jörg Haider, had pre-
viously made decidedly negative comments about immigrants. When 
the övp embarked on coalition negotiations with the fpö in January of 
that year, ‘the fourteen’ threatened to apply sanctions against Austria
should the fpö enter government. They claimed that, by pressurising
Austria to exclude the fpö from the government, they were attempting to
protect the common values of the Union, as formulated in article 6, sect. 1.
This action led to a deep crisis in the relationship between Austria and the
eu. Neither the eu, nor any single member, had ever interfered so openly
in the democratic process of a member state. Moreover, although the four-
teen had justified their action by appealing to the values formulated in 
article 6, they could not implement sanctions on behalf of the European
Union because, obviously, no concrete violation had as yet occurred. Once
the fpö had joined the government, the fourteen jointly implemented
bilateral sanctions. Austria reacted by threatening to obstruct the eu’s
decision-making process as far as possible and to hold a referendum on the
sanctions. The stalemate was broken only after the eu Presidency, on
behalf of the fourteen, asked a committee of ‘wise men’ to report on the
attitude of the new Austrian government towards European values. The
report concluded that Austrian immigration policy was compatible with
the values of the Union, and argued that maintaining sanctions might have
adverse effects. 
The Austrian example demonstrates, first and foremost, that upholding cer-
tain values, even in the form of general legal principles, provides neither
neutral nor unambiguous guidelines for concrete action. Second, the case
demonstrates that procedures and the rules-of-the-game can contribute to
the solution of differences of interpretation. The lesson, already learned 
earlier by the pragmatic eu, contributed to the decision to introduce into the
Treaty of Nice (1 February 2003) a modification of article 7. This provides a
more flexible and wait-and-see procedure when dealing with a “clear risk of
a serious breach by a member state of the principles referred to in article 6,
sect. 1”.2 Article 7 has already proved its worth. Although the new Italian
coalition government, consisting of Forza Italia, Alleanza Nazionale and
Lega Nord, that took office in 2001, again alarmed the eu, European leaders
knew they were now backed by the new rules. This reduced the potential 
for rash actions or political crises, without jeopardising the exertion of peer-
group pressure at the eu level on behalf of fundamental values.3 Finally, the
Austria case illustrates that, as the member states make greater demands on
each other’s constitutional democracies in the name of safeguarding com-
mon values, the battle against anti-democratic tendencies will require sup-
plementary rules and mechanisms. These will become all the more neces-
sary as fresh accession rounds simultaneously increase the diversity within
the eu.
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2.3 religion in the european member states
2.3.1 mutual autonomy and safeguarding freedoms
Because, through political Copenhagen criterion, the European Commis-
sion evaluates the democratic state in Turkey, it also indirectly confronts
the current members with questions and problems that had previously
fallen outside ‘normal’ European political discourse and public debate. It
asks questions as: what position should religion occupy in society? How
should church and state relate to each other?
It is evident that present and future member states must have a demo-
cratic constitutional system that acknowledges and guarantees the auton-
omy of church and state and freedom of religion and conscience.4 The
principle that church (and religious communities) and state respect each
other’s autonomy has been laid down in national constitutions, in so-
called concordats or agreements between the state and religious denomi-
nations, or has become embedded via the jurisprudence of national
Constitutional Courts. The principle of autonomy implies that state and
church each have separate domains of authority. Areas where the state has
exclusive jurisdiction must be protected from direct interference by
churches and religious communities. Conversely, the state has no direct
authority over the internal affairs of the church and religious communi-
ties. None of this, however, prevents the state from requiring religious
communities to observe the principles of the law. The fundamental right
of the freedom of religion and conscience implies that followers of minor-
ity religions, atheists, and agnostics, by virtue of their beliefs, meet no
restrictions in the exercise of their political and civil rights. This has legal
implications both at the individual and the collective levels. The constitu-
tional state should protect the individual from (group) coercion. The
individual, however, may not, even for the sake of his (religious) convic-
tion or affiliation, violate the fundamental principles of the state. The
state must also realise the right to collective worship. Although these
rights form part of the freedom of association and assembly and the free-
dom of expression, it is important that European states recognise the
principle that these collective rights are open to all religious groups
(Ferrari 2002:8). From this flows the principle of the neutrality of the
state towards religion: the state may not favour one belief system over
another. The political process, for example, must be equally accessible to
persons of all persuasions. Contrary to what is often thought, this does
not necessarily mean that faith and politics should be separated (Biele-
feldt 2000:6; Rouvoet 2003). 
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In the case of Turkey’s candidature, the European Commission criticises
particularly the current situation of inadequate religious rights. The 2003
Regular Report concludes:
“Concerning freedom of religion, the changes introduced by the reform packages have not
yet produced the desired effects. Executive bodies continue to adopt a very restrictive
interpretation of the relevant provisions, so that religious freedom is subject to serious
limitations as compared with European standards. This is particularly the case for the
absence of legal personality, education and training of ecclesiastic personnel as well as full
enjoyment of property rights of religious communities” (European Commission 2003).
Although these ‘European standards’ can be seen as referring to the princi-
ples of the freedom of religion embodied in the echr, there is no conform-
ity among member states over how, in practice, this freedom and auton-
omy from the state should be effectuated. As will become obvious, this
situation stems from the great diversity in national arrangements and, de
facto, from the favouring of traditional religious communities within the
member states. Moreover, the relationships between church and state, and
religion and society remain highly sensitive in many member states (see
also text box 2.1). Hence, in its assessment, the European Commission
limits itself to applying only the minimum conditions.
2.3.2 a european model?
To understand the actual role of religion in state and society, one needs to
look beyond these minimum conditions which anyway are difficult to
employ in practice. Equally, it is not enough to limit oneself to simple alter-
natives as whether or not there is a state church, whether or not there is
religious pluralism, and whether or not the state subsidises religious
communities. This will become even more evident when we abandon an
exclusive focus on constitutionally and legally established relationships
and embrace administrative, socio-political and cultural situations as well.
As will be argued below, a varied and variegated approach makes it impos-
sible to define one, ideal development path against which to measure the
modernity of the Turkish state and of Turkish Islam.
The institutional autonomy of church and state in European countries
today is the result of the Reformation, the processes of state-formation, the
growth of modern capitalism and the modern scientific revolution (Bader
2003b: 57). The way in which those processes reinforced each other
differed in time and place, and this created divergent path-dependencies.
These, in their turn, were influenced by the success or the failure of the
Reformation, which settled the divide between Protestant and Catholic/
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Orthodox countries in Europe; by the extent to which the Reformation and
the subsequent uprisings caused internal division (France, Belgium) or,
conversely, unity in the face of an external enemy (the Netherlands against
Spain; Ireland and the us against England); and, also by the presence or
absence of an assertive, Enlightened critique of religion (such as existed in
France and England, but not in Italy, Ireland and Spain) (see also text box
2.1).5
These different paths of development allow some general conclusions to be
drawn on the evolution of the ties between state, church, religion, politics
and society. First, it appears that although European states do indeed enjoy
a considerable real autonomy of church and state, by no means have all
states broken all official constitutional links with the church. Only the
Netherlands, France and, until the fall of communism, most Central and
Eastern European countries can be classified as states that have cut the
constitutional ties between the dominant religion or church and the state (a
process known as ‘disestablishment’).6 England has a state church under
the formal leadership of the head of state. The Prime Minister, via the head
of state, appoints not only the head of the church (the Archbishop of
Canterbury) but also the upper echelons of the Church of England. Places
are reserved in the House of Lords for 26 senior bishops, in their function
as ‘Lords Spiritual’, while six of the 33 officials charged with the manage-
ment of church property are government civil servants. All these func-
tionaries (including, by virtue of their office, the Prime Minister and the
Minister of Sports and Culture) are accountable to parliament and to the
General Synod of the Church of England.7
Over the course of time, countries such as Scotland, Norway, Denmark and
Switzerland have replaced systems allowing for strong state domination
over the church, with weaker constitutional links, but they have not
entirely dispensed with their state church. Nonetheless, one cannot say
that any of these countries are less democratic or modern. Second, the
absence of a state church does not imply an absolute separation of church
and state. In most countries where the state church was eventually abol-
ished, or where it never existed in the first place, the de facto political and
cultural domination by one church usually persisted, at least for a while. As
a result, the mutual political and cultural influencing of religion, state and
society generally continued (Bader 2003b: 59-61). For example, in countries
such as Poland, Greece, Ireland, Bulgaria, Romania and Armenia, the ties
between the state, the nation and the dominant church have remained
extraordinarily strong. In the last three, the struggle for independence
against the Ottoman and Turkish Muslims accentuated the ethnic signifi-
cance of the church.
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Text box 2.1 Christianity, church, state and nation in Europe
Struggles and schisms
The dominant and long-term presence of Christianity in Europe is still everywhere clearly
visible. However, the Christian religion has not always been a binding, integrating and
community-building force. The history of European Christianity is deeply scarred by
conflicts between sectarian groups and movements (or groups without any formal church
and/or hierarchy) and the established churches, principally the Roman Catholic, Protes-
tant and Orthodox churches. These three major churches eventually each developed their
own ties with the secular authority, thus obtaining legitimacy. At the same time, there
played out a long struggle between the power centres of the state and the church. From
about the 4th to the 19th century ad, representatives of the secular state authority all tended
to lend direct or indirect support to a system in which one (‘the true’) version of Christian-
ity enjoyed a religious monopoly. Religious uniformity and conformity, especially where it
coincided with the territorial authority of the state, was considered to be in the interest of
the state and its subjects and to reinforce internal order and stability. In this way, the state
was supported and legitimised by the established religious authorities, which also bene-
fited from the unity of doctrine and religious community. This found expression not only
in laws based on religious principles, but also in the institutional entanglement of religion
and state (Sunier 2004). When confronted with religious divisions among the populace
(because of religious splinter groups, territorial shifts, migrations, etc.) the state in the
early modern period usually reacted in one of three ways; either to suppress those oppos-
ing religious views which the church defined as ‘heretical’, or to distance itself from the
established religious church order and shift towards the deviant religious community, or to
tolerate (or ignore) deviant religious interpretations. Before the 19th century, complete reli-
gious tolerance, neutrality or complete suppression rarely occurred, probably because the
Reformation had left a legacy of a deep-rooted fear of revolts and civil wars. It is notable
that the multi-denominational countries of present-day Europe practice all these strate-
gies, partially at any rate, including elements of suppression (as in the case of radical sectar-
ian groups labelled as potentially violent, also towards the state). The legacy of conflicts
between churches and sectarian groups, and the alternating struggles and cooperation
among church, state and nation helps explain the sensitivity in many European countries
of issues concerning church-state relations.
The legacy of schisms which have divided Europe into north, south, east and west is still
apparent in post-1990 reunited Europe. The World Christian Encyclopaedia (2001) distin-
guishes cultural areas with zones where (combinations of) Roman Catholic, Anglican,
Calvinist, Protestant, Lutheran, Orthodox, Armenian and Muslim communities live. The
mono-denominational cultural zones, which include the Lutheran north, the Roman
Catholic south and the Orthodox east, embrace over 406 million of the approximately 681
million European citizens (Madeley 2003).
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Classifications 
Numerous systems exist to classify the relation between church and state in the different
European countries. Following Barrett et al., on the basis of formal legal criteria and
perceived existing connections Madeley (2003) discerns three categories: 
• states which promote (one) religion or religious institutions (‘religious’),
• states which neither promote nor discourage religion (‘secular’), and 
• states which suppress religion (‘atheist’). 
According to this classification, in 1980 no less than 22 of the in total 35 European states
fell into the first category (the Vatican, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, West-Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Monaco, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Andorra, Portugal, England, Scotland, Italy, Malta, Ireland and Cyprus). Only five
states fell into the second, secular group (Austria, the Netherlands, San Marino, France
and Turkey) while nine were classified as ‘atheist’ (Yugoslavia, the former German Demo-
cratic Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the ussr and 
Albania). However, most of the then communist states granted a special status to specific
religious traditions, especially those considered historically closely associated with the
nation-state. In Bulgaria, for example, even under communism a law continued to exist
that stated: “The Bulgarian Orthodox Church is the traditional faith of the Bulgarian
people. It is bound up with their history and, as such, its nature and its spirit can be
considered a church of the popular democracy” (Madeley 2003). At the same time,
however, the state and the communist party closely monitored religious institutions and
activities. 
A comparable classification of the relationship between church and state, undertaken in
2000 (covering a total 48 European states) found that 30 states belonged to the first cate-
gory. This increase was due primarily to the ‘transfer’ of former communist countries and
the recently independent states in Central and Eastern Europe from the category of ‘athe-
ist’ to the other two categories. As a result, the secular category leapt from 5 to 17 states,
whilst states justifying the catagorisation ‘atheistic’ disappeared entirely. Interestingly,
the state control of religion in the latter countries was dismantled and, in most cases,
made room for state support, either by means of financing the reconstruction or building
of churches or by making public revenues available to recognised religious societies.
Religious communities, subsidiarity and eu decision-making 
The growing significance of eu legislation increasingly attracts various philosophical
movements, such as religious denominations and humanist organisations, into the Brus-
sels political arena. This leads to the familiar pattern of ‘Europeanisation’ and mutual
competition (wrr 2003a). On the one hand, many religious organisations attempt to
safeguard their own national church-state model from European legislation, while on the
other, they search out formal and informal methods to propagate their own, preferred
(national), model at a European level, or at least to make sure, at that level, that people
know they exist. 
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Formally, European institutions have no role in the relationship between church and state,
since they fall under the so-called subsidiarity principle. This had already been established
in the separate (not legally binding) Declaration 11 of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which
states: “The European Union respects and does not prejudice the status under national law
of churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States. The European
Union equally respects the status of philosophical and non-confessional organisations”
(European Union, Official Journal C 340 of 10 November 1997).
During the preparation of the Treaty, a Commission of Experts of the Bishops’ Conferences
of the eu (comece) and the Church and Society Commission of the Council of European
Churches (cec) failed in an attempt to include a statement to the effect that the particular
model for church-state relations in each member state forms part of ‘the own identity’.
They were more successful, however, in getting Declaration 11 accepted into article I-51 of
the new European constitution. Moreover, par. 3 added the provision: “Recognising their
identity and their specific contribution, the Union shall maintain an open, transparent and
regular dialogue with these churches and organisations” (Provisional consolidated version
of the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 2004). 
Informally, the most successful religious groups are either those that utilise so-called
concordats (formulating special rights, social roles etc.) or those belonging to state
churches or having for some time enjoyed recognition by a member state. The cec and
comece are, for example, are invited to the tripartite talks with the European Council that
precede the half-yearly rotation of the European Presidency. Partly because of this and
also because they maintain a staff in Brussels and are fed information from concordat
countries like Germany, the cec and comece have an advantage in ways and means over,
for example, Islamic and humanist groups. The European Humanistic Federation has
recently become more active in lobbying in Brussels and has employed some staff, while
the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Catholic Church opened offices in Brus-
sels in 2002 and 2003, respectively. In addition to the European Council and member
states, religious groups also engage in an informal, more diffuse dialogue with the Euro-
pean Commission and a six-monthly meeting with the Forward Studies Unit, the think
tank of the president of the Commission. These dialogues allow for more space for other
groups, as Muslims, Protestant minorities, Buddhists, Hindus, Scientologists, etc.
(Massignon 2003).
Sociologists of religion have developed typologies of institutional and
governmental arrangements, which enable a better understanding of the
diverse patterns of relations between state, society and religion that have
emerged over time. One typology, developed by Bader, identifies four
dimensions of state intervention in religion:
1 the constitutional, legal, administrative, political and cultural links
between church and state;
2 the goals of the state in religious questions;
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3 the divergent powers (legislative, judiciary and executive) and adminis-
trative levels (federal, state, local);
4 the policy on areas other than those directly related to religion (Bader
2003b: 61-64).
The constitutional links concern the rules on religious freedoms and the
degree to which an established state church, with state obligations
embodied in a constitution, can be said to exist. These obligations may
include appointing or recognising church leaders, paying the salaries of
church officials and collecting taxes destined for the church. The legal and
administrative links range from the general but limited to the highly
specific but comprehensive, depending on the state’s goals. States have
the ability alternatively to suppress, tolerate, protect or actively promote
(certain) religions and have a variety of political instruments at their
disposal (see text box 2.1). For example, most European states offer
special legal or administrative dispensations on the basis of religious
convictions. These include the right to refuse military service, the right to
discriminate against women and homosexuals on the grounds of religion,
and exemptions from Sunday trading laws and building regulations, etc.
They also often grant specific privileges, such as subsidies to religious
organisations, groups and schools. In brief, a state deals with religious
freedoms in different ways, which results in different balances between
competing interests of individual and collective religious autonomy, free-
dom and non-discrimination. Recent developments in immigration,
secularisation, individualisation and the emergence of new denomina-
tions, however, have all forced states to become increasingly pluralistic
and to search for new arrangements between state, society and religious
(minority) groups.
The formal constitutional or legal recognition by the state of a specific reli-
gion or religious community is no guarantee that its members can actually
establish themselves as a congregation – they may encounter local adminis-
trative or political hurdles. For example, in Belgium Islamic worship has
been recognised since 1974. A Royal Decree called for “…the institution of
(provincial) committees charged with managing the temporal affairs of
recognised Islamic communities” (Waardenburg 2001: 48). Because these
committees never got off the ground and because the Muslims themselves
long contested that state-recognised national body of Muslims as their
representative, actual recognition came only in 1998 in the form of
compulsory state funding of Muslim worship. Conversely, the absence of
formal constitutional or legal recognition does not necessarily mean that
actual institutional, political of cultural development is hindered. In the
Netherlands, for example, even after the 1983 constitutional changes
formally severing the financial ties between church and state, various
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subsidy schemes for prayer areas and Muslim services were nevertheless
established, within the framework of the country’s integration policy.
Since, formally, religious activities may not be subsidised, such subsidies
are pragmatically labelled as social and cultural (Waardenburg 2001: 30;
Sunier 2004). One exception to this rule is the right to special education,
guaranteed in article 23 of the constitution, which protects state funding of
religiously-based education. England does not even have a legal statute
and, as a result, no church other than the Church of England can receive
formal recognition or subsidies. Nevertheless, since the 1980s, many
Islamic prayer-rooms have been registered as charitable organisations,
enabling them to qualify for certain tax benefits. These charity benefits are
also used by countless Islamic socio-cultural institutions and festivals. In
England, however, the establishment of Islamic schools has encountered
more problems than in the Netherlands because of greater local political
resistance (Waardenburg 2001: 63-69).
In Germany, too, the institutionalisation of other religions sometimes
encounters problems. In principle, the state views churches in a positive
light, but it attempts to retain strict neutrality among different religions.
Religious communities that have a permanent character and enjoy public-
law status have the right, enshrined in the constitution, to a church tax
imposed by the state. Moreover, the state can subsidise churches for social
and cultural activities. Efforts by Muslim organisations to obtain this
public-law status, however, have encountered great difficulties. In addition
to the difficulty of proving that they are indeed representative (a problem
also experienced in Belgium and the Netherlands), Muslim organisations
also face political opposition on formal grounds. Some German authorities
use the argument that Muslim migrants are by definition temporarily pres-
ent in the country to deny the permanent character of Muslim organisa-
tions. Other opponents reason that Muslim discrimination against women
is unconstitutional and, therefore, that formal recognition cannot be
granted (Waardenburg 2001: 54-62). Even when the central government
attempts to remain as neutral as possible, decisions involving privileges,
subsidies, taxes, building permits, etc. will also usually, if indirectly, flow
over into the political arena and influence political debate.
Using the four typologies described above, and taking the degree of reli-
gious pluralism into account, it is laicist France that best conforms to the
pure model of separation of church and state.8 As will become clear in
chapter 3, notwithstanding some differences, there are interesting similari-
ties between Turkish and French laicism. French laicism still has the scars
of long and bitter conflicts between the state and its religious communities.
Since the Middle Ages, Jews have endured pogroms and exile; in the 16th
and 17th centuries, Protestants were persecuted and even expelled
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(St. Bartholomew’s Night and the Edict of Nantes, respectively), while,
after the French Revolution, Catholics were severely persecuted as ‘hered-
itary enemies of the Enlightenment’. The Congregation Act (1903) only
recognised religious communities after they had applied for a compulsory
licence, that had to be approved by the French parliament. The Jesuit Order
refused to apply, on the grounds that God and not the French parliament
constituted the highest authority. As a result, for many decades, Jesuit
education was not offered in France. Since 1905, there has been legal,
administrative, political and cultural separation of church and state and the
state observes strict neutrality. Religious pluralism formally exists exclu-
sively in the private sphere and the civic domain of civil society, not in the
state. The latter guarantees freedom of religion and conscience and free-
dom to worship, formally without recognising, funding or subsidising reli-
gious services. There is, however, also a formal control-function entrusted
to the Prime Minister, who (except in Alsace-Lorraine) has the right to
propose cardinals and bishops, though the final appointment is left to the
Vatican (Le Goff & Rémond 1992). Nevertheless, for decades now, France
has been unable to avoid the de facto intrusion of pluralism into the public
sphere, though the state has primarily accommodated it as part of its
cultural policy.9 With the influx of large groups of Muslims, however, the
spectre of France’s turbulent past has again surfaced. At the end of 2003,
the so-called Stasi Commission recommended banning ostentatious reli-
gious symbols in public buildings. This move, though controversial, was
supported by numerous, also religious, groups, who viewd this exercise 
of strict ‘neutrality’ as a safeguard for peace, order and religious freedom
(Le Monde 12-12-2003). As one foreign commentator recently observed:
“one must realize that a militantly secular and neutral French republic is
perceived by most citizens as the only possible response to a long and
tormented French past, rife with religious tragedy, a story in which Islam is
simply the latest arrival” (International Herald Tribune 7-1-2004).10
Like France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, and Germany have no
state church, but unlike France, they do support religious pluralism in an
administrative, political, cultural and, to a lesser extent, legal sense (for
example, through family law). They recognise and encourage diverse reli-
gious organisations and try to draw them into the administrative, political
and cultural domain, by means of (often decentralised) negotiations, the
provision of information and the creation of advisory bodies. Norway,
Denmark, Finland, England and Scotland combine a relatively weak state
church with a limited degree of administrative, political and cultural
pluralism. They do not accommodate pluralism, either in a fundamental or
a legal sense, but instead employ a pragmatic approach to demands to insti-
tutionalise different religions. The new and candidate eu member states
further increase the diversity of traditions and regulations in Europe.
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Although their systems differ widely amongst themselves, in conformity
with the political Copenhagen criterion, they have all enshrined freedom
of religion in their constitutions. Even so, it is inevitable that, in practice,
these countries afford a certain privileged treatment to the traditional reli-
gious communities. Several countries, including Bulgaria, Romania and
Lithuania, go even further and exercise a deliberate policy to employ the
dominant religion to bind and build the nation (u.s. Department of State
2002; Jubilee Campaign 2003).
2.4 conclusion
According to the principles of the Treaties, the eu is a union founded on
the political and civic values of the democratic constitutional state. It is
emphatically not a union whose (potential) members subscribe to specific
cultural-historical or religious values. All the same, its political-civic union
of values assumes the existence of a state that guarantees the autonomy of
church and state and protects general religious freedoms and rights. How
this autonomy and protection are implemented, and the exact status of
religion, varies widely in practice from country to country. The real posi-
tion of religion in Europe, therefore, cannot easily be defined, whether
employing the minimum conditions of ‘the’ secular European constitu-
tional state, or employing the standard concepts of the still-popular
modernisation theory. This theory suggests that all modern European
states have followed more or less similar development trajectories, all of
which resulted inevitably in the privatisation of faith, far-reaching secular-
isation and the complete separation of church and state. The reality is that
European countries demonstrate divergent, historically determined rela-
tionships between religion, church, state and society, coupled with equally
diverse legal, institutional and political arrangements. 
What all this implies, is that there is no unambiguous, fixed European
standard against which the current situation in Turkey can be measured.
Nor are there any a priori reasons to assume that Turkey would, or would
not conform with any of the available European development models.
Furthermore none of these models and none of the situations are
immutable. Changes, either endogenous or exogenous, as the arrival of
new minority groups or the rise and decline of membership of different
churches, will force the state to look again for a reasonable balance among
the diverse interests and values that exist in a democratic constitutional
state. For example, the state may have to reconsider the implications of the
existence of a dominant religious majority for the opportunities for devel-
opment of religious minorities. Similarly, freedom of conscience must be
balanced against equal treatment and equal opportunities, and the need to
protect the position of apostates must be weighed against the autonomy of
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the religious community. In short, there is every reason to examine the
position of Turkish Islam from an historical perspective and to place it in
the context of a dynamic equilibrium between state, politics and society.
This will be the subject of the following chapter.
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notes
1 A few examples may illustrate this. At the time of the Greco-Persian wars
(5th century bc) the word ‘Europe’ regularly appeared as a territorial
concept. It referred to an area to the north of the Greek states, inhabited by
‘barbarians’, and it was clearly distinguished from the Greek and ‘Asiatic’
Persian regions by language, customs and values (McCormick 2002: 31). 
On classical maps, the eastern border of Europe was delineated by the river
Don. In the heyday of the Roman Empire (200 bc-400 ad) a large part of
this ‘Europe’ was, for the first time, brought under a common administra-
tion, but the empire’s centre of gravity lay in the region of the Mediter-
ranean, including parts of North Africa and the Middle East.
2 The modified article 7 of the Treaty of Nice is as follows: 
1 “On a reasoned proposal by one-third of the MS [member states], by the 
European Parliament or by the Commission, the Council, acting by a
majority of four fifth of its members after obtaining the assent of the
European Parliament, may determine that there is a clear risk of a seri-
ous breach by a Member State of the principles of liberty, democracy,
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law
(Art. 6, par. 1 eu), and address appropriate recommendations to that
State. Before making such a determination, the Council shall hear the
MS in question and acting in accordance with the same procedure, may
call on independent persons to submit within a reasonable time limit a
report on the situation in the MS in question.”
The Council regularly checks whether the motivations for its finding are
still present.
2 The European Council, consisting of heads of state and government
leaders, can, unanimously, acting on the proposal of one-third of the
member states or of the Commission, and once the European Parliament
has consented, diagnose a grave and ongoing violation of the principles
stated in Article 6, par. 1, by a member state, after having requested the
member state in question to submit its reactions.
3 When this has been determined, under paragraph 2, the Council, acting
with a qualified majority, may suspend certain rights deriving from the
application of this Treaty to the member state in question, including the
voting rights of the representative of the government of that member
state in the Council. In doing so, the Council shall take into account the
possible consequences of such a suspension, upon the rights and obliga-
tions of natural and legal persons.
The obligations of the member state in question arising from the Treaty
shall continue to be binding on that member state. 
4 The Council, acting on a qualified majority, may decide subsequently to
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modify or revoke measures taken through paragraph 3, in response to
changes in the situation that led to their being imposed.
5 For the purposes of this article, the Council shall act without taking into
account the vote of the member state in question. Abstentions by
members present, either in person or represented, shall not prevent the
adoption of decisions referred to in paragraph 2. A qualified majority is
described as the same share of weighted votes of the members of the
Council in question as laid down in article 205, par. 2, of the Treaty
establishing the European Community.
This paragraph shall also apply in the event of voting rights being
suspended pursuant to paragraph 3.
6 For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2, the European Parliament shall act
by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, representing a majority of its
members.” 
3 However, it is a condition that the member states agree on what a ‘serious
breach’ entails.
4 This also results from the obligations in article 9 of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights (1951) in respect to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion: “1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and
freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or
private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and
observance. 2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of
public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and free-
doms of others” (European Union, Official Journal C 80 0f 10 March 2001).
5 The outcomes of these four historical processes can be characterised, in
line with Bader (2003b: 58), as: 1. complete monopoly: all Catholic or
Orthodox member states; 2. duopoly or segmented pluralism: Protestant
states with a substantial Catholic minority (60-40 per cent); 3. qualified
pluralism: more pluralist; competition exists between the established
church and a substantial group of ‘dissident communities’, both outside
and inside the state church; 4. complete pluralism: full competition among
all religious communities.
6 In the Netherlands, the very first parliament, the National Assembly,
proclaimed in 1796: “We shall not tolerate any privileged or ruling Church
in the Netherlands.” The constitution of 1848 finally terminated the
constitutional privileges of the Dutch Reformed Church and, in 1871, the
Ministry of Worship was dissolved. A subsequent constitutional amend-
ment in 1917 and the Education Act of 1920 granted a large measure of
autonomy to religious communities. The 1983 constitutional reform
severed the financial ties between the state and the churches (including the
payment of religious functionaries) (Sunier 2004).
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7 The extent of the legacy of the state church in England only became clear to
most English in 2002. On the eve of Queen Elizabeth II’s golden jubilee,
The Guardian newspaper launched a campaign to repeal or amend the 1701
Act of Settlement, according to which only Protestant heirs of princess
Sofia of Hanover could ascend the throne. Repealing this Act proved to be a
complex matter, since it involved eight other, related, acts as well as the
comparable legislation of at least 15 Commonwealth countries (Madeley, to
be published). 
That same year, a successor for the Archbishop of Canterbury also had to be
found. According to law, the Prime Minister should appoint one of the two
candidates nominated by the Crown Appointments Committee. The
appointment itself is done by the Queen, who, in her capacity as head of
the church, had sworn to uphold the Protestant state religion of England
when she was crowned. Once elected, the Archbishop must take his place
in the House of Lords alongside the other 25 bishops (the Lords Spiritual).
England had only given the echr a legal basis in 1998, but this now
implied that that the discrimination on grounds of religion embodied in
the Act of Settlement was no longer legal. The Guardian described the Act
of Settlement as “part of the complex web of arcane legislation that binds
the monarch to and government with the Church of England,” and saw the
1998 legislation as a possible step towards abolishing the state church.
However, some bishops including the out-going Archbishop, called the
state church “an essential bulwark of British society” (quoted in: Madeley,
forthcoming). These examples of the entanglement of church and state
could easily be considered somewhat eccentric expressions of the English
love of tradition. However, elsewhere in Europe, the relationship between
religious institutions, state and society – in all its variants – is also firmly
on the political agenda.
8 The French Stasi Commission sees the concept of laïcité as based on three
inextricably related values: freedom of conscience, equal rights in the spiri-
tual and religious domain and neutrality of political power. In the words of
the Commission: “L’égalité en droit prohibe toute discrimination ou
contrainte et l’Etat ne privilégie aucune option. Enfin le pouvoir politique
reconnaît ses limites en s’abstenant de toute immixtion dans le domaine
spirituel ou religieux. La laïcité traduit ainsi une conception du bien
commun. Pour que chaque citoyen puisse se reconnaître dans la
République, elle soustrait le pouvoir politique à l’influence dominante de
toute option spirituelle ou religieuse, afin de pouvoir vivre ensemble.” See
also: http://www.laic.info/Members/webmestre/ Folder.2003-09-
11.4517/rapport-stasi.pdf.
9 As associations culturelles, for example, religious communities can enjoy
certain tax benefits and qualify for subsidies (Waardenburg 2001: 71).
10 The conclusions of the Stasi Commission not only led to heated discus-
sions in France, but also in other eu countries like the Netherlands. The
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French embassy in The Hague felt this was sufficient reason to discuss the
theme on its own website, under the title: “Debate about laïcité:
Frequently Asked Questions.”
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3 turkish isl am and the european union
3.1 introduction
Many arguments against Turkish eu membership assume that ‘Islam’ and
‘Europe’ are two different entities that are historically only distantly
related. Such arguments usually see Muslims as a new group of postwar
immigrants and their immediate descendants, who have increasingly
appeared as adherents of Islamic fundamentalism. Such views embrace
crude generalisations, in which the West and Islam are synonymous for
separate civilisations that are basically incompatible. According to Samuel
Huntington (1993, 1996), it is exactly between these two ‘civilisation
blocs’ that armed conflicts will increasingly occur. His hypothesis
confirms the characterisation of Muslims as a single group of traditional
and possibly fundamentalist believers, antagonistic to the West. Islam
appears as an antidemocratic religion, opposing, among other things, the
separation of the state and religion. Muslims would like nothing better
than to reverse this separation wherever it exists, and to introduce the
shari’a, the Islamic law. From the perspective of this ‘clash of civilisa-
tions’, a Muslim country like Turkey can never be part of the eu, at whose
core lie the values of democracy, respect for universal human rights and
the rule of law.
This chapter examines how, since the founding of the modern state, Turkey
has interpreted the secular democratic constitutional state, both formally
and actually. It begins by examining how far the secular state is historically
embedded in Turkey (section 3.2). It then explores how, since the 1950s, the
Turkish state has dealt with the rise of explicitly Islamic political move-
ments (section 3.3), as well as the attitude of Turkish state-Islam towards
the freedom of religion (section 3.4). Finally, the chapter explores the rela-
tionship between, political Islam and, in turn, democracy, human rights
and violence (sections 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 respectively).
3.2 the secul ar state: historical foundations
Historically, the area we now regard as Europe has virtually always been
home to Muslims. There has been a century-long Muslim presence in
Greece, and for long periods the Ottoman Empire occupied an area most
people now regard as European territory. Europe’s relationship with the
Ottoman Empire, with present-day Turkey at its centre, was marked by
long intervals of hostility and warfare. These form the basis of Europe’s
deep-rooted hostile image of Islam, an image that, incidentally, reinforced
the construction of Europe’s own identity (Zemni 2002). However, the
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relationship was equally marked by periods of mutual cooperation and
reciprocal influence.
In many ways, the present Republic of Turkey serves as testament to this
European influence, to which it has explicitly opened itself since the foun-
dation of the modern state. Protecting the state from religious interfer-
ence is pursued almost as rigorously in Turkey as it is in France, which
reconfirmed its role as undisputed European champion of laïcité in the
beginning of 2004 by banning ‘ostentatious religious symbols’ in public
education. The French model of laicism, that completely insulates the
institutions of the state from religious influence, served, to some extent, 
as a blueprint for Turkey, and this has often translated itself into similar
standpoints, such as banning headscarves in government buildings and at
public functions.
The protection of the state from religious influence is so strict, that the
European Parliament has urged the Turkish government to adopt “a more
relaxed attitude towards Islam and religion in general” in order to reduce
intolerance and violent religious extremism (European Parliament 2003).
Here indeed lies a paradox where the secular Union demands that the
government of a Muslim country adopt a less laicist stance. The countering
of religious influence on the state in Turkey, however, goes much further
than it does in most eu member states. Indeed, secularism has gone so far
that it appears as though Islam is subordinated to the state. It is almost the
inverse of a theocratic state, where the public sphere is subordinated to the
religious authority. Ironically, it is this theocratic model, currently prac-
ticed in Iran, which the West considers the primary problem of political
Islam.
The present Turkish government, led by a party of Islamic persuasion, is
strongly in favour of eu membership, not least because it sees the Union as
a guarantor of the religious freedoms against the state and the army (see
below). It supports the eu’s demand for a more relaxed attitude towards
Islam, but it has to tread cautiously. It has to take account of anti-Islam
sentiments prevalent among eu citizens, and maybe also their govern-
ments, as well as those of the Turkish establishment, especially in the state
apparatus, the military and the judiciary. The practice of the separation of
state and religion, cherished by that establishment, goes back a long way.
The secular character of the state also enjoys wide acceptance. However, as
will be shown below, controversies especially over the social and political
role of Islam still occur. 
The so-called Kemalist state ideology of Turkey is based on the philoso-
phies developed by Mustafa Kemal Pasja (later Atatürk), the first president
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of the Republic of Turkey (1923-1938). His ambition was to modernise the
nation and, thereby, launch Turkey into mainstream Western culture. It
was not that he was anti-Islam, but he viewed ‘true Islam’ as a rational and
natural religion. Individual believers needed no mediation between man
and God. Following this logic, Atatürk, viewed religious institutes as the
caliphate (administration of the Muslim community) and the ulema (reli-
gious scholars) as obstacles to this end; he abolished the former and placed
the latter under state control. Movements operating outside the state’s
control, such as the popular mystic Sufi orders, were prohibited. Family
law, the only area of law at the time still based on the sharia , was abolished
and reformed along the lines of the Swiss civil code. Constitutionally,
Turkey became a secular state and Atatürk gave it a central role in the coun-
try’s modernisation. After the Second World War, the military would
increasingly usurp this role. The modernisation mission, which was resis-
ted by parts of the population, also assumed the nature of a cultural offen-
sive. This involved the banning of Islamic symbols, including the tradi-
tional headdress of women and men, from public life, and the closure of
training centres for clergy and of the theological faculty.
In their study, Zürcher and Van der Linden point out that this secularisa-
tion did not begin in the 1920s with Atatürk. Rather, these reforms formed
the conclusion of almost a century of secularisation of state institutions.
Nor can we characterise the pre-reform situation as a theocracy, though
that remained the ideal among Islamic legal scholars of the time. While still
officially considered Islamic, in practice the Ottoman state had, of old, a
secular administration. Moreover, the Islamic legal system itself had only a
limited scope and was mainly concerned with family law and contract law.
The administration of the vast Ottoman empire obviously required afar
wider scope of legislation than this. The ulema’s only task was to check
that these other rules conformed to religious law. The ulema’s main func-
tion, therefore, was to provide a religious legitimisation for policy. Islam
was thus a cultural and political bridge between the state elite and the mass
of the population. This double-sided nature of the Ottoman Empire, the
decision-making autonomy of the sovereign and its religious legitimisa-
tion, sparked a modernisation movement already in the 19th century. After
a series of setbacks, the state institutions were modernised on the Euro-
pean model, with new codes of law, new courts etc. France, in particular,
served as a model, and these innovations were designed on laicist princi-
ples. The Ottoman Empire began to transmute into a modern state.
Although modernisation was still accompanied by explicit references to
religious law, in reality an elite emerged with a materialistic, scientific and
secularised worldview.
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In 1848, as elsewhere in Europe, the principle of the (divine) sovereignty of
the ruler came into dispute. These controversies also involved the search
for new forms of legitimacy, including nationalism (‘Osmanism’) and
democracy (and citizenship). In 1876, the first constitution was agreed, and
elections were held for the first Ottoman parliament, which guaranteed a
proportional number of seats for the non-Muslims who comprised 40 per
cent of the Empire’s population. Incidentally, the timing of these develop-
ments towards democracy more or less mirrored that of large parts of
Western Europe. The constitution made no mention of state religion, and
although Islam-inspired arguments were used in parliamentary debates,
the core message remained: democracy is inherent in Islam.
After the Ottoman defeat by Russia, the Berlin peace treaty (1878) required
the Empire to relinquish territory, with the result that the share of the
Muslim population in the remaining territory steadily increased. The
earlier political liberalisation now faced an ideological backlash, designed
to create a new identity among the Muslim citizens, and to add a new
mystique and authority to the sultanate. This new nationalism, coloured
with strong religious tints, mobilised Islam as a social cement and as a
means of reinforcing state power. It resulted, under sultan Abdülhamit II
(1876-1909), in far-reaching state intervention in the contents and propa-
gation of religion. The state also assumed new responsibilities in educa-
tion, communication and transport. Zürcher and Van der Linden see this
period as extremely important in shaping views on the role of the state,
which would later carry over into the creation of the Republic.
The revolution of 1908 by the ‘Young Turks’ witnessed the restoration of
the constitution and parliament and the end of the sultanate. In substance,
however, the national revival envisaged by the Young Turks represented a
continuation of Abdülhamit II’s ideology. It, too, aimed at enhanced state
power, centralisation and standardisation, using the Islamic identity as a
social cement for the population. This emphasis on Islam in the nationalist
ideology was further reinforced by the Balkan war, in which the Ottoman
Empire was attacked by four Christian Balkan states. The Young Turks
propagated a modern Islam with an open attitude towards science; an
Islam purged of the superstition of the Sufi sheiks and the conservatism of
the ulema. Numerous measures were introduced to reduce the role of reli-
gious institutions in education, law and hospitals, and to replace these by
increasing state control. Atatürk and his supporters belonged to the radical
wing of the Young Turks. The Kemalist movement they developed, built on
and advanced the programme of the Young Turks, and the founding of the
Turkish Republic in 1923 gave them the opportunity to put these ideas into
practice.
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Until the Second World War, measures gradually promoting secularisation
and efforts at state and nation building, were all imposed from above. They
proved particularly popular among the urban population. However, the
new power centres could not afford to ignore Islam. After all, Islam was
embedded in the beliefs and vocabulary of an increasingly Muslim popula-
tion (the consequence of territorial losses and population swaps after the
Balkan Wars). Even so, it was always the needs of the state that controlled
the institutional framework and determined the political role that Islam
could or should play. This hierarchical and paternalistic ordering of society,
and the enforced modernisation it enacted, found counterparts in Western
Europe between the wars.
Samuel Huntington (1996: 91-3) characterises Turkey’s assimilation of
European (especially French) political ideas, such as the separation of spiri-
tual and worldy power, as borrowing, thus implying that they lack depth
and internalisation. In his eyes, such political institutions are alien to
Turkey, and therefore less well-embedded than those in Western Europe.
Our historical sketch above, however, observes that, on those issues essen-
tial for eu membership, there are important similarities with Europe, and
sometimes almost parallel developments in Turkey and Europe. The fading
power of the sovereign, the rolling back of the influence of religious insti-
tutions over the state, the changing forms of legitimising of the power
centre, the continued influence of the legacy of the French Revolution and
the Napoleonic era, the emergence of democracy – all these processes have
also occurred in Turkey, not significantly later than in Western European
states. It is true that Turkey copied much from Western Europe, from
countries such as Switzerland, Belgium, Germany, Italy and especially
from France (Koçak 2003). This is hardly surprising since Western Europe
included most of the then world powers. Just as the United States today, so
in the 19th century European powers formed the obvious points of refer-
ence. France was a major source of inspiration on constitutional questions
for many countries, besides Turkey. The Netherlands, for example, based
its own constitution on both German and French models and ‘imitated’
many French laws and institutions, and this ‘borrowing’ has not dimin-
ished their internalisation. The same applies equally to Turkey (see Zürcher
and Van der Linden this volume). 
3.3 secul ar state and political isl am
After the Second World War, the Kemalist top-down model of cultural
and political modernisation, in which Islam was marginalized as a reac-
tionary bulwark, made way for a model that allowed more scope for
bottom-up influence. Partly through fear of the communist Soviet Union
and partly under American influence, in 1946 Turkey turned to the demo-
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cratic path and introduced multi-party democracy. The many rural voters,
barely touched by Kemalist modernisation, now became a relevant factor;
so too did the opponents of Atatürk’s authoritarian de-Islamization in
political and public life (Erdogˇan 1999). Initially this brought to power
non-religious political parties, who were more tolerant towards Islam, and
the government took steps to reintroduce Islamic education at schools,
establish courses for preachers, allow the call to prayer to be made in
Arabic, etc. These changes were viewed with great suspicion by the Kemal-
ists and by the army, which after 1960 began increasingly to see itself as the
guardian of Atatürk’s legacy (Yesilkagit 1997). Heavily seeped in a faith in
state sovereignty, they both had difficulty accepting the possible conse-
quences of popular sovereignty. However, neither the non-religious
Democratic Party nor its successor, the equally non-religious Justice Party,
questioned the secular nature of the state control of mosques and muftis
(advisors on matters of faith). Zürcher and Van der Linden suggest that the
postwar period has seen two opposing interpretations of secularism: the
Kemalist vision which saw secularism as a safeguard for freedom of
thought against Islam, and a more neutral secularism that wanted to
protect the state from religious influence, but expected the state to respect
freedom of religion. In the words of Süleyman Demirel of the Justice Party:
the state should be secular, but this does not mean that the individual
should be as well.
Since the 1960s, a political movement has been emerging that is explicitly
based on Islamic principles. This new phenomenon was not so much a
reflection of greater piety as a result of socio-economic developments
(Zürcher and Van der Linden, this volume). It is hardly a surprise that this
movement appeared on the political stage as soon as the democratic system
gave it the opportunity to do so (also see Erdogˇan 1999). The movement, in
which Necmettin Erbakan played a central role, articulated the ideals of
small entrepreneurs and traditionally-minded citizens who, unlike the
workers and industrialists, considered themselves unrepresented in the
existing political spectrum. The Islamic elements of its political program-
me (the ‘National Vision’, or Milli Görüs¸) concentrated on strengthening
ethics and morals in education and upbringing, fighting usury and corrup-
tion, abolishing articles in the constitution and criminal law that penalised
the political use of religion, and freeing religion from state control. The
Kemalist principle of equal rights for men and women – such as the voting
rights for women, dating from 1934, and equal rights regarding education
and employment – was left untouched. State secularism was accepted as
the point of departure; freedom of conscience and expression were seen as
the basis for democracy and human rights.
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Like the other religiously-inspired parties, Erbakan’s party was banned
during the 1980 military coup. The establishment still harboured the
notion that this more ‘populist’ Islam represented an anti-modernist and
anti-secular force. The junta launched an ideological offensive to immunise
the entire population against radical Islamic movements (those not
controlled by the state) and to immunise the youth against socialism. The
major tool in this offensive was Turkish nationalism; Islam was seen as
only one component of the Turkish identity, though an important one. The
junta had picked up some of its ideas from another movement, the ‘Turk-
ish-Islamic Synthesis’, which was established in response to the leftist
climate of the 1960s. In the period before 1995, this movement became
very influential. Its supporters came from various conservative parties,
particularly from the Nationalist Action Party which had a strong appeal
among impoverished youth of the ghettos and which had also been banned
in 1980. The ideological offensive stressed Turkish identity, unity and
harmony, and military and authoritarian values. It presented Islam as an
‘enlightened’ religion, open towards science and technology. The Direc-
torate of Religious Affairs, the Diyanet, was entrusted with protecting and
propagating this state-Islam as central to Turkish national identity. Not
surprisingly, following the coup, many adherents of the Turkish-Islamic
Synthesis landed in important positions, especially in the educational and
cultural sectors.
The Welfare Party, relaunched by Erbakan as an Islamic party in 1983, broke
through in the elections of 1994 and 1995. Ironically, the Islamic politics of
the junta itself probably prepared the path for its success. The party’s
supporters were found mainly among the local shopkeepers and traders,
the affluent Anatolian entrepreneurial class of the provincial towns (whose
numbers had grown rapidly as a result of economic liberalisation) and the
migrants that moved to the big cities in ever-increasing numbers in the
1980s and 1990s. Because of the state’s inability to offer these migrants
essential services, they had to rely on private networks, particularly the
mystic brotherhoods active in the cities, which were officially banned. A
new military coup resulted in Erbakan’s fall in 1997 and the outlawing of
his party. The party resurfaced as the Virtue Party, but it had little success
and fared badly in the 1999 elections before it was also banned in 2001. It
almost immediately bounced back as the Felicity Party, with an extremely
religious programme, a strong emphasis on conservative values and stan-
dards and the intention to Islamise education. The party was soon split,
however, because the younger members wanted far less emphasis on reli-
gion and because a separate party might increase their chances of being
accepted as a governing party by the military and other sectors of the 
state apparatus. It might also increase their acceptability to the voters, 
since various elections had shown a majority against a strongly religious
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programme. The new Justice and Development Party (ak Party), estab-
lished in 2001, presented itself as a broad conservative party, with respect
for Islamic values and standards but without an explicitly religious
programme. The party won by such a large majority in 2002 that, for the
first time since World War II, a single-party government was formed. 
The government was accepted by the military, although its work is still
viewed with apprehension. 
One noticeable aspect of the history of Turkish political parties is that even
the Islamic political formations that shared the Turkish political landscape
in recent decades also favoured the principle of separation of the state and
religion, though they did advocate, and in the case of the current ak
government allow, more freedom of religion than Kemalists would counte-
nance. The confrontations between the state apparatus, including the
army, on the one hand, and Islamic parties on the other, revolve around the
two interpretations of secularism, mentioned above: one where the state
has a dominance over religion and the other where both are autonomous
domains on an equal footing. The separation of the state and religion is a
broadly accepted facet of political life in Turkey, and its roots run deep, as
deep as those in most eu member states. Thus, contrary to Huntington’s
assumption, Turkish secularism appears fully embedded. There is no
reason for Europe to fear that political Islam aspires to placing religion
above the state, and certainly not in Turkey. It is true that there are Turkish-
Islamic movements in Turkey and other countries (Germany) that want to
establish a theocracy, but their support-base is miniscule (see section 3.7).
Europe’s fears may well reflect more its own history of Christian ambitions
towards the state. For example, the Roman-Catholic Church only decided
to accept the principle of separation of church and state after the Second
Vatican Council (1962-1965). 
3.4 state- isl am and freedom of religion
Despite the formal separation of state and religion and the constitutionally
guaranteed religious freedoms, the Turkish state, in practice, still exercises
a strong control over religion. This is a legacy of the Ottoman period,
although it reached its zenith in the heyday of Kemalism. Restrictions on,
and state intervention in the content of religion go further than what is
customary in eu member states. This explains why the eu is critically
monitoring freedom of religion in Turkey.
However desirable greater freedom of religion may be, one needs also to
consider the specific Turkish context. The incorporation of Turkish Islam
by the state was accelerated on two occasions: in the early 1920s and in
1982. In the 1920s, the last vestiges of Islamic influence on the state were
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abolished with the dismantling the ‘caliphate’ and the ‘seyhülislam’ (high-
est religious legal advisor). The latter was replaced by the Diyanet, with
wide-ranging powers over religious life, including managing mosques,
appointing preachers, offering instruction on the content of sermons and
suppressing brotherhoods etc. This made possible the secularisation of the
law and paved the way to a ‘popular edification’ focusing on modern Islam.
The 1980 military coup must be placed against the backdrop of the interna-
tional rise of fundamentalism, which the establishment feared might spill
over into Muslim Turkey. Islamic political parties were abolished, and in
1982 the Diyanet was constitutionally entrusted with the task of protecting
Turkish national identity. To counter undesirable Islamic influences, it was
to propagate the ‘correct’, Sunni, Islam through the mosques and compul-
sory classes on Islam, with a strong emphasis on ethics, human rights and
each citizen’s duties towards state and country.
From the current European perspective, these measures are indeed some-
what excessive. This also applies to the ban on Erbakan’s Welfare Party in
1998 (upheld, incidentally, by the European Court of Human Rights). Even
so, other European countries in the postwar period have also sometimes
considered banning parties (usually communist, racist or fascist parties)
that they considered a threat to democracy and the constitutional state.
Moreover, nothwithstanding the formal separation of church and state, eu
states also maintain privileged relations with respect to both finance and
content with certain denominations (see chapter 2) though none went so
far as the Diyanet. Nor, in the eu, is freedom of religion unlimited; fear of
sects, for example, occasionally results in a ban or refusal to grant a licence.
As described in chapter 2, the dogma of separation of church and state
permitted existing arrangements between the two to continue, though
their content differed from state to state, as did legal restrictions on the
freedom of religion. Turkey is, therefore, no exception in its desire to
protect its constitutional characteristics. One must concede, however, that
it is exceptional that state organs co-determine the content of the religious
message; the messengers themselves – the imams – are also civil servants.
Even in European states where a state church exists, such as the Anglican
Church in England and the Presbyterian Church in Scotland, it still remains
an autonomous institution with respect to content. In Sunni Islam, which
is the dominant religion in Turkey, there is no institution comparable to a
church. The Diyanet could be seen, therefore, as its functional equivalent
in the sense that administering religious personnel and effects is an impor-
tant function. Equally, although Turkey also goes further than Europe in
ensuring the ‘correctness’ of religious education, it should be remembered
that European states also maintain some controls, though in the form of a
tie between the cash flow and the (legal) conditions for receiving it. This
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can be supervised, because the religious communities in question are
legally accountable bodies. The absence of a similar institutionalised posi-
tion of religion in Turkey, means that there are no such bodies to which
powers and responsibilities can be transferred. In Sunni Islam, without a
body such as the Diyanet, every mosque would be fully autonomous in
practice.
The Diyanet includes representatives of traditional Islam and the more
modern Sunni Islam. One consequence is that the state-Islam that is prop-
agated by mosques and schools remains sufficiently flexible and realistic to
offer a safe middle path, but that it does not exactly radiate renewal. The
resulting message is a mixed appeal of social conservatism, human rights
and freedoms, patriotism and obedience to the state. From the state’s
perspective, it is a safe message that is guaranteed by its institutional posi-
tion. Similar safety is attained in Europe by tying church institutions that
lie outside its domain, to both various conditions and to statutory supervi-
sion. The historically determined links between the Diyanet and the state
have not served to prevent the emergence of alternative expressions of
Islam. The educational activities of the Süleymancis and the Fethullahcilar
are a good example of this. This plurality in practice has not yet been
formally recognised.
Given the increasing freedom of religion and the emergence of Islamic 
political parties, it is no surprise that the Diyanet’s position has come 
under discussion. This discussion has naturally spilled over onto the 
compulsory education in state-Islam and ethics at school, and the favour-
ing of certain denominations. Various participants have urged the state to
adopt a more neutral stance towards religion. The smaller Özgürlük ve
Demokrasi Partisi, for example, has questioned the constitutional position
of the Diyanet, and was disbanded for its pains (Koçak 2004). It is very 
difficult for the state apparatus to countenance changing the status of the
Diyanet, since it represents an important instrument in the control of Islam.
However, the incident has led to a decision, following a ruling of the Consti-
tutional Court, to scrap the legal provision for disbanding a party on the
grounds that it had challenged the position of the Diyanet (Koçak 2004).
Turkey’s eu membership would confront the Union with a state whose
historical development has left it with ties between religion and the state
that go further than those of any other member. This relationship is
unlikely to change much in the short term, but the longer term is a differ-
ent matter. As democratisation advances in Turkey, it will contribute to the
formal recognition of greater social plurality, including religious plurality.
This, in its turn, will have implications for the way in which the state inter-
venes in religion, and possibly even for the position of the Diyanet. As
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demonstrated by Zürcher and Van der Linden’s account of the so-called
‘pocket catechism’, part of the message is that Islam requires obedience to
the state. Further democratisation will undermine this Islamic legitimacy
for a strong state, and to contest state actions will be regarded as a normal
phenomenon. Democratisation will mean that society will acquire more
influence over the state through the political arena. This would allow the
Islam advanced by the Diyanet to aquire a more civil and individual charac-
ter. The Diyanet might even offer its facilities to other Islamic movements
and religions, giving it a new position, and one more independent of state
power. 
3.5 democr ac y and political isl am
It is not only the issue of the separation of religion and the state that fuels
the doubts in the eu on Turkish membership; the eu is also concerned
about the relationship of Islam to democracy in general. Turkey’s postwar
political history has been a turbulent one, and this is obviously not what
the Union is waiting for. The interventions of 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997
were all targeted at the manifestations of political Islam at the time. Politi-
cal Islam has clearly been an explosive factor in Turkish politics. But were
these Islamic parties a danger for democracy? Did they want to overthrow
democracy, or were they, on the contrary, manifestations of democracy?
As we have already shown, none of the successive Islamic political parties
has ever wanted to attack the secular character of the state. However, they
have advocated a different type of secularism than that contained in
Kemalist state ideology. Kemalist politicians considered the very existence
of religion as an attack on the foundations of the Turkish Republic. Islamic
political parties, by contrast, viewed democracy as based on freedom of
conscience, expression, religion and religious practice. None of them has
ever contested the value of democracy in their programmes and they have
always worked within the rules of the democratic constitutional state to
exert their influence. For example, Erbakan did not fight the banishment of
his Welfare Party in 1998 on the streets in the name of Allah, but in the
European Court of Human Rights (see Zürcher and Van der Linden). He
also accepted its decision that the ban was lawful. This suggests that the
problem of Turkey is not the antidemocratic or anti-human rights nature of
political Islam, but rather, the state’s fear of the consequences of democracy
(Yavuz 2003).
From the moment of political Islam’s emergence in the 1960s, it has
polarised the political debate in Turkey. Given the Turkish state’s history 
of denying and suppressing Islam as a political force, this is not surprising.
The Islamic-political breakthrough, both locally and nationally, during the
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1980s and 1990s, kept the temperature high on the issue, as did interna-
tional developments in the form of the rise of Muslim fundamentalism and
terrorism. However, the extreme reactions in Turkey against political Islam
were not justified by events on the ground. The political manifestation of
Islam, through its various mutations in Erbakan’s party, expressed the
wishes of groups that did not identify with the Kemalist project. This drew
new demographic groups into the public arena and into politics. This mani-
festation was also an outcome of major socio-economic changes that were
taking place in Turkish society, including the emergence of a new middle
class, stimulated by economic liberalisation, and large-scale migration to
big cities. Since the Islamic parties were based largely on regional and local
organisations and networks, they in fact helped create a political sector that
was far more representative of society as a whole (Yavuz 2003: 227-231).
Despite many disagreements with the establishment, some recent, Islam as
a politically relevant factor has gradually become accepted in Turkish poli-
tics. This suggests that extending the ‘normal’ political channels and
broadening the political arena may have had a ‘pacifying’ influence on the
debate.
Islamic parties initially stressed religion and focused on the Middle East
and Central Asia. In this they were reacting against the secularist basis and
European inspiration of the Kemalist movement. Yet, according to Yavuz,
there was a remarkable reversal in the following decade in attitudes
towards Europe and the eu. Whilst part of the state establishment began to
see the eu as a threat to Kemalist nationalism, supporters of political Islam
began to appreciate a difference between the Kemalism and the eu. They
now overwhelmingly support eu membership, convinced that the Union
offers a form of secularism that sees freedom of religion as a fundamental
human right, and one to be protected. The plea of European institutions for
democratisation and respect for human rights in Turkey has played an
important part in this transformation (Yavuz 2003: 254-261). 
This reversal in perspective, however, does not mean that the prospect 
of eu membership will actually simultaneously strengthen the hands of
anti-modernist forces. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, both the
Kemalists and political Islamists in Turkey have been greatly influenced by
modern European ideas and practices (Yavuz 2003: 265-274). Secondly,
Turkey has never been a colony. Unlike Islam elsewhere in the Muslim
world, Islam in Turkey never became an ideological vehicle for nationalist
resistance to a Western oppressor. The Western influences present in
Turkey are the result of the country’s own choices and not of coercion by
foreign powers. Whilst many changes have been imposed from above by
its own elite, they remain indigenous products. The West is portrayed as
an enemy to Islam to a far lesser degree than in other Muslim countries. If
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there was indeed a Western enemy, it was Russia and later the Soviet
Union. This resulted in Turkey’s membership of the nato, which consti-
tuted the joint Turkish-European-Atlantic military framework for the fight
against communism. Communism was also political Islam’s greatest
enemy. Thirdly, it also missed out on large-scale socio-economic depriva-
tion and frustration that formed a breeding-ground for extremism else-
where in the Muslim world. Fourthly, unlike some other Muslim coun-
tries, any existing dissatisfaction could always manifest itself through
politics, and government parties and could always be voted out of office.
This is also why political Islam in Turkey lacks the extremist characteristics
that can be found elsewhere. There have been fifteen national elections
since World War ii, of which twelve were free and fair (see Zürcher and
Van der Linden). Fifthly, Turkey’s climate of moderation is also attributable
in part to the rapidly growing urban middle class, who share religious
beliefs (and also demand that they be recognised by Kemalists) but who are
also the children of eighty years of secularism and Kemalism. Sixthly,
despite being formally banned, the Sufi movements and their intellectuals
have had an important influence on Turkish Muslims and have contributed
to the fact that pluralism and moderation are important features of Turkish
Islam. Finally, Turkish Islam’s traditional orientation towards the state
allowed it to develop a pragmatic and flexible character.
We have already referred to the headscarf affairs in both Turkey and Euro-
pean states in recent decades. The gradual recognition of Islam as a socially
and politically relevant factor was accompanied by an awareness among
well-educated young people that Islam is part of their identity. These
people certainly do not wear headscarves as a display of traditionalism or
an expression of fundamentalism. They seek recognition of their Muslim
identity through this symbol, in particular in the public domain, which
had been so long, and so explicitly, ideologically closed to them (Göle
1996). Zürcher and Van der Linden suggest that this recognition is founded
not in theology, but in an appeal to human rights (in this case, the individ-
ual right to show one’s religious conviction). Basically, the breakthrough of
political Islam has ended the distinction, cherished in the Kemalist
discourse, between ‘modern Kemalists’ and ‘backward Muslims’ (Yavuz
2003). The fact that the current Islamic inspired government recently
proposed a bill against discrimination of homosexuals and got it through
Parliament (The Economist 21-2-2004), does not fit with the usual image of
Muslims held in the West. In short, the state has lost its ideological
monopoly on modernity. If the state apparatus, including the military,
gains more respect for democracy and recognises the autonomy of civil
society, the differences that existed for so long between state and society
may eventually disappear.
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Zürcher and Van der Linden rightly stress that one should avoid the
impression that religion is the single most important issue in Turkey, or in
a discussion on Turkish democracy. Their study and ours, which both focus
on religion, could easily create this impression. However, it is not true that
the increasing role of political Islam and its electoral success are deter-
mined solely by religion. Turkish voters do show some religious prefer-
ences, but they, too, would vote out religious parties from government that
would fail to meet their expectations on, for instance, economic perform-
ance or the fight against crime and terrorism. Moreover, the Turkish elec-
torate seems to prefer moderate parties; and moderate in an Islamic sense
as well. When, for example, in the last elections in 2002, it had a choice
between the more outspoken Islamic Felicity Party and the moderate ak
Party, the ak Party won by an overwhelming majority, even in the
constituency of Erbakan, the leader of the Felicity Party. 
Surveys show that the Turkish population characterises itself as being
largely religious, but certainly not religiously zealous; as being tolerant and
not at all fundamentalist. The majority is opposed to religion playing a role
in political life, supports the secular character of the Republic and also
thinks that the state should stay out of religion. They see religion as part of
the private area and strongly dislike the exploitation of religious differ-
ences (Çarkog˘lu and Toprak 2000). The 2002 Eurobarometer also shows
that the majority of the Turkish population favours accession to the eu.
The proportion in favour is higher than that of all the (then) candidate
states. This fervour is relatively untouched with knowledge, but levels of
knowledge on the eu are low among other candidates as well, not to
mention within the eu itself (European Commission 2002).
3.6 constitutional state and political isl am
As indicated in section 3.2, the current law in Turkey is secular law. Koçak
(2004) divides the history of the legal system into three periods, with 1839
and 1920 as cut-off points. Islamic law persisted formally in the Ottoman
period until 1839, alongside a large body of secular law, sanctioned by the
Islamic authorities. After 1839 the Islamic state made room for a state with
a mixed legal system. For example, the Criminal Code of 1858 (a translation
of the French code of law of 1810) banned most traditional sharia punish-
ments. Incidentally, the stoning of adulteresses had already been abolished
in the seventeenth century. The commercial law that was introduced in
1850, which was also derived from France, permitted the charging of inter-
est, a financial concept contrary to the sharia. During this period there
were separate secular and Islamic courts, as well as mixed courts, each
covering different legal areas. By and large the influence of the religious
courts diminished. Of all areas, family law remained under Islamic law the
the europe a n union, t urkey a nd isl a m
58
WRR-69 / English  26-08-2004  00:08  Pagina 58
longest, but even that was abolished in 1917. With the foundation of the
Republic of Turkey, the last remnants of legal pluralism were removed. The
sharia courts were forbidden in 1924, and in 1926 a new civil code of law
was introduced, based on the Swiss model. The wearing of religious dress
in government buildings was prohibited in 1925. The Criminal Code of
1926 prohibited the use of religion for political purposes, and in 1928, the
still existing article that referred to Islam as the state religion was removed
from the constitution; a new preamble identified national sovereignty with
a laicist and democratic republic (Koçak 2004).
This long history of legal secularisation, which had been inspired by the
legal systems of several European states, is indicative of how embedded
this law is in the country. Legal secularisation was no innovation of the
Kemalist movement, but had gradually taken shape over a long period
when the country was an Islamic state (see also Zürcher and Van der
Linden). Moreover, the many steps in this process were always freely
taken, in contrast with elsewhere in the Muslim world, where they were
imposed by a colonial power, or assumed in order to please the West
(Koçak, 2004). This also means that the secular law has become an endoge-
nous feature of Turkey. It may well be more endogenous than even the
Turkish establishment realises, with its forced reactions against any alleged
breaches of the secular character of the state. While the participation of
Islamic parties in elections is evidence that the law against the use of reli-
gion for political purposes has been superseded, incidents like the head-
scarf affairs are still highly controversial. The position of the Diyanet,
which now falls directly under the Prime Minister, is also highly sensitive,
and any discussions on the subject can quickly be considered to overstep
the boundaries of political debate permitted in the constitution. 
The Refah Party was banned in 1997 by the Turkish Constitutional Court.
The banning itself was not based on Refah’s party programme (which actu-
ally subscribed to the secular state), nor on its actions in government. It
was based on a number of separate actions by officials (such as wearing a
headscarf, advocating the possibility of prayers during working hours) and
a few speeches by its leader, Necmettin Erbakan, in which he demanded the
right of believers to live under their own legal system (sharia) and linked a
fair social order to jihad.1 The Constitutional Court insisted that this boiled
down to advocating legal pluralism, and undermining the secular character
of the state. 
The ban was subsequently upheld by the European Court of Human
Rights, but on the basis of statements of individual party officials, and not
on the basis of an official party programme. However, it is worth noting
that the Court tested their statements against the constitution that had
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been introduced in 1980 by the military junta, and also that the Court was
much divided. A minority saw no compelling or convincing evidence in
the official actions of the Refah Party, either that it wanted to destroy the
secular order, or that it promoted violence or religious hatred (Koçak 2004).
Erbakan’s appeals at his party’s conferences for reintroducing elements of
the sharia says nothing about the electoral popularity of the issue. For
example, according to sociological surveys quoted in the previous section,
an overwhelming majority rejects the reintroduction of the religious law
into family law (such as recognition of Islamic marriage or divorce) and
only 10-15 per cent are in favour (Carkoglu & Toprak 2000).
Although the principles of the secular rule of law have a strong basis in
Turkish history and current society, this says nothing about attitudes
towards human rights and their enforcement. This issue is extremely
important in assessing whether Turkey meets the Copenhagen criteria, and
the progress in this field is justifiably a major topic in the regular reports of
the European Commission. This test will not be carried out here, but the
attitude of Turkish political Islam towards human rights is obviously an
important point for attention.
It is remarkable that political Islam demands a place in political space by
appealing to human rights. Zürcher and Van der Linden argue that demo-
cracy and human rights are applied as a reference framework, because this
is an accepted discourse in the Turkish situation. After all, eu membership
is supported by Islamists (the supporters of political Islam), because the 
eu would offer a better protection of freedom of religion than the Kemalist
state. This raises the question how far the appeal to human rights is
inspired by self-interest – creating a legal room for oneself – rather than a
recognition of the rights of others. In his 1975 book, also quoted by Zürcher
and Van der Linden, Erbakan states that his movement is loyal to all rights
and freedoms enshrined in the constitution. All the same, he saw the Tur-
kish system as one allowing non-believers to deny human rights to believ-
ers. Erbakan wanted the stipulation in criminal law that penalises the polit-
ical use of religion replaced by a Human Rights Protection Act. This would
suggest that his appeal to human rights was indeed largely inspired by the
need to safeguard the rights of believers and of his own political move-
ment. Seeing how controversial freedom of religion was for Kemalists and
how much opposition Erbakan’s various Islamic parties generated, this is
not so surprising. 
The current governing ak Party is much more explicit on the universal
implications of human rights. Its election programme pays much atten-
tion to the issue and proposes many modifications to bring Turkish law
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and practice in line with European norms. It sees differences in religion,
culture and opinion as an enrichment of society, and considers secularism
as one principle of freedom which makes this plurality possible. It
proposes that people with a different language, religion, race and social
status must be able to express themselves freely on the basis of equal legal
protection and, as such, must also be able to participate in politics. The
programme also explicitly discusses the equal rights of non-believers. It
clarifies that all these objectives, and the measures to implement them,
are not a means of obtaining an entry ticket to the eu, but are necessary
for the country’s modernisation. Its success will require a change in the
relationship between state and society; a change whereby the current
authoritarian top-down approach makes way for a state at the service of
society.
This approach is more sensitive to the positive value of plurality, includ-
ing religious plurality, than that advocated by the state and even perhaps
that offered by the Refah Party. The ak Party’s perception of human
rights is an inclusive one and not a particularistic concept to enhance its
own electoral chances. The European Commission’s reports will reveal in
due course whether, now it is in government, the ak Party acts in the
same spirit. The 2003 report records that great progress had been made
(European Commission 2003). Making allowance for the usual rhetoric of
election programmes, the Party’s intentions do not appear to be solely
based on political opportunism. Its views reflect long-term changes in
Turkey. Socio-economic transformations and improved education have
both contributed to a broadening of the political space; a broadening from
which Erbakan’s parties have especially benefited. As was the case with
its predecessors, the current ak Party is also supported by local and
regional networks of activists who unify – often divergent – aspirations
under the symbolic flag of Islam (White 2002). In the Kemalist climate,
Islam could only obtain grudging recognition as a political force through
regular confrontations. However, this broadened the opportunity for the
public debate, and the state was seen less and less as automatically right.
After the confrontations of the 1980s and 1990s, the ak Party made full
use of this opportunity and has synthesised and consolidated its message.
The earlier polarisation between Islamism and the Kemalist movement
has disappeared from its election programmes and has been replaced by 
a very strong focus on the constitutional state. It now accepts the state
must be subjugated to the law, the state should be neutral towards reli-
gion, it should advance democratisation and guarantee ‘inclusive’ human
rights in which the freedom of expression occupies a central, strategic
place. This will allow the party to overcome electoral differences between
Islamists and Kemalists.
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The conditions for the new social contract between state and society now
seem to be present. At the same time, freeing the reins for democracy to
flourish in Turkey, will not happen without resistance.
3.7 violence and political isl am
A special concern in eu member states is whether Turkey’s membership
will introduce religious-nationalist or religious-based extremism and
violence into the Union. It is true that religious violence is no stranger to
some member states, as shown in the long conflict between Protestants
and Catholics in Northern Ireland. The same applies to the nationalist
violence that is still part of the independence struggle of the Basques in
Spain. In both cases, the conflict remained largely within local or national
frontiers. However, because of the large number of Turks in different
member states, an outbreak of violence in Turkey would possibly quickly
spill over its national frontiers.
One can distinguish three ideal-type positions in Turkey’s current politi-
cal-religious landscape: modernism, traditionalism and fundamentalism.
Modernists are open to a continuous reinterpretation of the moral ideal, as
revealed to Mohammed (see Zürcher and Van der Linden) They emphasise
the moral independence of the individual and his freedom and ability to
gain relevant moral knowledge for changing conditions. While traditional-
ists also allow an interpretation of the moral ideal, when it has taken place
and been ratified by believers, it cannot be revised. As a result, the authori-
tative text of Islam is increasingly expanded with the interpretations of
previous generations. The fundamentalists, however, oppose the right and
the necessity of subjective interpretation and ascribe an absolute meaning
to the original texts and sources. They want to model social and political
life according to the Muslim community at the time of Mohammed, and
introduce the sharia. This is often motivated by the wish to protect the
moral ideal against manipulation and corruption by rulers.
Mainstream Turkish Islam relates to modernism and traditionalism.
Modernism, which views Islam primarily as a personal religious conviction
and is open to science, can be found among the Young Turks, in the subse-
quent Kemalist interpretations of Islam, as well as in major branches of the
Nurcu movement. The National Vision (Milli Görüs¸), and Naks¸ibendi
movement from which it originates, can be considered to be part of tradi-
tionalism. Fundamentalism does not have to be violent, and this is shown
in some of the Nurcu movements, such as the Aczmendi’s, but also within
the Milli Görüs¸ movement. Violent fundamentalist movements are of
course illegal. It involves a small number of numerically limited but very
active movements. These include the banned group ‘Islamic Great Eastern
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Raiders- Front’ (ibda-c), which refuses to recognise the Turkish state and
wants to heal the divisions in the Islamic world. It rejects the European
influence on Turkey and wants it replaced by Islam, not only as a religion,
but also as a civilisation. It has a clandestine branch that does not shun
violence, that possibly maintains contacts with al-Qaeda, and that is
suspected of being responsible for the suicide attacks in Istanbul in
November 2003. Another movement is Hizbullah, whose aim it is to estab-
lish an independent Islamic state. In the 1990s it also used terror against
the Kurdish pkk and progressive Turkish and Kurdish businessmen and
intellectuals who sympathised with their cause. It has been claimed that
this movement was used by security forces in the fight against the pkk.
When the security forces no longer needed them, it was largely disbanded.
The ‘Caliphate of Cologne’, a prohibited splinter group of the National
Vision movement, also wants to overthrow the secular state and democ-
racy in Turkey, and it has proclaimed the caliphate from Germany. The
movement has recently been banned in Germany, but its activities
continue underground.
These underground movements are not averse to using violence to realise
‘holy’ aims in Turkey, such as the founding of an Islamic state absorbing
Turkey into a broad Islamic framework and introducing the sharia. Their
aims are not only diametrically opposite to those of the Kemalists, but they
also represent a break with a tradition going back to Ottoman times, since
when a tradition of a separation of religion and state existed in practice.
Given the long history of the secular state, and its support by the main-
stream of Turkish Islam and most of the population, it would seem that the
realisation of these aims is illusory. The more relaxed attitude of the state
towards Turkish Islam and, in particular, its political manifestations, as is
advocated by the European Parliament, could perhaps reduce even further
the following of these extremist movements. 
Underground movements would view Turkey’s accession to the eu as the
highpoint of betrayal. It is therefore far from inconceivable that, in the run-
up to eu membership, violence will intensify, perhaps also in the current
member states. The eu should not allow this prospect to change its posi-
tion on Turkish membership. To do so, would imply that these small
groups of extremists and terrorists could hold the country to ransom and
sabotage the membership ambitions, cherished and supported for so long
by a broad cross-section of the population. 
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3.8 conclusion
Not only are there differences among current eu member states in the
development of the formal and practical relationship between the state and
religion, so there are between eu member states and Turkey. Nevertheless,
especially in developments of importance for the secular, democratic
constitutional state, the historical development of Turkey has many paral-
lels with that of Europe. Although officially Islamic, the Ottoman state 
for a long time had a secular state system, and the range of Islamic law
remained restricted largely to family law and contract law. Both the
Ottoman state, and later the Turkish state, were formed by a combination
of the crumbling power of the sovereign ruler, the declining influence of
religious institutions, the changing grounds for legitimacy of the power
centre, the continued effect of the legacy of the French Revolution and
Napoleonic period, the influence of constitutional innovations elsewhere
in Europe, and rising democracy. Against the background of the emerging
democratisation of the 1960s, there emerged alongside existing social and
cultural movements, political parties that were more explicitly based on
values inspired by Islam, and that demanded greater freedom from the
state. This enabled the goals both of greater religious autonomy from the
state and of firmer guarantees of religious freedoms by the state, to gain
increased and broader support. These beliefs, which are consistent with the
eu requirements for the democratic constitutional state, have become an
important motivation for the supporters of the current Turkish govern-
ment to strive for their country’s membership of the eu.
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note
1 Jihad means ‘striving’ or ‘struggle’. It is, however, a concept which has
many different, context-dependent meanings, both in the Islamic world
and beyond. Many feel that a distinction should be drawn between ‘great
jihad’, the internal, mental struggle of the believer to do right, and the
‘small jihad’, the armed struggle on behalf of the faith and the community
of faithful. Others view jihad primarily as the struggle for (social) justice. 
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4 conclusions
The eu has committed itself to assessing Turkey’s membership using the
same procedures it applies, and has applied, to other candidate member
states. Although the religion-factor plays only a limited role in this assess-
ment, it is precisely this factor that has generated so much disquiet. This is
why, through this report and the supplementary survey, the wrr has
attempted to contribute to a greater insight into the characteristics of Turk-
ish Islam and the historical background of its relationship with the Turkish
state.
The central question posed in this report is whether the fact that the majority
of its population is Muslim will be an obstacle to Turkey’s accession to the eu.
The answer is negative. Neither the historical developments described, nor
the characteristics of present-day Turkey and Turkish Islam, could justify the
argument that Turkish Islam forms an obstacle to Turkey’s accession to the
eu. The wrr has reached this conclusion by also taking into account the
widely divergent ways in which the present member states of the Union real-
ize the relationship between state and religion, both formally and actually.
That fact that Turkey is a country with a predominantly Muslim popula-
tion, certainly presents the eu with a unique situation. After all, the Chris-
tian faith is the dominant religion in the present member states as well as
in the other candidate countries. So religion, i.e. Islam, has understandably
become a talking point. In the supplementary study, Zürcher and Van der
Linden highlight the paradox that it is precisely the eu member states,
with their discourse on the separation of church and state, which include
the substance of the religion in their assessment of Turkish membership.
An additional factor explaining concern over Turkey is the general percep-
tion of Islam, including the rise of political Islam in Muslim states and also,
naturally, recent manifestations of religious-inspired terrorism. This has
contributed to the idea that the Islamic world and the West are incompati-
ble, and that the Islamic worldview has no room for the attributes of West-
ern democratic constitutional states; it is said to favour establishing the
state on theocratic, as opposed to democratic, principles. This would mean
dissolving the separation of the state and religion, replacing secular law
with its Islamic counterpart, and recognising Islamic rights only, rather
than a more universal concept of human rights.
Islam, like Christianity, has many faces. As far as Christianity is concerned,
there are considerable differences, both within and between countries and
regions, and the development of the relationship between church and state
varies from country to country (see chapter 2). This is a generally accepted
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fact in Europe, but far less is known about the different manifestations of
Islam. Consequently, there is a tendency to consider and discuss Islam in
terms of generalities. However, the pluriformity that so characterises
Christianity is also found in Islam. Turkish Islam has its own, unique char-
acteristics and its extensive plurality is largely determined by Turkish
history and context. This is also true of the political manifestations of
Islam in Turkey.
Turkish history has in some respects a striking number of parallels with
that of Western Europe. On the subject of the separation of the spiritual
and the worldly domains, the development of the secular constitutional
state and also the early manifestations of democracy, its history reveals
even a considerable simultaneity. For its constitutional and legal develop-
ment, Turkey has looked to Europe for models long before even the found-
ing of the Republic. This historical development had meant that values and
institutions important to the eu’s assessment of Turkey’s membership are
firmly embedded in Turkish society. The principles of the democratic
constitutional state are also shared by the mainstream of Islamic political
philosophy in Turkey that has existed since the 1960s. There are no
grounds for suggesting, therefore, that Turkey does not share the cultural
heritage on which the eu is based. Modern Turkey is characterised by a
state system in which Islam has no say and the state actually controls
Islam. Freedom of religion therefore, forms a major demand of Islamic
political parties. The law and the legal system are based on the same secular
principles as those of eu member states. 
Chapter 3 showed that Turkey has experienced distinct periods of serious
polarisation between the state apparatus on the one hand, and society on
the other. The two most sensitive issues have always been Kurdish inde-
pendence and the social and political role of Islam. Given the fact that it
took centuries to reduce the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire to those
of modern Turkey and to transform a religious state to a secular one, it is
not surprising that these territorial and religious sensitivities exist. It is
surprising, however, that the country went through this substantial
reduction of its territory and change in character without being seriously
affected by Muslim extremism and without losing its principal focus on
Europe. These processes have left it with a reasonably well-functioning
democracy. While the global revival of Islamic activism in the 1970s and
1980s did not leave the country undisturbed, it did not deflect it from its
pro-eu and democratisation course. On the contrary, it gave rise to an
Islamic political movement that forcefully embraces this course. 
Like every candidate country, Turkey also has its problems. For example,
the Kemalist state philosophy, which sees political Islam as an anomaly,
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has been cherished and vigorously defended by the state system until this
very day. From the eu’s perspective, this state orientation forms a greater
problem than does the rise of political Islam. The attachment to a strong
state has prevented the realisation of a fully-fledged democratisation of
society, although Turkey undoubtedly has a form of controlled democ-
racy. The state supervision on the political process is still a sign of the fear
of Islam as a political force, and it led to tight restrictions on its expres-
sions. 
This role of the state and, more especially, of the military, is obviously
unacceptable if Turkey wants to join the eu. Both the European Commis-
sion and the Parliament are, therefore, right to demand that the military
be placed under civil control, a demand also made to Central and Eastern
European countries. Recent developments have been very promising,
including the reform programmes and planned change of the constitu-
tion, developed with one eye to accession. Nevertheless, the wrr points
out that the normalisation of the relationship between the military and
the civil administration should take account of its impact in advancing the
democratic process. Could the withdrawal of this ‘guardian’ of the secular
government and the secular state contribute to such a resurgence of
Muslim fundamentalism, that it might challenge the advances already
made? And what if Turkey were, at that moment, already a member of the
eu?
The long history of democratic and constitutional state institutions testi-
fies to their entrenchment and their stability in present-day Turkey. It
would, however, be a sign of historicism on this basis to claim certainty
about the future. The fact that something has existed for a long time, is no
guarantee that it will continue to do so. However, while taking this into
account, it still is possible to formulate some expectations.
In the first place, the wrr considers the chance of an attack on the demo-
cratic rule of law to be remote because of the broad popular support for
membership of the Union, a dislike among Turks of religious intolerance
and the sociological processes (described in the previous chapter) that
form the basis of political Islam. As section 3.6 shows, the electorate has
regularly expressed its preference for moderate parties and appears to
have abandoned a more radical Islamic phase, support for which was
anyway always limited. The purifying effect of democracy applies just as
much to Turkey as to other countries. From a sociological standpoint, the
preference for moderation is not only an expression of ideas, but also of
interests; and the large middle class has a great economic interest in acces-
sion to the eu. Likewise, advocates of a greater freedom of religion also
view accession as an important protection of this religious freedom.
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In the second place, membership of the Union may even have a mitigating
effect on the tensions within Turkish society. Since 1961, the military has
always committed itself to upholding security in Turkey; it often regarded
political manifestations of Islam as a threat to that security. In other words:
using state-Islam to hold mosques to a conservative-nationalist philoso-
phy, has retarded the development of a more liberal Islam and prevented an
open religious-social dialogue.
Christian-Democratic parties are a normal phenomenon within the politi-
cal landscape of member states and this should also apply to Islamic-demo-
cratic parties. Integration into a secular Union that has committed itself to
safeguarding rights and freedoms (and that will focus even more on this if
its new constitution is ratified) will allow Turks to create more space for
Islamic parties and make them a more acceptable phenomenon. The social-
isation implied in the acceptance of ‘rules-of-the-game’ involved in eu
membership, will mean that the role of the military will shrink by itself. 
Nonetheless, it is not impossible that both the military’s weakening grip
on the democratic and administrative process, and the loss of sovereignty
that eu membership implies, will initially play into the hand of traditional-
ist and nationalist political movements. In countries in Middle and Eastern
Europe, where the transfer to democracy was even more sudden, this
process was indeed initially accompanied by such a radicalisation. On the
other hand, a truly democratic political arena will also allow liberal-Islamic
(counter)forces to mobilise, which, in the past, have always been pushed to
the background by the conservative state-Islam. 
Even if it is initially accompanied by considerably fierce debates, the
growth of a flourishing plurality does not have to be assessed negatively.
Rather, it should be seen as a necessary condition to realise a better balance
between state, religion and society. For example, the current government,
supported by the women’s movement, has led the attack both on the
formal and actual discrimination against women and girls, and on the still
frequent use of violence (honour killings) against them. This subject has
been taboo until now, also because those involved justified ‘traditional
behaviour’ by referring to Islam. These traditions, however, are not
restricted to Muslims; they can also be found in Christian Mediterranean
countries (aiv 1999: 14). As long as the legislation and its implementation
comply with the echr, the eu has few other grounds for calling the Turk-
ish state to account for these wrongful practices. It is all the more impor-
tant, therefore, that the Islamic aspects of these practices are debated in
Turkey itself and – as is happening now – that Muslims themselves
condemn these practises. Those of the opinion that Islam orders these
practices will obviously also speak out. This, too, is important. After all,
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the Union is not competent to decide on what is Islamic and what is not.
Only the Turks themselves, with the support of the law, can end these
culturally-determined practices. However, neither Turkey nor any eu
member in the same position should have the illusion that such practices
will end in the foreseeable future. For the eu, and for Turkish minorities in
eu states, it is very important that the government and Islamic authorities
in Turkey itself send out clear signals that discrimination of women and
honour killings have little to do with Islam, and that the latter are also
criminal. That the taboo on this issue has been broken in Turkey, is a posi-
tive development. A further democratisation will have comparable effects
on other issues that are still considered taboo.
Various arguments can be given for the expectation that the secular demo-
cratic rule of law in Turkey will not be endangered should its self-
proclaimed ‘guardians’ withdraw, though the gradually increase in free-
dom will initially result in a much broader range of opinions, and create
greater contrasts than exist in the current controlled democracy. The
period between starting accession negotiations and the actual accession
itself may still take many years, but nonetheless it offers Turkey the chance
gradually to become further accustomed to European practices. Once
Turkey’s accession becomes a fact, one cannot exclude the possibility that
new situations may arise that will threaten the democratic constitutional
state, for example a renewed coup. This danger, however, does not only
apply to Turkey. Since many of the new member states have only recently
converted to democracy, the danger has certainly not become smaller. As
indicated in chapter 2, the Union has proved in earlier conflicts that it is
able to formulate rules to handle this. New types of conflicts may force it to
do this again. The previously agreed procedure applies in the event of a
“clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the principles referred
to in article 6, par. 1” (see chapter 2). Should the Turkish government have
to deal with strong anti-eu forces due to certain developments, the consti-
tution of the Union provides for the possibility of voluntary withdrawal
(art. I-59).
The wrr considers it unlikely that these procedures, designed for situa-
tions in which the paths of Turkey and the eu may fundamentally diverge,
will be needed. Nevertheless, they reduce the risk of mutual damage
should the union not succeed.
On the basis of these considerations on the future, we feel there are no
grounds for the assumption that Turkish Islam forms an impediment to
membership. We therefore recommend that, should the government share
this view, it should actively propagate it at home and abroad.
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epilogue
The wrr does not consider that the characteristics of Turkish Islam as such
constitute any obstacle to eu accession. Yet, if the Turkish accession
becomes reality, will it not also be important for the relationship between
the West and the Muslim world? This relationship has become increasingly
problematic, for example through spiralling Islamic terror and invasions of
Afghanistan and Iraq. Could Turkish accession temper the fear of an
unavoidable ‘clash of civilisations’?
It is obvious that this should not be the main reason for allowing Turkey to
join the eu. Accession should be judged on its own merits, on the basis of
the criterion of an adequate functioning eu as a union of values and objec-
tives. No-one will profit from a watered-down Union. However, if Turkish
membership is accepted, this issue would become very relevant. For
governments whose populations currently oppose a Turkish membership,
this could be an important additional argument in its favour. The eu does
not only want to maintain an internal legitimacy and effectiveness but,
since it cannot isolate itself from the world, it also has a great interest in
peaceful external relations. Now that the composition of the population of
the eu is increasingly reflecting the world population, internal relations are
also no longer immune to discordant relations elsewhere.
As indicated in chapter 2, the historical rationale of the European integra-
tion project was not to create a link among nations with a similar identity
and culture or with equal values and standards. Nor was it a project among
states with a mutual history of peace. It all began by supranational partner-
ship and economic integration to end a history of conflict among countries
that displayed great differences of identity, culture, values and standards.
Looking at the situation today, and at existing animosities, one could legiti-
mately ask whether the European integration project can again play a role
in defusing conflict.
In the world today, the relationship between the West and Islam is unam-
biguously problematic. In the early 1990s, Samuel Huntington (1993)
already argued that there would be new conflicts after the Cold War, in
particular between these two civilisations. Since then, this ‘clash of civili-
sations’ has been accepted by many parties in Islam and in Western coun-
tries as a characterisation of the relationship between Islam and the West.
The attacks of 11 September 2001 and subsequent wars and new attacks
seem to confirm that it is correct. As stated in chapter 1, the recent hesita-
tions of member states towards Turkey’s eu candidacy are partly based on
this kind of analysis.
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According to Zürcher and Van der Linden, Turkey’s membership would be
a hopeful sign for the Islamic world that the West does not support the
paradigm of ‘clash of civilisations’, as many Islamic countries had thought
and feared. Perhaps, too, Western achievements could also find a place in
Muslim countries. The wrr shares this opinion. In general, Turkish
membership indicates that the two worlds are not mutually exclusive.
Should Turkey become part of the Union, it will put an end to the idea of
two geographically distinctive blocs, each defined by religion. As a result,
at least one condition for maintaining the clash paradigm would become
unsustainable. Zürcher and Van der Linden also demonstrate convincingly
that the concept of greatly divergent civilisation blocs is untenable from an
historical and cultural viewpoint. There is actually far more similarity
between, and simultaneity in, developments of Turkey and Europe than
allowed for in Huntington’s concept. The many Muslims in eu member
states also mean that the European identity and civilisation can no longer
be defined in purely Western terms, and perhaps this has never been the
case. Should Turkey be refused eu membership on religious grounds, it
would be a signal to these Muslims that they can only belong to Europe by
becoming totally assimilated. Conversely, Turkey’s accession would
emphasise that they already fully belong to the Union.
It is more doubtful whether, as a member of the Union, Turkey can func-
tion as a model for other Muslim countries. The arrangements existing in
Turkey are determined by highly specific historical factors that are absent
in other Muslim countries. Moreover, the Arab world sees Turkey as a
former coloniser and as a current accomplice of the West. Taspinar (2003)
therefore describes the Turkish situation as sui generis instead of as a
model. He points to the authoritarian nature of the Kemalist movement
and the role of the military, to argue it is not yet possible to speak of a
fully-fledged liberal democracy. Together these factors will prevent
Turkey from becoming a model, though it may still exercise a more
general influence. In a dynamic sense, Turkey could certainly be an inspi-
ration for other states, because it shows that Islam and democracy are not
necessarily incompatible. Eventual eu membership will benefit Turkey
by further embedding democracy and protecting rights and freedoms.
Moreover, there will be a greater pressure in the Arab nations for
increased democratisation and more respect for human rights. The two
recently published Arab Human Development Reports of the United
Nations Development Programme (2002 and 2003), in addition to ‘9-11’
and subsequent wars, have reinforced the internal pressure on this front.
For many Muslim governments, Islamic extremism is a nightmare, as a
result of which there is a greater fear of democratisation and of offering
citizens more protection against the state.
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The recent relatively large openness of the Turkish political system to the
different expressions of political Islam has protected the country against
the degree of extremism that occurred elsewhere. Democracy was not
introduced with a big bang, but gradually, and under the cautious and
suspicious ‘guidance’ by the military. Whatever people think about this
role, and however harshly it was enforced, the army always withdrew to
their barracks shortly after intervening. In this respect, the Turkish devel-
opment also differs from that of many other Muslim countries (Taspinar
2003). A report by the British Parliamentary Commission for Foreign
Affairs on the accession of Turkey to the eu refers to this special position of
the Turkish military. After all, since 1961, the military has had the constitu-
tional task to protect the security of Turkey against domestic as well as
foreign enemies. As such, it enjoys a great trust among the population.
Although it does not see the role played by the military in defining and
controlling the boundaries of the democratic process as entirely negative,
this British Commission condemns the military for overestimating the
dangers by political Islam to stability and the secular nature of the state.
While it sees the present position of the Turkish military as unacceptable
for the eu, the Commission urges that reforming its constitutional and
social position be taken very seriously and that a way be found to gradually
place it under civil control (House of Commons 2001). On the subject
democratisation, Zakaria also refers to the importance of gradualness.
Liberal democracies do not start on demand. Experience shows that if their
introduction is too swift, the chances are high that this will result in ‘illib-
eral’ democracies. He considers that constitutional liberalism – separation
of powers, the constitutional state and protection of basic liberties – should
precede democracy: if power is not first limited, its execution may degen-
erate into tyranny, however democratically the power might have been
obtained (Zakaria 1997). Through internal and/or external pressure, many
Muslim states still have to follow the path towards a further democratisa-
tion, and have to avoid the risks described by Zakaria. At the moment, these
countries are less stable than Turkey, and the Turkish experiences in gradu-
ally loosening the military’s grip on society could be very instructive. 
The Turkish record on human rights and freedoms is definitely not
unblemished. According to Graham Fuller (2003), its authoritarian secular-
ism can certainly not be applied as a model for other countries. Despite
this, however, Turkey shows that political parties have gradually been
given a place in the political spectrum that does justice to their own Islamic
traditions and the growing democratic participation of the population. This
Turkish development took place by trial and error, but it has eventually
offered a learning curve showing how the secular state, democracy and
political Islam can be brought into line with each other within one consti-
tutional framework, albeit with some stick-and-carrot from the eu in the
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form of prospective membership. This may encourage countries wishing
to follow the same path, to experiment with the rule of law and democrati-
sation themselves. Turkey does not offer them any model; rather, it is a
laboratory in which experiments take place that are interesting for other
countries (Yavuz 2003: 7).
In many Muslim countries there are distorted views of the West, and vice
versa. Some views need correcting. It is not true that Western secularism
involves the hostility of the state towards religion in general and Islam in
particular. It is not opposed to religion and it does not endorse nihilism,
immorality and lawlessness. This also applies to Western views on the
backwardness of Islam, and the anti-democratic and intolerant character of
its followers. The ‘discovery’ by Islamic parties in Turkey, in contrast to
earlier held prejudices, that the eu guarantees their freedom to manoeuvre,
is a major step forward. As a member of the Union, Turkey, which has been
in the forefront of debates on Islam, and is already well acquainted with the
idiom of the debate, could certainly have a bridging function in correction
misperceptions on both sides, and soften the contours of a debate that is
still too often cast in terms of incompatibility and an inevitable ‘clash’. To
the conclusion that the characteristics of Turkish Islam do not stand in the
way of Turkey’s eu accession, one might add the rider that membership
might smooth the growing differences (and perceptions thereof) between
the West and the Islamic world. 
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1 introduction: turkey – fault- line,
frontline or test case?
Since the mid-1990s, the discussion on Turkey’s potential accession to the
European Union (eu) has not merely been conducted on the basis of crite-
ria determining the state of democracy and human rights, security and the
economy. The eu’s dramatic eastward expansion has also prompted Euro-
pean writers and politicians in particular to reflect more generally on
‘Europe’s’ fundamental characteristics and borders. It almost goes without
saying that these discussions have become focused on the case of Turkey.
After all, this is not merely the only country officially enjoying the
prospect of full membership of the eec/ec/eu for over forty years, but
also the country that is perceived as being culturally least like the other
member states.
In debates, the divergent cultural character of Turkey is generally linked to
the fact that over 95 per cent of its population say that they are Muslims.
Historically, a contributing factor to that perception is surely that for
hundreds of years, Turkey, or rather, the Ottoman Empire, was the only
Islamic superpower directly confronting Europe.
Those who voice objections to Turkey’s inclusion into the eu on cultural
or religious grounds, often base their arguments either explicitly or implic-
itly on American sociologist Samuel Huntington’s theories on the so-
called ‘clash of civilisations’. Huntington first aired his ideas on the ‘clash
of civilisations’ in the American journal, Foreign Affairs in 1993. What he
said in his article, and what he further developed in 1996 in a book, is
summarised below.
Since the birth of the system of international relations in the 16th and 17th
centuries, roughly four phases can be distinguished in history. The first
phase lasted until the French Revolution. International relations during
this time were essentially conducted among sovereigns. The French Revo-
lution changed this into a system of relations among nations. During both
these phases, the international system was multipolar. In other words,
there were many more or less equal players who together determined the
course of war and peace. After the First World War, this system founded
on nation-states came to an end. The rise of communism, and shortly
thereafter of fascism and national socialism, marked the beginning of an
international system built on competing ideological blocs. The conclusion
of the Second World War did not end of this phase, but actually marked
the beginning of the most ideological phase in the history of international
relations. For fifty years, the Cold War froze the world to a bipolar system,
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in which the so-called Third World was the passive battlefield on which
‘East’ and ‘West’ fought out, or allowed others to fight out, their struggle
for world domination.
In Huntington’s view, the collapse of communism has created a fundamen-
tally new situation. International relations are now no longer determined
by two ideological blocs but by a multipolar system made up of nation-
states. The policy orientation of these states – and this is the core idea of
‘The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order’ – are now
guided by cultural factors: solidarity within their own civilisation and
antagonism towards other civilisations. Huntington perceives the world as
divided into seven large cultural blocs (Chinese, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic,
Orthodox, Western and Latin-American), and he expects the major
conflicts of the future to be fought on the peripheries of these civilisations,
in particular between ‘the West’, China, and ‘Islam’. Civilisations as such
will not be the actors within these large, worldwide conflicts, since they
lack governments or armies. It is the dominant state within each civilisa-
tion, such as the United States, India or China, that will base its policies on
its place within this ‘civilisation’.
The ‘clash of civilisations’ has now become a household concept, and not
just in the academic world. Huntington’s thesis has been widely debated
within political science and contemporary history, and reactions have
mostly ranged from the critical to the outright dismissive. This applies
both to the empirical foundation of his thesis (Huntington’s factual knowl-
edge is often dubious) and to the mentality it exudes, described by critics as
‘intellectual tribalism’. He is often accused of unjustifiably suggesting that
civilisations are monoliths rather than complex mosaics. In reality, George
Bush’s ‘West’ obviously differs from that of Woody Allen, and this is even
more true for kaleidoscopic Europe.
Huntington’s ideas have had an even larger impact outside academia,
within politics and foreign policy. They emerge in all sorts of debates, often
in dubious ways. Huntington unthinkingly adopted the Chinese national-
ist notion that the fabulous rise of the Asian tiger economies was based on
‘Confucian values’. Obviously, this was grist to the mills of authoritarian
rulers such as Mahatir in Malaysia and Lee in Singapore, both of whom
claimed that democracy and human rights were Western inventions that
did not fit in with ‘Asian values’.
In Huntington’s view, the eu, too, is a cultural community whose east-
ward expansion has restored the traditional cultural border between
western and eastern Christianity. (Thus, he conveniently bypasses the
role of Greece.) In Europe, the ideas he expounded in his article of 1993
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and his book of 1996 have influenced Christian-Democrats such as Kohl
and Martens and liberals such as Bolkestein, prompting them to define
Europe as a cultural community based on Christianity and humanism.
From this they logically concluded that Islamic states such as candidate-
member Turkey do not belong to Europe. In 2002, Chairman of the Euro-
pean Convention Giscard d’Estaing chose to repeat this standpoint.
In Huntington’s worldview it is the Chinese and Islamic civilisations in
particular which, from the strength of their own value systems, have
evolved into rivals of Western liberal democracy. This view is clearly music
to the ears of Islamic fundamentalists, who tend to see Islamic religion and
culture as incompatible with ‘Western’ civilisation, including liberal
democracy.
Is Islam the antithesis of Western civilisation? In that case, Turkey would
seem to be the test case par excellence or, better still, the frontline where
Huntington’s theories can be tested. It is Europe’s largest Muslim neigh-
bour, a nato member, an aspiring eu member, and a member of the Coun-
cil of Europe and the osce. In addition, 95 per cent of its population
consider themselves as Muslims, and it is the direct heir of the Ottoman
Empire. For many centuries Ottoman sultans were Christian Europe’s
most important opponents. They ruled the Middle East and South-East
Europe for four hundred years, representing the only Islamic sovereigns to
claim the title of ‘Defender of the Holy Sites’ (Mecca and Medina).
In this survey we want to examine the validity of the widely held percep-
tion that there exists a cultural fault-line between Turkey and Europe, 
whose religious dimension makes its potential impact all the more destruc-
tive. In other words, does the fact that Turkey is an Islamic country, or
rather that it has a predominantly Muslims population, also render it the
odd man out who had better be excluded from the eu? Examining this
question clearly also forces us to consider whether Huntington’s thinking
in terms of cultural blocs is meaningful and productive. Do the ‘West’ and
‘Islam’ really exist? And is the dividing line between those two ‘blocs’
really a frontline? Or does Turkey in fact enable us to see the contours of a
symbiosis of Western and Islamic cultural elements?
To answer these questions, we have chosen the following approach. In the
first part (chapter 2) we will begin by describing the most important aspects
of contemporary Turkish Islam. The aim is to chart this in a way that reflects
both the most significant properties of its Turkishness, and the multi-faceted
nature of religious life in Turkey. Rather than conducting a general discus-
sion on ‘Islam’, we examine it in its specific local and historical context. In
other words, we describe the evolution and characteristics of Turkish Islam.
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It should be emphasised, though, that in analysing a phenomenon such as
‘Islam’ or even ‘Turkish Islam’ we cannot possibly pretend to be exhaus-
tive. Islam is both a doctrine or ideological system that tries to answer all
the why’s and wherefores of our existence, and a social phenomenon
encompassing a wide range of actual manifestations.
In addition, it is not easy to indicate what should be considered as still a
part of ‘Islam’ and what should not. Cultural codes, habits and traditions
which in themselves have nothing to do with the doctrinal system of
Islam, such as arranged marriages, honour killings and veiling, are often
perceived by the outside world and especially the West, as typical of Islam.
Traditional sections of the population uphold these customs, sanctify them
and consider them as cornerstones of their faith. This report deals in partic-
ular with the position of Islam as a doctrinal system in Turkish society,
even though ideology and cultural codes occasionally have some ground in
common, such as in the case of the banning of headscarves from educa-
tional institutions. This is one of the frontlines of political conflict in
Turkey.
In the first part, we have decided to cover the five most important aspects
of Turkish Islam as a stepping stone for examining the extent to which
Turkey has witnessed a symbiosis of eu values (such as democracy and
human rights) and Islamic cultural heritage, or is likely to do so in future.
The subjects under discussion are the relationship between Islam and the
state; official doctrine versus Tarikats and neo-movements; Sunni Islam
and Alevism; Islamic fundamentalism and the position of non-Muslims.
Based on these topics, we will return to our central question in the second
part (chapter 3) dealing with sub-issues related to Turkey’s ability to fit in
with the eu. One example is the issue of Turkey’s role in a common Euro-
pean cultural heritage, and another its compatibility with notions of
democracy and human rights that have developed in Europe. And also: to
what extent are the worldviews and lifestyles of Turks actually determined
by their religion and what are the chances or risks of an Islamic fundamen-
talist victory? We will base the answers to these questions in part on the
core texts of the different manifestations of Turkish Islam described in
chapter 2. These involve texts as the pocket-catechism of so-called ‘state-
Islam’, a publication by Necmettin Erbakan, the manifesto of the ak Party
and a speech by a prominent modernist. We examine to what extent the
statements in these texts contradict the core values ascribed to ‘Western
civilisation’, and in this case to those of the eu. Based on these compar-
isons but for instance also on the results of surveys of the religious atti-
tudes of the Turkish population, we try to provide more insight into Turk-
ish receptiveness to Islamic fundamentalism. Working on the assumption
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that pluralism, such as in religion and the media, is a product of a demo-
cratic political system, we conclude the chapter by briefly considering the
extent to which such pluralism is present in different areas. In the conclu-
sion we subsequently return to Turkey’s position within the framework of
the ‘clash of civilisations’, and its implications for the country’s eu acces-
sion.
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2 turkey’s current isl amic l andscape
This chapter describes the most important aspects of contemporary Turk-
ish Islam. Since this contemporary landscape is the outcome of several
radical transformations in the past, we will regularly refer back to crucial
historical backgrounds that decisively shaped these important contempo-
rary developments. 
2.1 isl am and the state
2.1.1 the ‘28 february process’:  confrontation bet ween
religion, societ y and state
On 28 June 1996, the Turkish Republic witnessed an event unprecedented
in its history since its creation in 1923: a politician who explicitly allowed
himself to be inspired, both politically and personally, by Islamic standards
and values, was sworn in as prime minister. Necmettin Erbakan, the leader
of the Welfare Party, owed this post to his election victory in December
1995 (when he received 21.3 per cent of the vote) and to the shrewd manner
in which he had exploited the divisions among the other political parties.
Erbakan’s governing coalition, with the conservative, Western-oriented
and secular True Path Party, seemed to herald a new era in modern Turkish
history. However, it soon emerged that this development was anathema to
the secular state machinery.
On 28 February 1997 the Turkish army leadership launched a campaign in
which it identified ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ (irtica, literally: ‘reactionary
inclination) as the largest threat to Turkey’s national security, worse than
Kurdish separatism or foreign threats. Through the National Security
Council, the very powerful body within which the military leadership
advises the cabinet, the army presented a list of eighteen conditions that
the Erbakan government had to fulfil. The implicit threat behind these
demands was clear: the army would bring down the government if it failed
to meet them. When the Erbakan government hesitated and dawdled with
their fulfilment, the military organised a campaign in which the media, the
judiciary, the bureaucracy and eventually also the parliamentary represen-
tatives of the True Path Party, were all lobbied and mobilised against the
government. Trade unions and employers’ organisation formed their own
‘Secularist Front’. As a result of this pressure, the Erbakan government fell
on 18 June 1997.
This ‘28 February process’, which is denoted in Turkey as a ‘soft’ or ‘post-
modern’ coup d’état’, continued after the cabinet’s fall. The measures that
the military insisted on having implemented, were sweeping and far-
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reaching. One of their most important demands was the introduction of an
eight-year period of primary education. Until then, primary schools in
Turkey offered five years of education, after which many parents, either out
of conviction or financial necessity, sent their children to Islamic schools
for a further three-years of religious education. By setting compulsory state
education at eight years, these so-called imam-hatip okullar (schools for
pastoral care workers and preachers), lost their market. Many additional
measures exacted by the military were also undertaken by Erbakan’s
successor in the years 1997 to 1999. In January 1998, the Constitutional
Court ordered the dissolution of the Welfare Party and banned Erbakan
from politics for a period of five years, a verdict later upheld by the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights (Yavuz 2003: 3, 244).
The Constitutional Court’s decision was based on articles 68 and 69 of
the Turkish constitution, which had been introduced by an earlier mili-
tary junta during its coup d’état in September 1980. These articles stated
that no political party could be formed that “violates the principles of
secular Republic” (art. 68), and that parties “exploiting religious senti-
ments, symbols or arguments” would be banned (art. 69). The Court’s
motivation was notable in that it emphasised that religion should not play
a role in politics and social life, and that “religion controls the inner aspect
of the individual, while secularism controls the outward aspect of the
individual.” The court thus strictly followed in the footsteps of Kemal-
ism, the Turkish state ideology taking shape since the 1920s (Yavuz 2003:
247).
For a better understanding of the positions and arguments of the main
players in this confrontation between religion, society and state, we will
examine two factors that shaped the current situation. The first concerns
ideas on state and religion during the Ottoman Empire (1300-1922), the
direct predecessor of the Republic of Turkey; the second concerns the
process of secularisation, which began around 1840 under the Ottoman
Empire and in the Turkish Republic reached its zenith between 1923 and
1945.
2.1.2 isl am and the state under the ottomans
The Ottoman-Islamic heritage of the Republic of Turkey, in turn, repre-
sents a tradition that draws from two very divergent and partly conflicting
sources: firstly, the Islamic roots of society and, secondly, the Turkish
tradition of state formation and state constitution which had taken shape
in Central Asia by the 6th century and in the Middle East by the 10th
century.
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The oldest Islamic community, which sprung up around the prophet
Mohammed in 622 in Yathrib, later Medina, was an autonomous commu-
nity. Its leaders derived their legitimacy from religious charisma and they
governed muslims in war and in peace. Logically, the rules creating the
foundation of this early Islamic community did not anticipate a state above
or beyond the community of believers. The lives of the faithful were
governed by a system of religious standards and rules, supervised by reli-
gious leaders. In the beginning, these were Mohammed and his direct
successors (the ‘rightful caliphs’) but leadership soon became the pre-
eminent field for religious specialists, the Islamic scholars (the ulema). The
ulema expanded the pronunciations in the Koran and the traditions of the
workings and teachings of the prophet Mohammed into a system of laws
(the sharia, or s¸eriat in Turkish). This formed the basis for communal and
personal life. In the eyes of the Muslims, the s¸eriat was and is God’s work.
Its rules can be interpreted, but in principle it is immutable; legislation by
humans is impossible.
In the 9th century, two hundred years after the actions of Mohammed,
Islam assumed a more orthodox character when the free interpretation of
the s¸eriat by individual legal scholars ceased to be considered legitimate.
Since that time, interpretation had to be restricted to debates on the works
of earlier exegetists, whose work therefore assumed enormous authority
(Yerasimos et al. 2000: 13-15; Mardin 1989: 20-21).
The rapid conquest of regions ranging from Spain in the west to India in
the east inevitably led to the creation of a solid governance system, i.e. a
state. The attitude of Islamic legal scholars towards the state was ambiva-
lent from the start. On the one hand, the state was an essential institution
for maintaining religious order and fulfilling God’s plan for humanity.
Without protection by the state, the true faith could not survive in an evil
world. On the other hand, there was a widespread notion that power
corrupts and that state governance could not go hand in hand with a pious
and good life (Lewis 1996: 157-8). That this was seen as an inevitability can
be illustrated with an Ottoman example: not one of the Ottoman sultans
between 1300 and 1922 ever undertook the hadj, the pilgrimage to Mecca
that is, in principle, compulsory for every Muslim. Religious scholars all
agreed that the political duty of the sultan to protect the ‘house of islam’
(dar-ul-islam), ranked above his personal salvation. 
In the eyes of the ulema, the ideal Islamic state was a theocracy that had
God as the exclusive source of legitimacy and justice. At the same time,
Muslims realised that in order to keep government institutions opera-
tional, their worldly ruler and ‘God’s shadow on earth’ had to formulate
rules and impose punishments to supplement the body of rules already
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anchored into religious law. This authority of sovereigns was denoted in
Arabic as siyâsa (living on in modern Turkish as ‘politics’: siyaset) or its
equivalents, such as urf (Turkish: örf). To proclaim these kind of rules and
regulations, sovereigns required authorisation by leading religious experts,
who had to certify that the rules were indeed supplementary, and not
contradictory to the s¸eriat (Lewis 1996: 223-4).
From the 10th century on, almost the entire core region of Islam came under
the rule of Turkish dynasties originating from the Central Asian steppes.
Virtually all of these dynasties had converted to Islam in Central Asia,
prior to their invasion of the Middle East. In addition, they also brought
with them the strong military and political traditions developed by the
Turks. In the border regions between the Middle East and Central Asia,
these traditions blended with the ancient Persian monarchical tradition,
that strongly emphasised the independent authority of the sovereign.
Partly inspired by the Persian kingdoms they encountered en route, the
Turkish dynasties embraced the Sunni type of Islam and, more specifically,
the Hanifite school of religious thought. This has influenced the way in
which subsequent Turkish dynasties have shaped the relationship between
state and Islam. Of the four schools of religious thought within Sunni
Islam, the Hanifite school offers the greatest opportunity for ‘Realpolitik’.
Hanafite theory on rule simply defines the legitimate ruler as he who
manages to come to power and hold on to it (Imber 1997: 24, 67). For the
Turkish newcomers from the steppes, whose power depended on the
sword, this was obviously quite attractive. As their power increased,
however, they also developed additional arguments supporting the legiti-
macy of their authority. These included invented genealogies and, in the
case of the Ottomans, the myth of the ‘transfer’ of the caliphate to the
Ottoman sultan by the last Arab Abbasid caliph.
More than any other dynasty, the Ottomans succeeded in uniting Islamic
and Turkish-Persian traditions into a single administrative system.
Formally, the Ottoman Empire was an Islamic state, whose ruler, the
sultan, had to protect the land of the Muslims and ensure their opportuni-
ties to live as good Muslims within its borders. Also formally, divine law or
s¸eriat formed the foundation of the legal system. In practice, the s¸eriat’s
effectiveness was largely limited to what we would call the realm of private
law: family law and contract law. Everything that we today would consider
as public law, in particular all aspects of public order and public administra-
tion, was regulated in collections of edicts (kanun, from the Byzantine
canon) published in the name of the sultan. Obviously, these two legal
systems were in force in different regions. The s¸eriat was the law of the
Islamic community, both inside and outside the Empire; Muslims in
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South-East Asia or China also organised their personal lives according to
this law. Yet the s¸eriat was not applicable to the largely autonomous Chris-
tian and Jewish communities inside the Empire. As the law of the state,
however, the kanun applied to all subjects inside the state’s borders.
It was the task of the leading ulema, in particular of the highest-ranking
mufti (legal adviser) of the Empire, the s¸eyhülislam, to harmonise the
sacred law and the edicts of the sultan (Poulton 1997: 34-5). This implied
that the religious authorities and the palace were caught in a mutual
embrace. Since the sultan pretended to be not just an Islamic sovereign but
the Islamic sovereign par excellence, he could ill-afford losing the legiti-
macy provided by Islamic legal scholars. This being said, the Ottoman
sultans were much more successful than their predecessors in incorporat-
ing the ulema into the state apparatus by a system of strict appointments
and controls. This clearly provided the court with a whole repertory of
levers on an uncooperative ulema. 
Thus, despite the theocratic ideal of Islamic legal scholarship, the Ottoman
state was de facto a secular administrative apparatus whose policies were
legitimised by religion. As the ‘great tradition’ with a hegemonic nature,
Islam acted as the cultural and political bridge between the state elite and
the masses, who were predominantly Sunni Muslims (Yavuz 2003: 38-9).
Without this kind of sacralising, it is unlikely that the Ottoman Empire
could have retained the loyalty of its Islamic population and survived for
six hundred years.
2.1.3 secul arisation in the ottoman empire
From the facts above we can also conclude that the oft-heard cliché that
Islam has never known the separation of ‘church and state’ represents a
huge distortion of reality. Its origins from an autonomous community
meant that in Islam, or at least among its legal scholars, theory formation
on the state is rather poor. By contrast, Turkish Islamic states, in particular
the Ottoman Empire, developed an extensive and codified practice of de
facto secular governance. Political legitimacy was in essence two-fold:
Islam and state (or sovereign) were both sources of legislation (Mardin
1989: 21). It was this highly practical dual system of religiously sanctioned
rules and institutions which essentially stemmed from the autonomous
authority of the sovereign, that in the 19th century would start off processes
of modernisation and secularisation.
In the latter part of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century,
the Ottoman Empire suffered several traumatic defeats at the hands of
European states. In 1774, 1792 and 1829 wars were lost to Russia. There are
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two reasons why this had catastrophic consequences for the authority of
the Ottoman sultan. Firstly, the Ottomans lost control of the Black Sea, 
on which they were dependent for food supplies to their capital Istanbul.
Secondly, the sultan had to cede areas inhabited by Muslim populations 
to non-Islamic rulers (the Russian tsar). In the same period, the then
Ottoman province of Egypt was occupied by Napoleon Bonaparte (1798-
1801). As a result, European rulers, for the first time since the crusades,
obtained one of the heartlands of the Islamic Middle East, including the
Empire’s second city, Cairo.
The shock of these defeats prompted a group of reform-minded adminis-
trators in Istanbul to call for the modernisation of Ottoman state institu-
tions on European models. The prime example for this modernisation was
France, both the France of the Bourbon dynasty and that of the Revolution
and Napoleon. After being ousted from power in 1808, these reformers
were able to pursue their policies again after 1826, under the autocratic
reign of Sultan Mahmut II (r. 1808-1839). Initially, their reforms aimed at
strengthening both the internal and external powers of the central state.
Their first concern was the modernisation of the army, but once a Euro-
pean-style army was formed, their reform efforts spread unchecked. Facto-
ries were needed for uniforms, training institutes for officers, population
registers to facilitate conscription and efficient tax-collection systems to
pay for it all.
Throughout the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire slowly took on the
appearance of a typically modern state. There were state schools in every
town, postal services, railways, clock towers (with a unified time for the
whole Empire) and lighthouses, museums, population censuses, birth
certificates and passports. The small state apparatus of the beginning of the
19th century grew sixty-fold and assumed the typical characteristics of a
bureaucracy.
The 1839 edict announcing the sultan’s intention to implement wide-rang-
ing reforms (the ‘Hatti S¸erif of Gülhane’ or ‘Noble Edict of the Rose Cham-
ber’), explicitly paid lip service to religious law. Its preamble stated that
“countries not governed by s¸eriat could not continue to exist” (Deringil
1998: 9). Yet the measures themselves had little if anything to do with reli-
gious law. They actually had secularising side effects, be it initially only
implicitly. Pupils training for doctors and veterinarians at the new schools,
and the engineers and artillery officers dealing with modern mathematics,
for instance, all became the bearers of a materialistic, scientific worldview.
During the 1850s and 1860s, secularisation also acquired a legal and institu-
tional face through the introduction of new, European-inspired, law books
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such as the criminal code or the commercial code and the institution of
new courts, councils and ministries based on the European model. The
s¸eriat was never rendered inoperative, but its area of implementation kept
shrinking. Since the new procedures and laws were largely based on the
French model, they also reflected legal practice in this fortress of laïcité
(Dumont in Landau (ed.) 1984: 35-37).
As in other European monarchies, the purely traditional concept of a God-
given monarchy legitimised solely by religion and tradition, also became
increasingly a subject for discussion in the Ottoman Empire after 1848.
Pushed by rising nationalism among the non-Islamic population groups
and, from 1860 onwards also, by a fledgling liberal movement, there began
a quest for a new type of legitimacy with national and democratic dimen-
sions (Hobsbawm 1990: 84). The Ottoman Empire’s power elite concluded
that having obedient subjects at the state’s disposal no longer sufficed.
Rivalry with European states meant that the state should be able to appeal
to the masses to mobilise national forces. The Empire’s subjects thus had
to be moulded into Ottoman citizens who identified with ‘their’ state. If
this were ever possible, it could only be done by granting them a say in the
state’s governance through a process of implicit negotiations (Deringil
1998: 45). Since the Ottoman Empire was, until 1878, still a state of which
forty per cent of all citizens were non-Muslims, this therefore also implied
a process of secularisation.
During the approximately twenty-year period between 1856 and 1876, this
‘ottomanism’ (Turkish term: ittihadi anasır, unity of the elements)
provided an ideological guideline for political activity. It eventually culmi-
nated in the proclamation of the Ottoman constitution and in elections for
the first Ottoman parliament, both in 1876. The constitution made no
mention of a state religion and non-Muslims were proportionally repre-
sented in parliament. At the same time, however, constitution and parlia-
ment were still advocated with reference to Islamic arguments, as had been
the case with the first great reformation decree less than forty years earlier.
This line of argumentation was embedded in a discourse shaped during the
1860 by a group of young bureaucrats, the so-called ‘Young Ottomans’.
They defended liberal values using Islamic arguments and tried to show,
through reinterpretation of Koranic texts and Islamic traditions, that
democracy was actually intrinsic to Islam (Zürcher 1995: 80; Mardin 1979:
381-443).
In this respect, the lost war of 1877-1888 against Russia represented a
watershed. It had followed a dramatic course and had ended with Russian
troops entering the suburbs of Istanbul. The Ottoman Empire’s subsequent
loss of territory under the Treaty of Berlin prompted large groups of
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Muslims to leave the Balkan and Caucus regions, thus radically changing
the Empire’s population make-up. After 1878, more than eighty per cent
were Muslims. Ottoman citizenship, as laid down in the constitution and
in parliament, had not been able to protect the country from disaster. Its
ideological foundations had thus been discredited, and the state now faced
the task of finding another ideological vehicle to unite the shaken Empire’s
newcomers and native populations (Yavuz 2003: 43-44).
During the long reign of Sultan Abdülhamit II (r. 1876-1909) the goalposts
were moved. This Ottoman sultan, who now also strongly emphasised his
religious function as caliph, launched an ideological offensive aimed at
creating a new foundation for solidarity among the Empire’s Muslim
subjects. Like the Hapsburgs in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the
Romanov’s Russia, the Ottomans answered the threats of nationalism and
liberalism by launching an ‘official nationalism’ whose strong religious
undertones should provide the monarchy with a new mysticism and power
of expression (Deringil 1998: 47, 67; Anderson 1991: 83-111).
The Ottoman court’s ambitions to employ Islam as social cement and a
means for bolstering state-power, prompted unprecedented state interfer-
ence both with the content and the spread of the faith. Islam had to be loyal
to the state, uniform and controllable on a scale hitherto unknown. Thus,
there emerged regulations for publishers of the Koran, for religious educa-
tion at schools and for sermons in the mosques. The most important
outcome of this standardising of Islam by the state was the codification,
modelled on a European code, of religious law, the Mecelle. This standard
text, the fruit of many years’ work by a state commission, was distributed
to the far-flung corners of the Empire (Deringil 1998: 50).
Sultan Abdülhamit’s Islam policy was in no way a simple reversion to old
Ottoman traditions. Its ideological drive paralleled an enormous expansion
of modern education, means of communications (telegraph-lines, rail-
ways) and printing. The modern state, with its aspirations to regulate the
lives of its citizens right down to the finest detail, was born in this era, and
the Republic of Turkey would be inconceivable without the legacy of
Abdülhamit.
The constitutional revolution of July 1908 led directly to the reinstatement
of the constitution and of parliament, which had been suspended in 1878.
Indirectly (in April 1909) it also caused the fall of Sultan Abdülhamit. Both
these events were the doing of the so-called ‘Young Turks’, young officers
and civil servants who had been schooled in the modern, European-
inspired educational institutions that had been developed under the reign
of Abdülhamit. These Young Turks saw the old regime as corrupt and
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powerless, particularly against Europe, and they considered the time ripe
for a national revival. In their view, a constitutional parliamentary regime
provided not a goals in itself but merely one of several technical devices to
bring about this revival (Haniogˇlu 1995: 214-16). 
The regime of the Young Turks, which would last from 1908 until 1918, was
in some respects a continuation of Abdülhamit’s regime. These Young
Turks, who almost all came from the ranks of state civil servants, also
strived for an increase in state power and for centralisation and standardi-
zation. This quickly brought them into conflict with the non-Islamic popu-
lation of the Empire, who had expected the constitutional revolution to
provide exactly the opposite, i.e. decentralisation and even autonomy.
After the start of the Balkan War (1912), when the Ottoman Empire was
attacked by four Christian Balkan states, the ‘Muslim/non-Muslim’
antithesis had become the fault-line running through the entire society
(see also sect. 2.5). As in the time of Abdülhamit, the Young Turks
mobilised the population on the basis of a nationalist ideology whose
unifying element was Islam, or at least belonging to an Islamic population
group (Zürcher: Karpat (ed.) 2000: 150-179).
Paradoxically, the Young Turks, who propagated a nationalism based on
religious ‘markers’, were anything but devoted or traditional Muslims.
They were heavily influenced by materialism and positivism. They saw the
role of Islam primarily as that of social cement, and were simultaneously
driven by a strong anticlericalism. Islam had to be cleared from its supersti-
tious mysticism and from the narrow conservatism of its ulema. Such
elements should no longer be allowed to influence the administration, nor
hinder the freedom of thought (Zürcher, ‘Ottoman sources of Kemalist
thought’). The resulting ‘true’ Islam would be progressive and open to
science and technology. According to some of the more extreme Young
Turkish writers, Islam was not only the pre-eminently rational religion,
but it was actually identical to positivism. Islam needed to be made consis-
tent with science, or as Abdullah Cevdet, one of the most secularist of the
Young Turkish thinkers, put it: “Religion is the science of the masses and
science is the religion of the elite” (Haniogˇlu 1997: 133-158).
Several conceptions of the Young Turks did indeed lead to concrete meas-
ures that limited the authority of the religious experts and the holy law still
further and that also increased the state’s grip on Islam. In 1916, the
s¸eyhülislam, the highest mufti, lost his cabinet seat and his ministry was
downgraded to a department. He lost his jurisdiction over the religious
courts to the Ministry of Justice, while the administration of religiously
inspired foundations, the evkaf, was transferred to the Ministry of Finance.
The latter measure was very drastic indeed, since all religious and charita-
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ble institutes in the Empire, such as mosques, medreses (religious acade-
mies), hospitals and libraries, depended financially on foundations which
had been set up by benefactors in an earlier age. Islamic institutions thus
lost their financial independence and religious schools were now placed
under the supervision of the Ministry of Education. In 1917, the govern-
ment also had the family law re-codified. While it is true that the customs
of the different religious communities (for Muslims, the rules of the s¸eriat)
remained intact, the mere fact that the state judiciary could now supervise
the implementation of these rules, was a step in the direction of secular-
ism. The adoption in 1917 of the European (Gregorian) calendar further
highlighted the separation of state and Islam (Dumont in Landau (ed.)
1984: 37-38).
In terms of both their underlying world view and actual measures, the
Young Turks during this period paved the way for the future ‘Kemalist
revolution’ that would take shape in the Republic of Turkey in the 1920s.
2.1.4 the kemalist ideal
Unlike for the rest of Europe, for Turkey (and in a way also for Russia) the
First World War ended in 1922 rather than 1918. Through a bitter war of
independence, fought not directly against the victors of the First World
War, Great Britain and France, but against their local allies, the Armenians
in the east and the Greeks in the west, the Ottomans managed to reverse a
further subdivision of what remained of their Empire. This victory eventu-
ally materialised in the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), through which present-
day Turkey appeared on the map as an independent national state. As a
result of this victory, there was no longer a need to appeal to religion for
mobilising the population. From 1923, all attention could thus be devoted
to developing the country.
Mustafa Kemal Pasja (after 1934: Atatürk), the leader of the independence
struggle and after October 1923 the first president of the new Republic of
Turkey, belonged to a radical faction of the Young Turks. They shared a
deep conviction that only rationalism and knowledge could serve as the
basis upon which to accelerate Turkey’s modernisation. Their discourse on
Islam perfectly matched that of the Young Turks prior to 1918. Time and
again, Mustafa Kemal emphasised he was not against Islam, because ‘true’
Islam was a rational and natural religion. At the same time, he seized every
possible opportunity to attack the ulema and in particular those religious
leaders that were not linked to the state, such as Sufi sheikhs, miracle
workers and holy men. Islam, as propagated by Kemal, was a personal
conviction which required no intermediaries between God and the indi-
vidual.
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In practice, these views resulted in various confrontations with Islamism
in Turkey. Firstly, the process was completed of bringing religious institu-
tions wholly under state control. The state itself became officially secular in
1928. Secondly, in 1924 the caliphate was abolished, as was separate reli-
gious education. True, the 1924 constitution did record Islam as the state
religion, but this passage was deleted in 1928. The function of s¸eyhülislam
was abolished, and replaced by a new body, the Directorate of Religious
Affairs (Diyanet I˙s¸leri Bas¸kanlıgˇı, Diyanet), which fell directly under the
premier. This body had complete authority over all religious aspects of
Turkish life, controlling mosques, sacred tombs and Dervish monasteries
(until they were closed in 1925), and appointing not only preachers
(imams) and other functionaries connected to the mosques, but also all
muftis (advisors on matters of faith). From its new capital in Ankara, it
supplied instructions on the content of both sermons and religious advice.
Paradoxically, the secular Republic of Turkey thus appropriated greater reli-
gious authority than the sultan-caliph ever had (Dumont in Landau (ed.)
1984: 38).
These measures were in fact the epilogue to a century of secularisation of
institutions, providing a logical continuation of the measures taken by the
Young Turks in 1916-1917. The position of the ulema was even further
undermined when in 1926 the sacred law was abolished in family law,
which had been its only remaining area of enforcement. The substitution
of the 19th-century codification of the s¸eriat, the Mecelle, for an adaptation
of the Swiss civil code, was a radical step that is still unique in the present-
day Islamic world.
Whereas state-linked Islamism was brought under strict control,
autonomous Islamic movements, especially the mystical brotherhoods
(tarikats), were simply abolished in 1925. Dervish monasteries (tekkes),
which formed the local centres of the brotherhoods, were closed, as were
the sacred tombs (türbes), which were often popular places of pilgrimage.
The issue of the tarikats, their role in the society and their legacy is of such
importance that it is dealt with separately in section 2.2.
Measures such as the introduction of Swiss family law or the banning of
dervish orders had a direct impact on the personal lives of people from all
walks of life, thus causing considerably more dissatisfaction and protest
than the earlier abolition of institutions such as the caliphate or the func-
tion of s¸eyhülislam. The same was true for several other measures which
can probably best be described as outright attacks on Islamic culture. The
1920s and 1930s were a period in which Turkey’s outward appearance
changed dramatically as a result of legislation that overhauled the public
experience of space and time. Dress codes banning traditional headdress,
turkey’s current islamic landscape
103
WRR-69 / English  26-08-2004  00:08  Pagina 103
the introduction of the European calendar and European clocks, the 
replacement of Arabic writing with the Latin alphabet, the laying-out of
parks and terraces, the erection of statues of Atatürk – all these were actions
not directly relating to faith, but clearly involving a reorientation away from
Middle Eastern culture and towards Europe. However, in many cases the
masses took this message as an attack on religion. In the Middle East, head-
dress had for centuries served as a distinguishing element to identify a per-
son’s social and religious standing, while Arabic writing was immediately
associated with the language of the Koran, especially by villagers whose
only contact with written culture was mosque-related. Thus the cultural
offensive had strong anti-Islamic connotations (Zürcher 1993: 194-197).
The metamorphosis of at least the urban part of Turkey also deeply impres-
sed foreigners. Countless visitors stated their admiration for the ‘new’
Turkey in books with such revealing titles as The Veils have Dropped! or
Allah Dethroned. These writers generally had no idea of what had happened
in the one hundred years preceding the secularisation of Turkey, ascribing
these changes exclusively to Atatürk’s Republic.
During the first twenty years of its existence, top-ranking highly-educated
Ottoman ulema could provide the Republic with religious knowledge.
Unlike their Young Turkish predecessors, who had tried to modernise the
curricula of religious training colleges, the Kemalists thought little of
reforming training colleges for the ulema. Thus, in 1930-1931 the county’s
two-dozen colleges for imams and preachers were closed and in 1935, its
only remaining theological faculty, at the University of Istanbul, under-
went the same fate. The long-term effect was to create a lost generation, a
‘missing link’ in Turkish Islam and a breach in the great Ottoman tradition
of religious scholarship.
The fact that the Kemalists actually pursued a policy of driving back Islam
from public life, reflected their awareness of their own minority position.
They saw themselves as the teachers of a backward nation, whose mission
it was to drag the people, kicking and screaming, into the modern world
according to the Kemalist maxim, ‘despite the people for the people’ (halka
rag˘men halk için). They recognised the mobilising power of Islamic slogans
and were constantly on the look-out for ‘religious reaction’ (irtica). This
term, which is still today continuously used by secularists in Turkey, first
became fashionable during the Islam-inspired counterrevolution of April
1909, which had been a traumatic event for the entire generation of Young
Turks to which Atatürk and his followers also belonged. Less than a year
after the constitutional revolution, the ‘liberators’ were driven from the
capital by a mob chanting Islamic slogans. Even though troops led by
Young Turks managed to end the revolt within two weeks, the mortal
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danger of a politically exploited Islam was indelibly printed in the memory
of the Young Turks. Under the Republic, they continued to interpret any
signs of opposition in this light. This was true of the Kurdish uprising in
1925, the murder in 1930 of a reserve officer by a group of Dervish in Mene-
men near Izmir, the rise of Sait Nursî and many more minor incidents (see
also sect. 2.2.6). Fear of a combination of malevolent Islamic reactionaries
and underdeveloped, manipulable popular masses, has motivated hard-
line Kemalists to this day. 
This tough anti-Islamic policy stance was continued by Atatürk’s succes-
sors after his death in 1938 until, for a variety of reasons, the ending of the
Second World War made it impossible to pursue.
2.1.5 t wo interpretations of secul arism
Almost immediately after the end of the Second World War in Europe,
I˙smet I˙nönü, Atatürk’s successor as president and leader of the party,
signalled that Turkey would embark on the road to democracy. There were
both external and domestic reasons for choosing this path. Turkey had
remained neutral for practically the entire war, but at the very end had
joined the United Nations (un) and had also signed its charter. From 1946
on, it emerged that Turkey was being subjected to intense pressure from
the Soviet Union, which it could not withstand without assistance. With
the declaration of the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and the availability of
Marshall Aid, the United States became Turkey’s most important political
and economic partner, and fulfilling American demands in the spheres of
democratisation and economic liberalism became a matter of life and death.
At the same time, domestic tension had increased considerably throughout
the war years, which for most people had been years of authoritarian
oppression and impoverishment.
In 1946, Turkey became a multi-party democracy. This immediately
affected the relationship between the state and Islam. Competition for
electoral support now really began to matter, and over 75 per cent of the
voters still lived in rural areas. Both there and in the small provincial
towns, a conservative, strongly religious outlook dominated which had
hardly been touched by the Kemalist cultural revolution. In its quest for
electoral support, the government allowed Islam some more breathing
space. Islamic education at school, albeit optional for the moment, was
reintroduced and the theological faculty was reopened. A few training
programmes for preachers re-appeared, and in 1948, for the first time in a
generation, some Turks could make the pilgrimage to Mecca. The final cabi-
net of the Kemalist regime (1949-1950) was even led by S¸msettin Günaltay,
a professor of Islamic theology.
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It was all to no avail. Despite its u-turn, the Republican People’s Party
which had upheld 25 years of authoritarian and secularist policy, had lost
all credibility in the eyes of the population. The May 1950 elections were
won, with a large majority, by the opposition Democratic Party under the
leadership of Adnan Menderes. In contrast to the Republican People’s
Party, the Democratic Party had derived its power from the backing of local
networks, which in the 1950s discovered the value of their support. This
made the party sensitive to the needs and perceptions of the people. As a
result, the Democratic Party and its successors have often been accused by
secularists in Turkey of exploiting religious policies and gambling with
Atatürk’s legacy. But this is at most a half-truth.
It is true that Menderes made concessions to the religious sentiments of the
population. One of the first things he did was allowing the azan (call to
prayer) to be made in Arabic again. Furthermore, religious education in
schools was expanded and more training programmes for imams and
preachers sprung up. The sale of religious literature was permitted and the
Democratic Party sought the support of religious movements such as the
Nurcus (sect. 2.2.6) during elections. Even so, there was no meddling
whatsoever with the secular character of the state and legislation. A return
to Islamic legislation or a relaxation of state control over muftis and
mosques was never considered. When in 1950 a group of radical religious
activists of the Ticani Dervish order vandalised busts of Atatürk, a strict
law preventing the desecration of Atatürk’s memory was immediately
pushed through parliament (Zürcher 1993: 243-5; Yavuz 2003: 61-2).
Menderes and his followers reacted outspokenly to the continuous accusa-
tions by the Republican People’s Party that they were undermining secu-
larism. Against the Kemalist view of secularism as a defence mechanism
protecting the freedom of thought from Islamic interference, they
proposed a secularism that would guarantee citizen’s freedom of religion.
Secularism should not be anti-religious and should be limited to matters of
state and constitution.
Although the Turkish army repeatedly intervened in the political process,
notably through the coup of May 1960 and the ‘coup by memorandum’ of
March 1971, and also through several warnings and demonstrations in 
the intermediate period, the political current represented by Menderes
remained the dominant political force throughout the 1960s and 1970s.
After 1965, the successor to the Democratic Party, Süleyman Demirel’s
True Path Party, managed to attract the majority of the Democratic Party’s
former supporters. The Islam policy of this large conservative people’s
party remained largely identical to that of Menderes’ party. Demirel stated
repeatedly that, although the state was secular and should remain so, this
did not mean that the individual should also be secular. Islam was appreci-
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ated as a moral code that provided strength to Turkish society. During the
Cold War years, politicians of a more conservative orientation even saw
Islamic standards and values, along with Kemalist nationalism, as an essen-
tial counterweight to the threats of socialism and communism. Religious
movements benefited from this view by becoming even more integrated
into the mainstream of Turkish politics (Yavuz 2003: 62).
2.1.6 isl am in politics and ‘state- isl am’
Apart from a growing interest in Islam by non-religious parties, the 1960s
also witnessed the rise of explicitly Islamic, or Islamist, political move-
ments. That is to say, movements whose political manifesto are (also)
based on Islamic guidelines. The new constitution that was adopted in
1961, gave more room to Islamic political movements.
The rise of an Islamic political movement was not due to an increase in
piety among the population, but to the specific socio-economic develop-
ments of the 1960s. These were the years when Turkey built up a large and
powerful industrial sector and also saw the rise of a considerable, and
frequently militant, labour movement. The esnaf (small entrepreneurs)
had increasing difficulties identifying with the policies of the larger parties,
which were strongly geared to big business (in the case of the Justice Party)
or to civil servants and organised labour (the Republican People’s Party).
By the end of the 1960s, these small entrepreneurs had managed to take
over the control of the Union of Chambers of Commerce of Turkey from
the big industrialists in Istanbul. Their representative became the presi-
dent. This was Necmettin Erbakan, a partially German-educated professor
of mechanical engineering at the Technical University of Istanbul, who in
1969 was elected to parliament as an independent representative for the
conservative town of Konya. In 1970, together with a few other parliamen-
tarians, he formed the National Order Party, which was banned for anti-
secular activities when in March 1971 the Turkish army seized power
behind the scenes. In 1973, Erbakan became the leader of a new party, or
rather, his old party under a new name: the National Salvation Party. It
gave a leading role to members of religious brotherhoods, in particular to
members of a branch of the Naks¸ibendis (sect. 2.2.4). Erbakan also
belonged, and still belongs, to this order. 
Since 1973, the ideology of Erbakan’s party was referred to as ‘National
Vision’ (Milli Görüs¸). Its manifesto included typically Islamist points, such
as an emphasis on ethics and morality in education and upbringing, as well
as the fight against usury and corruption. Surprisingly, though, the mani-
festo also strongly emphasised secularism. Freedom of opinion and freedom
of expression were qualified as the foundations of democracy and human
turkey’s current islamic landscape
107
WRR-69 / English  26-08-2004  00:08  Pagina 107
rights. However, it was a different interpretation of secularism than that of
the Kemalists. What was meant was complete freedom of religion, without
state control. The Kemalist notion of secularism was rejected as the ‘dicta-
torship of the non-believers’. From the start, therefore, Erbakan’s political 
agenda gave priority to the withdrawal of all articles from the penal code
and the constitution that banned the political uses of religion (Erbakan 1975).
In the changeable climate of the 1970s, with increasing labour unrest and
political and societal dislocation resulting from the economic crisis, the
National Salvation Party proved attractive to a sizeable part of the tradi-
tionally-oriented electorate. In the 1973 elections, it received twelve per
cent of the vote, thus becoming essential in helping coalitions gain a major-
ity. It subsequently used this power to fill all strategic posts in ‘its’
ministries with its own party members.
In the eyes of the voters, the party’s participation in established politics
meant that it also shared responsibility for the policies that had failed to end
the economic crisis and to quell political violence in the streets. In the 1977
elections, therefore, support for the party dropped to under nine per cent.
However, National Salvation Party activists remained firmly in control of
parts of the state apparatus. When the military intervened in September
1980, Erbakan’s party was banned, along with all other political organisa-
tions. Erbakan himself was prosecuted, though finally acquitted. In the
1980s, the core of the party’s activities shifted to Europe, where supporters
of National Vision had much more room to manoeuvre than in Turkey itself
(Zürcher in Driessen (ed.) 1997: 365-7).
The other islamist political movement that acquired influence in the 1970s
and 1980s was the so-called ‘Turkish-Islamist Synthesis’. This ideology
was systematically developed in the 1970s by the writer I˙brahim Kafesogˇlu.
It assumed that Islam had a special appeal to Turks, since the original Islam
of the prophet Mohammed had a lot in common with the culture of the
Central Asian Turks. They shared a high regard for justice, monotheism, a
belief in the immortal soul and a strong devotion to family and decency.
Therefore, it was the Turkish people’s mission to be exceptional ‘soldiers of
Islam’. For the supporters of this ideology, Islam and the National Vision
were inextricably linked to modern Turkish culture.
The Turkish-Islamist Synthesis was first embraced by an organisation call-
ing itself the ‘Hearth-fires of the Enlightened Souls’ (Aydın Ocakları). It
was a club set up in 1970 by leading figures from business, politics and
university which aimed at challenging all the left-wing intellectuals who
used to control political and ideological discussion in those days. They
would be taken on with their own weapons: conferences, forums, publica-
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tions, etc. Despite the secular Kemalist tradition of the Turkish officer’s
corps, quite a few members of the military were interested in this move-
ment. In the second half of the 1970s, the Synthesis ideology also gained
popularity amongst supporters of the Nationalist Action Party. Created
from yet another splinter party in 1969, this was a radical (reactionary)
right-wing party led be an ex-colonel, Alpsalan Türkes. Its support came
mainly from conservative Sunni Turks residing in the wide belt bisecting
Anatolia, where the population is heavily mixed (Turks vs Kurds and
Sunnis vs Alevis). During the early years of its existence, it propagated an
ultra-nationalistic brand of Kemalism, but by the mid-1970s the Turkish-
Islamist Synthesis obtained the upper hand.
Türkes’s Nationalist Action Party was even more successful than Erbakan’s
National Salvation Party in acquiring support from the poorly educated
and impoverished youth of the city slums. These places were the breeding
grounds for the young stormtrooper-like commandoes who, under the
banner of ‘Idealists’ (Ülkücü), and wearing their Grey Wolf emblem,
captured the streets from left-wing activists. Türkes’s party was also
banned after the 1980 coup d’état and, like Erbakan, he was prosecuted but
eventually acquitted (Zürcher in Driessen (ed.) 1997: 367).
In 1980, a junta led by General Kenan Evren, the son of an imam, took
control. He did not stop at banning the other religiously-oriented parties,
but instead unleashed an all-inclusive ideological offensive, in which Islam
occupied a central role. The Islam that was officially approved and propa-
gated by the military leadership, had much in common with the Turkish-
Islamist Synthesis. A few leading members of the ‘Hearth-fires of the
Enlightened Souls’ also played major roles in shaping this new ideology
(Yavuz 2003, 71-73). It had a strong nationalist character, emphasised the
link between state and nation, national unity and social harmony and it
glorified military and authoritarian values. In addition, Islam was
presented as an ‘enlightened’ religion, open to science and technology
(Evren 1986: 221). The goal of this ideological offensive was to render Turk-
ish youth immune to both socialist propaganda and the temptations of
radical Islamic movements that were not controlled by the state.
The islamisation of state ideology also dictated a radical reinterpretation of
the legacy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. He was now presented as a reformer
of Islam. And secularism was presented as a necessary step in purifying
Islam and creating a ‘true Islam’ (Yavuz 2003: 70-1).
Starting in 1982, this ‘state-Islam’ was mostly propagated through educa-
tion. It formed the basis of the National Cultural Report (1983) of the State
Planning Bureau (Poulton 1997: 184). Lessons in religion and ethics were
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made compulsory for all classes and the state-controlled media (radio and
television) also spread the message. The Directorate of Religious Affairs
remained just as tied to the state as before, but in 1982 its existence and
tasks were constitutionally fixed. These tasks reflected the close ties
between religion and nationalism that were now propagated. The Direc-
torate had to “protect the Turkish national identity” – a phrase borrowed
directly from Kafesogˇlu’s original programme (Poulton 1997: 185-7). Mate-
rially, it profited from this new policy line: staff membership grew from
50,765 in 1979 to 84,172 ten years later. That the spread of ‘correct’ Islam
was not limited to Turkey, could be witnessed by the Directorate’s staff
numbers working in Europe, which increased from 20 to 628 over the same
period (Poulton 1997: 185-7).
Curiously, when observing this instrumentalisation of Islam as the state’s
ideological weapon by the military and its successors in the 1980s, one is
somehow strongly reminded of the policies of Sultan Abdülhamit II,
exactly a century earlier. 
2.1.7 isl amic break through and kemalist revival 
The Islam policy of the military rulers is often described as paving the 
way for the Islamist breakthrough during the 1994 and 1995 elections of
Erbakan’s re-created and renamed Welfare Party (of 1983) (Sunier 1998: 
23-4). The idea behind this is that, once you open the door to Islam, there is
no longer a choice of what kind of Islam may enter. Demographic develop-
ments, however, certainly also played role. The 1980s and early 1990s
witnessed a period of unprecedented migration into Turkey’s main cities. 
A city like Istanbul doubled in size in this period, and its new migrants
formed the majority of the urban (municipal) electorate. In this new envi-
ronment, the existence of migrants depended heavily on private networks
and mystical brotherhoods (sect. 2.2). These penetrated all social levels and
provided the networks par excellence to assist newcomers in finding
employment, housing and fuel. It was only logical that the migrants’s who
were accepted into these networks also followed the electoral advice of
their leaders.
As we have seen at the beginning of this chapter, the breakthrough of the
Welfare Party in 1994-1995 not only caused widespread panic within
Turkey’s secular establishment, but also led to vigorous intervention by the
military. After the fall of Erbakan and the dissolution of the Welfare Party
one year later, its parliamentarians reorganised themselves in the so-called
Virtue Party. Against all expectations, they did relatively badly during the
national elections of April 1999. They failed to mobilise the anger among
the old Welfare Party’s supporters and ended up in third place. This poor
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showing ultimately led to the long-awaited split within the Islamic move-
ment of the National Vision. The old guard, Necmettin Erbakan’s circle,
was heavily dominated by members of the Naks¸ibendi brotherhood and
stuck to a very religiously-coloured manifesto (sect. 2.2.4). When the
Virtue Party was also banned in June 2001, it re-emerged as the Felicity
Party. The younger party leaders, including Recep Tayyip Erdogˇan (the
former mayor of greater Istanbul) and Abdullah Gül, saw this as a dead-end
road – both because they realised that a strictly Islamic party would never
be accepted as a governing party by the state apparatus (the lesson of
February 1997), and because they expected such a party to cater for not
more than about twenty per cent of the Turkish electorate. In August 2001,
therefore, they launched the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve
Kalkınma Partisi or ak Party). It deliberately presented itself as a broad
conservative party that respected Islamic standards and values but
eschewed an explicitly religious manifesto. The ‘Justice’ part of the name
specifically recalled the Justice Party, the broad conservative people’s party
which, as a right-wing popular party between 1961 and 1980, had taken
over the torch from Menderes’ Democratic Party.
During the Islamist breakthrough of 1994-1995, a countermovement had
meanwhile developed. While the fall of Erbakan had, to a large extent, 
been the work of the military leadership, in the following years the military
also instigated a broad civil Atatürkçülük movement (‘atatürkism’). This
defensive movement believed that the nation’s security was threatened 
by militant Islam and Kurdish separatism, which in turn were seen to be
manipulated by dark ‘foreign forces’ intent on dividing Turkey. Its support-
ers expected the state, and in particular the military, to come to their 
‘rescue’. They also continued to demand measures to defend secularism.
The Atatürkçülük movement’s attitude towards democracy and human
rights is ambivalent. To prevent the threat of an Islamic takeover or
Turkey’s fragmentation, its supporters rely on a ‘strong state’, and are
generally willing to accept limitations to democratic rights. They are quick
to qualify pluriformity as a weakness (Yavuz 2003: 263). Atatürkists of this
persuasion are often convinced that Islam, unlike Christianity, cannot be
domesticated within a democratic secular system. Among all their larger,
and more active civil organisations, the most outspoken ones were (and
are) the Association of Atatürkist Thought (Atatürkçü Düs¸ünce Dernegˇi)
and the Associate for Support for Contemporary Life (Çagˇdas¸ Yas¸amı
Destekleme Dernegˇi). The supporters of this civil atatürkism took a very
dim view of the 12 September 1980 coup and its legacy, the spread of the
Turkish-Islamist Synthesis. The junta of 1980 is seen as a group of ‘false
Kemalists’ who invited fundamentalism in through the backdoor (Erdogˇan
in Yerasimos et al. (ed.) 2000: 251-2; 277-8).
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Interestingly, both the Islamists and the Atatürkists employ an opposition
discourse. Each movement views itself as the weaker party fighting for a
good cause. The Islamists consider themselves the victims of an omnipo-
tent and unjust state, whereas the Atatürkists believe that Atatürk’s legacy
has been squandered and that ‘real’ Atatürkists no longer have access to
political power (Erdogˇan in Yerasimos et al. (ed.) 2000: 251-2; 261-2).
During the years of Kemalist restoration after February 1997, and certainly
after the 1999 elections, state-oriented secularists in Turkey appeared to be
winning, but internal conflicts in the ruling coalition in 2002 made fresh
elections inevitable. These elections caused a political landslide. The earlier
mentioned ak Party received more than 34 per cent of the vote which, due
to the idiosyncracies of the Turkish electoral system, translated into two-
thirds of the parliamentary seats. This victory was so overwhelming that it
had become impossible to form a government without the inclusion of the
ak Party. It was a fait accompli that the state apparatus also accepted.
Since the 2002 elections and the coming to power of the ak Party under
Erdogˇan, a bipolar system has been operational in Turkey. The state and the
governing party each have a fundamentally different notion of secularism.
Supported by the secularist opposition and Atatürkist civil movements,
the state seeks to associate itself with the traditions of the 1930s and 1940s,
when secularism was seen as a barrier to safeguard liberty against Islamic
forces. The governing party, in turn, associates itself much more with the
traditions of Menderes, Demirel and Özal (founder of the Motherland
Party in 1983). It believes that a secular state should also provide room for
religious individuals to express their standards and values.
At the moment, recovery from the deep financial and economic crisis of
2001 and attempts to obtain eu membership mean that state and politics
have a common interest in making their marriage-of-convenience work.
The ak Party in particular has a lot to gain from pushing through the
reforms needed to fulfil the eu’s Copenhagen criteria. After all, these
reforms tend to transfer state power to actors in society. However, there
are constant irritations endangering this symbiosis. These tend to flare up
in connection with phenomena that have assumed a symbolic value
during the Republic’s history of secularisation – questions such as dress
codes (and the banning of the headscarf) in education and within the state
apparatus, on which fierce political debates has raged over the last twenty
years (Göle 1996).
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2.2 official doctrine versus tarikats and neo -
movements 
2.2.1 mystical order s and current affair s 
Turkish mystical Islamic brotherhoods (tarikats) were dissolved and
banned in 1925, and their properties transferred to the state. And yet there
is something odd about them. Whoever wants to visit, for example, the
tomb of the holy mystic Celaleddin Rumi in Konya, can happily go there as
a tourist – with pleasure, since the complex is a museum that falls under
the authority of the Turkish Ministry of Culture. Once inside, the visitor
will notice that countless Turkish visitors, mainly women, are actually on
pilgrimage. Devotion and commerce seem to go hand in hand on this spot.
Both Rumi texts and Rumi trinkets are for sale in and around the museum,
and there are regular tourist performances of Mevlevi-Dervish’s ritual
dances in for instance the local sports hall. In places like this, signs of devo-
tion are omnipresent – votive offerings are left and visitors can sometimes
be found in a state of ecstasy, wandering around with tears in their eyes
(Shankland 1999: 67).
Almost eighty years after their abolition, the various mystical orders still
make the news on an almost daily basis. Especially since the mid-1990s,
the newspapers are full of alarming reports on the activities of religious
networks, in particular on their infiltration of the state apparatus. This
raises the question of how the Dervish orders managed to survive Turkey’s
secularisation measures and what role they play in the current Islamic
landscape.
2.2.2 isl amic mysticism 
Islam, like Judaism, is first and foremost a system of standards, values and
rules, of which Muslims believe they have been revealed by God. Living
according to the commandments of God’s law (the s¸eriat) is the first
requirement for a true believer. However, early in the history of Islam there
also emerged the need for a more direct, personal and emotional religious
experience that went beyond the mere following of God’s law. Thus,
Islamic mysticism (tassavuf or Sufism) was born. The aim of the mystic is
to go beyond the s¸eriat in order to experience divine reality (hakikat) in a
personal way. Mystics call the individual’s path towards this aim, which
runs along many intermediate stages, the tarikat (path).
Wandering mystical preachers and holy men played a leading role during
the conversions to Islam of the Turkish peoples of Western Central Asia,
and even before the start of migration to the Middle East. These mystics
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have remained influential among the Turks. Their popularity was also
partially due to their use of everyday language rather than the Arabic of
scholarly Islam.
During the era of severe crisis in the Middle East caused by the Mongol
incursions and the Crusades (1200-1300 ad), Islamic mysticism actually
blossomed. It also underwent organisational changes. Whereas previously
mystics were mostly engaged with their faith on an individual basis or in
small groups, there now began to emerge personalities who were recog-
nized as a master (mürs¸id or s¸eyh, or ‘sheikh’) by large groups of followers.
While the majority of these sheikhs had no intention whatsoever of estab-
lishing a school, their followers gradually organised themselves in mystical
orders or brotherhoods, and their teachers came to be regarded as founders.
Over time, the word tarikat obtained popularity to refer to the brother-
hoods that considered themselves the spiritual descendents of one and the
same teacher. It is in this sense that is used in Turkey to this day.
2.2.3 the tarik ats and the ottoman state 
The Ottoman Empire was home to many Sufi orders. Some of them had
their origins in Central Asia, others in Anatolia or the Arab world. They all
placed a much higher value on intuitive insight into divine truth (marifet)
than on religious knowledge obtained by learning (ilim). Nevertheless,
both the mystics themselves and their followers considered it important to
demonstrate that mysticism in no way conflicts with orthodox Sunni
teachings, even if the lifestyles and rituals of some mystics or brother-
hoods suggests otherwise.
The mystic who wants to achieve unity with God, can do so through self-
denial and absolute devotion to God, a process which requires passing
through several stages or levels. All brotherhoods are also aware of their
own specific spiritual and physical exercises aimed at accelerating this
unification process. These are called zikir, literally: ‘the commemoration’
(of God’s name). Zikir can take various shapes and forms, from a simple
repetition, in silence or not, of the first part of the profession of faith
(‘There is no god but God/Allah’) to the renowned music and dance of the
Mevlevi Dervishes (Buitelaar & Ter Haar (eds.) 1999: 9-17).
The tarikats played a very important role in the Ottoman Empire as chan-
nels between the urban and rural population and the state. The leaders of
local Dervish monasteries (tekkes) often had great authority, allowing them
to solve local conflicts through mediation. In societies in which the
cultural, power and wealth gaps between the governing elites and the
people were not only massive, but also constantly emphasised as core
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elements of the ‘world order’, the brotherhoods provided one of the few
channels that cut straight through the social strata. The vast majority of
tarikat members were not ‘full-time mystics’ but lay brothers who
combined their membership with a social function, varying from porter,
shopkeeper or professional soldier to governor. Many religious scholars
were simultaneously also mystics (Zürcher 1993: 14). Hierarchy within the
order, which was based on the individual’s acquired level of mystical
enlightenment and insight, could thus cut across a social hierarchy based
on position and status.
The Ottoman sultans systematized and organised the brotherhoods, as
they had done before when they incorporated all the ulema into an hier-
archical, controlled system previously unknown to the Middle East. The
paradox that we have encountered in official Ottoman Islam, also applied
to the mystic brotherhoods – the Ottomans incorporated the brother-
hoods into the state apparatus in a way that gave the rulers some control,
but also allowed for a growing influence of these brotherhoods on not just
the state, but also the capital (Mardin 1989: 183-5). The sultans themselves,
as well as many of the highest state functionaries, openly associated them-
selves with one or more of the tarikats. In every major town, a ‘head of 
the brotherhoods’ (s¸eyh al-turuk) was appointed, whom the state held
responsible for the conduct of the organised mystics (Geoffroy in EI2, vol.
X: 243-6).
The 19th century Ottoman sultans, from Mahmut II (r. 1808-1839) to
Abdülhamit II (r. 1876-1909), primarily took on the role of champions of
Sunni orthodoxy, but they also understood that the mystic brotherhoods
were essential for creating broad social support among the masses. Sufi
sheiks were actively used by the court for propaganda purposes, but state
control over their activities remained pivotal. Sultan Mahmut’s creation of
a Ministry for Pious Foundations had the specific purpose of controlling
the appointments of local tekke sheikhs (Abu Manneh 1979: 138; Deringil
1998: 63-6).
In the 19th and early 20th century, the mystical brotherhoods seemed to have
increased their influence and popularity even further. This can be interpret-
ed as part of the Islamic reaction to Europe’s economic, political and cultural
penetration in that period (Zürcher 1993: 200). It has also been pointed out
that the reforms of the Ottoman Empire and the Kemalist Republic during
this period actually depersonalised the traditional patrimonial system based
on personal relationships between patron and client, and replaced this by a
formal, Western-style contractual relationship. It was only within the net-
works of orders, where personal connections between master and pupil were
pivotal, that these old codes remained intact (Mardin 1989: 10-13).
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2.2.4 the nak s¸ibendi order
Of all the Sufi brotherhoods in operation during the Ottoman Empire and
the Turkish Republic, the Naks¸ibendi order undoubtedly played the most
important role. It went all the way back to 14th century, where Bahaeddin
Naks¸bend lived in Bukhara, present-day Uzbekistan. During the 15th and 16
centuries, his order spread through all of Central Asia, even reaching the
Indian subcontinent. In India in the 18th century, the order gave birth to a
movement for renewal, which reached the Ottoman Empire through the
preachings of Mevlana Khalid Baghdadi (1776-1827).
Inspired by these events in India, Khalid introduced two significant
reforms that became charcteristic to the Naks¸ibendi movement in the
Ottoman Empire: the compulsory retreat for novices and the doctrine of
the rabita, the unbreakable spiritual bond between the master and his
pupil. Clearly, these changes considerably assisted discipline and cohesion
within the order. The Khalidi version of the Naks¸ibendi doctrine soon
became dominant in the regions under Ottoman control. It placed itself
emphatically on the side of Sunni orthodoxy and stressed the importance
of obedience to the rules of the holy law. One could also say this highly
influential Dervish order was directed against the Western-style reforms
of the Tanzimat era (1839-1871) and against the later reforms of the Young
Turks. Instead, it was closely linked to the Islamist policies of Sultan
Abdülhamit II (Zarcone in EI2, vol. X: 332-4).
2.2.5 kemalist action against the order s
On 30 November 1925, two years after the declaration of the Republic of
Turkey, the parliament in Ankara decided, under law 677, to abolish the
Dervish orders. Its centres, the tekkes, were closed and transferred to the
state. This decision was primarily dictated by the anticlericalism of the
Kemalists, for whom the mystical sheikhs, even more than the ulema,
symbolised the nation’s backwardness. Another reason was undoubtedly
the fact that their widespread networks, with their close-knit structures
and culture of obedience to the authority of religious leaders, provided
competing power bases that the Kemalist state refused to tolerate.
The orders had no other choice but to close down, resist or go under-
ground. Resistance there was, especially in the early years of the Republic,
but this was limited to more isolated incidents. Some of these incidents,
such as the murder of reserve officer Kubilay in Menemen in 1930, were
seized upon to pursue large-scale persecutions, in this case of the
Naks¸ibendis. Going underground was much easier for some orders than for
others. The Naks¸ibendis, members of the most common Dervish order,
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had a relatively easy time since they did not employ elaborate rituals
involving song and dance, and could also convene in private living rooms.
Several of their branches thus survived the Kemalist one-party dictator-
ship (1925-1945) without too many problems. Their main branche was the
I˙skenderpas¸a community in Istanbul, led by Sheikh Mehmed Zahid Kotku
(1897-1980). As the ‘spiritual father’ of the National Vision movement, he
became active in Turkish politics at the ends of the 1960s, under his pupil
Necmettin Erbakan. After Kotku’s death, the community was led by his
son-in-law, Mehmed Esat Cos¸an, who fled to Australia after the February
1997 military intervention, where he also died in 2001. His son and succes-
sor after his death, Muharrem Nurettin Cos¸an, still leads this influential
and thriving branch of the Naks¸ibendi order (Yavuz 2003: 139-142).
A key survival strategy of the Naks¸ibendis during the years of rampant
Kemalist secularism was their active lobbying for functions in the bureau-
cracy of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, the Diyanet. Several obtained
influential positions, which they could exploit when the Democratic
Party’s 1950 victory brought more tolerance for religious expression.
Although Menderes did not repeal the ban on the Dervish orders (nor did
any of his successors), by the mid-1950s, the mystic sheikhs could increas-
ingly publicly guide their followers, if not unwatched by the bastions of
secularism – the military, the public prosecutor’s office and the judiciary.
As with all the large Dervish orders, the Naks¸ibendi order over the years
split into various subbranches. Currently, there are five branches in Turkey
that consider themselves part of the order and are also recognised as such
by the other branches. Aside from the earlier mentioned I˙skenderpas¸a
community, the Erenköy community is also highly influential. There are,
however, many others that owe much of their philosophies to the
Naks¸ibendi order, but no longer qualify as part of it. This brings us into the
realm of the ‘neo-movements’ or ‘neo-tarikats’. Three of these deserve a
separate treatment: the Nurcu movement (Disciples of the Light), the
Süleymancıs (Disciples of Süleyman), and the Fethullahcılar (followers of
Fethullah), whose movement evolved out of the Nurcu movement.
2.2.6 sait nur sî and the nurcu movement
Sait Nursî (1876-1960), called Bediüzzaman (Wonder of the Age) by his
followers, was a Kurdish Naks¸ibendi. He came from a village community
and had little or no formal education. Nursî had had an ambivalent rela-
tionship with the Young Turks. He had taken part in the counterrevolution
of 1909, but had also served as a propagandist for the government in the
First World War. He had supported Mustafa Kemal Pasja’s national resist-
ance movement, but had already warned against secularist tendencies in
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1923. Prior to 1908 he had built up a reputation as a religious scholar, partic-
ularly in the southeast of Anatolia. After the Kurdish ‘Sheikh Sait Uprising’
of 1925, along with many other prominent Kurds, he was arrested and
deported to the town of Isparta in the west of the country. Since the 1920s,
he had begun to record his religious ideas in books and pamphlets, which
later became known as the Risale-i Nur – Külliyatı (‘Message of the Light –
Collected Works’). In his work he called upon Muslims to make God’s indi-
visibility the foundation of their lives, but he also urged them to study and
employ modern Western science and technology to further the cause of
Islam. Since he saw the Muslim community as the only true basis for social
cohesion, he rejected nationalism. A large part of his work consisted of
calls to use in-depth-study of the Koran as a stepping stone from which to
reform and adapt Islam to the needs of the modern age, thus facilitating its
use in the fight against materialism and positivism (Yavuz 2000: 7, 14). The
collected statements of Sait Nursî took many directions, were often
obscure or multi-interpretable, but that merely increased their appeal to a
wide range of different groups (Karpat in EI2, vol. VIII: 143-4).
Between 1935 and 1953, Sait Nursî was arrested several times and tried for
the political use of religion, but while he did preach social mobilisation and
rejected both secularism and nationalism, he did not directly involve
himself in political matters. His writings were banned during the Kemalist
period, but they were copied out by hand by his ever wider circle of disci-
ples. Under Menderes, whom he increasingly supported throughout the
1950s, he was given more breathing space for his preaching. Secularists,
however, considered his public support for only one political party as an
horrendous example of the political abuse of religion. After his death in
1960, the Nurcu movement, as it was now called, continued to grow. It
became influential both in Turkey itself and amongst Turkish immigrants
in European countries (Zürcher 1993: 201).
Sait Nursî did not look upon his movement as a tarikat in the classic sense
of the word and he did not seen himself as a sheikh, but as an imam (Karpat
in EI2, vol. VIII: 143-4). Indeed, he was not succeeded after his death, as
would have been the case with a true Dervish order. Instead, the written
account of his message, the Risale, has become the centrepiece of his
rapidly expanding community of followers. Due to the importance of this
text for their movement, the Nurcus have also applied themselves success-
fully to printing and publishing.
The political differences in the Turkey during the 1970s and 1980s also led
to schisms within the Nurcu movement. When, in 1970, the first true
Islamist party (Erbakan’s National Order Party, later National Salvation
Party) was formed by members of the I˙skenderpas¸a movement, several
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Nurcus gave it their support, while the majority remained loyal to Süley-
man Demirel’s Justice Party. A more serious schism occurred on the occa-
sion of the military coup d’état in September 1980. The military were
supported by a few prominent Nurcu leaders, such as Mehmet Kırkıncı in
Erzurum and Fethullah Gülen in Izmir, but they were fiercely opposed by a
group called Yeni Asya (‘New Asia’, a newspaper), which continued to
support deposed prime minister Demirel. In the early 1980s, this split
eventually gave rise to two new branches, one supporting Turgut Özal and
his Motherland Party, and the other supporting Demirel, who had mean-
while been banned from politics. However, politics was not the only factor
behind these splits in the Nurcu movement. There are currently ten differ-
ent Nurcu movements, with ideas ranging from the extremely fundamen-
talist to the modernist (Yavuz 2003: 179).
2.2.7 the süleymancis
The founder of the second large Islamic ‘neo-movement’ in Turkey, Süley-
man Hilmi Tunahan (1888-1959), was both a Naks¸ibendi sheikh and a
conservative religious scholar. Already in the 1930s and 1940s, when the
Republic had abolished all formal religious education, Tunahan had made
an effort to offer Islamic instruction. Since this was of course illegal, he had
frequent encounters with the police.
Tunahan and his followers primarily concentrated on the Koranic schools.
In 1949, when the Kemalist regime’s democratisation efforts meant that
Koranic schools were officially allowed to operate again, the Süleymancis
readily seized their chance. With 25 years of experience, they were well-
placed to train religious functionaries for positions in the bureaucracy of
the Directorate of Religious Affairs. In the 1950s and 1960s, as growing
prosperity in the countryside was accompanied by an explosive rise in the
number of mosques, many newly appointed preachers were indeed gradu-
ates of Tunahan’s schools. The Süleymancıs and the state developed a
symbiotic relationship; the Süleymancıs incorporated nationalism and
respect for the state firmly into their Islamic teaching, while the state in
turn tried to used their movement as a potential counterweight to the ever-
present communist threat.
The ‘intimate’ relationship between the Süleymancıs and the state was
disrupted after 1965. A new law for the Directorate of Religious Affairs
declared that only graduates of official schools for preachers could be
appointed. After the March 1971 military ‘coup by memorandum’, in which
the army extracted several far-reaching changes in legislation, many of the
Süleymancı’s private schools were taken over by the state. The resulting
coolness in their relationship with the state also prompted the Süleymancıs
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to explore new spheres of activity, which they found in the provision of
Islamic education to the increasingly large Turkish communities in Europe.
The Directorate of Religious Affairs had neglected the spiritual needs of
Turkish migrants in Europe, and so the Süleymancıs were fulfilling a real
need.
After the military takeover of September 1980, the Directorate was given
the task of propagating the state-sympathetic Islam of the Turkish-Islamic
Synthesis among the Turks in Europe. This led to the restoration of the
warm relationship between the Directorate and the Süleymancıs, and
allowed the latter even more room to manoeuvre. Today, the movement
runs a large network of boarding schools, especially in Germany. These use
the latest technology for the teaching and indoctrination of their pupils
(Yavuz 2003: 146-7). Discipline plays a key role. In line with the Khalidi
tradition we mentioned earlier, Süleyman Tunahan emphasised the direct
spiritual bond between the teacher (i.e. himself) and his followers. His
personality cult still plays an important role within the movement. Tuna-
han is seen as the last and most perfect of holy men. Having visions of the
sheikh and becoming absorbed into them, is considered a prerequisite for
knowledge of divine reality (Yavuz 2003: 145-7).
2.2.8 the fethull ahcil ar
A movement which shares the Süleymancı’s emphasis on education, is that
of the followers of Hoca (teacher) Fethullah Gülen, born in a village near
Erzurum, northeast Turkey, in 1941. This movement originates from the
Nurcu movement, but it has developed an entirely own identity over the
last ten years.
Fethullah Gülen, at first a follower of the Nurcu movement, began his
career as a preacher in a mosque in Izmir, but found his calling in arranging
accommodation, or boarding-houses, for poor, Islamic-oriented pupils and
students. From this start, he built up an education network of Summer
camps and intensive courses preparing for state exams. Like Tunahan, he
offered a cheap alternative to the expensive private schools used by the
urban middle classes to give their offspring a good start in life. Over the
years, countless pupils from impoverished backgrounds got the chance to
pursue a career in Turkey’s enormous administrative bureaucracy. This was
and is exactly the sort of ‘infiltration’ which greatly worries the army and
the secular middle class (Shankland 1999: 83-5).
Unlike the Süleymancıs, Fethullah and his followers have also built up a
large network of institutions for further and higher education. The liberali-
sation of Turkish education since 1983, allowed for the starting of grammer
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schools and universities run by foundations rather than by the state. The
movement immediately jumped on this development and now, twenty
years later, it administers over two hundred schools for further education
as well as seven universities. These are not just based in Turkey, but also in
Western Europe (e.g. the Islamic University of Rotterdam), in the Balkans
and in Central Asia.
Like other branches of the Nurcu movement, Fethullah Gülen attached great
importance to developing his own media. At first, he concentrated on the
printed media, such as the daily newspaper Zaman (The Times), but the
deregulation of Turkish radio and television also enabled him to launch pri-
vate radio and television stations. The best known is his television station
Samanyolu (Milky Way).
Gülen’s rise certainly benefited from the fact that, from the start, he
strongly backed the military coup of September 1980. With the assistance
of the then prime minister, and later president, Turgut Özal, who himself
had strong connections with the Naks¸ibendi order, Gülen presented
himself as the spokesman for a modern, forward-looking, and state-
sympathetic Islam. The symbiosis of the Fethullahcılar and the state
remained intact for a long time. In the mid-1990s, Fethullah Gülen was still
generally seen by the political establishment as the ‘acceptable face of
Islam’, and politicians across the spectrum, from the right (Tansu Çiller) to
the left (Bülent Ecevit) praised him and met him publicly. Gülen also
supported the military intervention of February 1997, also when this even-
tually led to the fall of the Erbakan government. He criticised Erbakan’s
Welfare Party, describing it as radical.
Despite all such attempts at portraying his movement as a pillar under the
state, the military eventually also came down on Fethullah’s movement.
This scenario perfectly fitted the u-turn of Turkey’s secularist, pro-state
movements since the mid-1990s, and it also opened the debate on the
entire legacy of the 1980 coup, including Islam’s incorporation into the
state ideology. In June 1999, the Turkish media, under directions from the
National Security Council, began a fierce campaign against Gülen. They
reported the ‘discovery’ of tapes with recordings of sermons of 1986, in
which he called on his followers to be patient and to infiltrate the state
organs from below. The Chief of the General Staff spoke openly about
Gülen’s plans to undermine the state, and in 2000 Gülen was formally
accused of attempting to alter the secular character of the Republic. Fethul-
lah Gülen thereafter went into exile in the United States, where he still is
today (Yavuz 2003: 183, 202-3; Shankland 1999: 83-5).
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2.2.9 financing of the order s: foundations and associations
Almost eighty years since the original banning of the Dervish orders in
Turkey, they are still illegal in the eyes of the law. However, since the 1950s
and even more so since the 1980s, both the religious orders and the neo-
movements have managed to set up an immense network of schools,
publishers, television stations, hospitals and other kinds of services. These
institutions have nearly always taken on the legal form of charitable foun-
dations (vakıf), and they are maintained with voluntary contributions.
Support for these foundations is often organised in associations (dernek).
Since the late 1980s, many of the financial contributions to these networks
have come from Islamic businessmen. The liberalisation of the Turkish
economy has mobilised a whole new class of, often highly prosperous,
entrepreneurs in the provincial Anatolian towns. These are people who
tend to combine strict religious ideas with modern entrepreneurship and a
predilection for technology. The best-known example of this is Kombasan,
an industrial conglomerate in Konya, which has recently been accused of
supporting fundamentalist movements in Turkey with investments
obtained under false pretexts from Turks elsewhere in Europe. This combi-
nation of money, a tightly-knit organisation and targeted indoctrination
through education is seen by secular circles in Turkey as the single largest
threat to their country’s Western orientation.
2.3 sunni isl am and alevism
2.3.1 the non -sunni movements
The previous paragraphs have stressed the varied nature of Islam in Turkey,
which is expressed in, for instance, the relationship between state-Islam
and mystical brotherhoods and neo-movements. While these all belong to
Sunni Islam, this should not lead to the impression that Turkey is a
uniformly Sunni nation. On the contrary, apart from the 80 to 85 per cent
Sunni majority, the country is also home to important heterodox group-
ings. Turkey thus reflects the situation within the Muslim world at large.
The large majority of Muslims in the world, some 85 per cent, adhere to the
Sunni faith, but there are a few dozen other creeds and persuasions in
Islam. The best-known is that of the Shia, more specifically the so-called
‘Twelver’ Shiites, a name which points to the fact that its followers recog-
nise twelve rightful successors to the prophet Mohammed. It is the state
religion of Iran and the religion of the majority of Iraqis. Of the smaller
other creeds within Islam, several others belong to Shia, but not to the
Iranian variety. Again others have clear similarities to Shia, but their
followers are not recognised as co-religionists by the majority of Shiites.
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Examples are the Druses of Syria and Lebanon, the ehl-i haqq and yezidis
(‘devil-worshippers’) of Kurdistan and the Alevis of Turkey. Since their
beliefs are so different from those of mainstream Sunni and Shiite, they are
now also widely known in the Middle East by the umbrella term of ghulât
(‘exaggerators’) (Douwes in Driessen (ed.) 1997: 162).
In this chapter, we will concentrate on only one of these heterodox groups,
the Alevis of Turkey.
2.3.2 who are the alevis?
The Alevis are currently the largest religious minority in Turkey. However,
it is virtually impossible to provide an accurate assessment of their
numbers. The Republic of Turkey recognises no religious minorities other
than the Christians and Jews, whose status was internationally established
in the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). Most Alevis speak Turkish, while a smaller
proportion speaks one of the Kurdish languages. They live scattered over
large areas of the country and have no special external features. The Turk-
ish censuses do not register the Alevis; they are simply registered as
Muslims. While estimates of their numbers range from ten to twenty
million, a twelve to fifteen million-range is perhaps the most realistic
(Shindeldecker 2000; Kehl-Bodrogi 1997: XI-XII; Gezik 2000; Shankland
1999: 136).
The Turkish Alevis traditionally inhabit a wide belt stretching from
Ankara, through Çorum, Yozgat, Amasya, Samsun, Tokat and Sivas, to
Erzincan in the east and Kahramanmaras¸ in the south. Kurdish Alevis
predominantly live in the provinces of Bingöl, Elazıgˇ, Tunceli, and Malatya.
What holds for the Alevis, however, also holds for the entire rural popula-
tion of Turkey; due to massive migration into the cities since the 1950s, a
large proportion of the population now lives in the immense agglomera-
tions of Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara, Bursa and Adana. Since the regions from
which the Alevis originated are among the poorer areas in Turkey, migra-
tion levels were even higher there. It is therefore no exaggeration to expect
about half of today’s Alevis to live in large cities. As we will see, the drift to
the cities has had large consequences for Alevi identity.
Historically, modern Alevism originated from the many heterodox groups
which, at the start of the 16th century, fell under the spell of the Shiite
Safawid movement and that supported the Safawid Shah Ismaïl against the
Ottoman sultan. What was basically a political power struggle between
Sunni Ottomans and Shiite Safawids, forced the population of Anatolia
and Kurdistan to take sides. For the many Anatolian tribes adhering to
heterodox, syncretic forms of Islam which included Christian and shaman-
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istic elements, the Safawid movement was much more familiar than the
Ottomans, who had by now become sedentary and Sunni.
The Ottomans succeeded in defeating the Safawid movement in Anatolia
and the Western Kurdish regions. The Ottoman Sultan Selim I (r. 1512-
1520), in particular, organised horrendous pogroms among the Anatolian
ghulât. These military conflicts and their consequences, were decisive for
the relationship between the Ottoman state and the Alevi minority in the
centuries to come. The Alevis could assert themselves in isolated rural
areas and, where possible, avoid contact with the state and the Sunni popu-
lation. Now inward-looking, the Alevi community developed a close-knit
social and religious organisation that enabled them to survive in a hostile
environment (Ocak 1997). Towards the outside world, the Alevis lived by
the principle of takiye (prudently concealing one’s convictions), which was
also accepted in other Shiite creeds. 
After the 16th century, Ottoman policies ceased to aim at persecuting Alevi
‘heretics’ and instead exuded a kind of silent tolerance. Silent, since sectari-
anism within the community of believers was ideologically unacceptable
and nowhere recorded. In theory, the ümmet, the Islamic community of
faithful, was indivisible. This tolerance did not mean equal justice, though.
The Alevis were generally despised by the Sunni majority, which
harboured many prejudices against the relatively closed and unknown
Alevi community. Traces of this prejudice, particularly in reference to their
sexual morality, can still be found today.
Somewhat like the Jewish people, the Alevis survived because religion was
also seen as ethnicity. The Alevis considered themselves as a tribal commu-
nity and maintained strict endogamy. Only those born within the commu-
nity could receive the knowledge of the Alevi doctrine. This was passed on
orally by the dedes (‘grandfathers’) or pirs (‘spiritual elders’), a sort of
hereditary priestly castes that claimed to be descendants of the prophet.
The dedes also functioned as judges and mediators within the community,
thus ensuring as much as possible that community members would appeal
to an Ottoman judge (Kehl-Bodrogi 1997: XI-XII).
2.3.3 are the alevis muslims?
The much-posed question of whether the Alevis can still be considered
Muslims, even though their faith and rituals are so different from Sunni
orthodoxy, is answered very differently in Sunni and Alevi communities.
The most meaningful way of reaching a conclusion, without passing judg-
ment (since one man’s religion is another man’s sect), is by comparing Alevi
religious ideas and principles with those of Sunni and ‘twelver’ Shiite Islam.
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In all three branches of Islam, the so-called ‘Five Pillars’ are seen as basic
obligations of the faith:
1 professing the faith;
2 fasting;
3 ritual praying;
4 giving alms to the poor;
5 undertaking the pilgrimage to Mecca.
Using this checklist, we can establish the following differences.
1 Professing the faith
Everyone who wants to become a Muslim must solemnly profess: “There
is no god but God/Allah and Mohammed is God’s messenger”. Alevis also
profess this, but it is not clear to what extent this is a form of takiye. Some
Alevis add: “And Ali is the proconsul of God and the confident of
Mohammed.” This emphasises the enormous importance that Alevis, and
other Shiites, attach to the person of Ali, the son-in-law and cousin of the
prophet. They see him as the first Muslim, the only rightful successor to
Mohammed who was sidelined by ‘impostors’ after the prophet’s death.
Some even go so far as to assume that God’s revelations were intended for
Ali, not Mohammed. In Alevi religious practice, Ali fulfils a larger and also
more sentimental role than Mohammed.
In Alevi thought, there is also a large role for the concept of the good or
complete person (insan), of whom Ali is the prototype. This also brings a
sense of perspective to the faith itself, by assuming that what is important
is not religion, but being a (good) person. Modern Alevi writers therefore
often compare their creed to European humanism.
2 Fasting
Both Sunni and ‘regular’ Shiite Muslims fast between sunrise and sunset
during the thirty days of the month of Ramazan in the Islamic calendar,
but Alevis generally do not. Fasts are generally held during twelve days of
the month of Muharrem, commemorating the death of Ali’s youngest son
who, along with most of Ali’s family, was murdered by opponents in 680
ad.
3 Ritual praying
Devout Muslims perform the ritual prayer (namaz), a combination of
strictly regulated movements and utterances, five times a day. Attending
Friday afternoon prayer, including the weekly sermon, is in principle an
obligation for all men. Alevis do neither. In Alevi villages, traditionally
there are also no mosques, although attempts were made, both under the
late Ottoman Empire and the Republic, to ‘Sunni-fy’ the Alevis by erecting
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mosques in their villages and districts. The Republic undertook this after
1980, when the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, with its mixed religious-nation-
alist message, became the state ideology.
Alevis have their own religious gatherings or services. This is the ayini cem
(gathering), which traditionally takes place on Thursday evening. Held in a
purpose-built place or a normal house, it is led by a dede, who on such occa-
sions also hears disputes, reconciles people and can also impose punish-
ments. His most severe sanction is a form of excommunication (düs¸künlük),
an eviction from the community, which in the old days of isolated Anatolian
villages obviously amounted to a death penalty. The confession of sins and
the communal meal, which may well have been adopted from Christian
sacraments, form part of the service in which both men and women partici-
pate. In Alevi rituals, ballads to the accompaniment of a lute, often on the
subject of the death of Ali and his sons, occupy a major place.
4 Giving alms to the poor
The Alevis have a strong tradition of donating to charitable causes for the
benefit of the community, but this is not done according to the detailed
rules of Sunni Islam.
5 Undertaking the pilgrimage to Mecca
The Alevis are not in the habit of making the pilgrimage to Mecca, but they
often pay their respects to the tombs of Alevi saints in Anatolia. This has
the purpose of spiritual cleansing, not of obtaining a place in paradise. The
best known pilgrimage takes place on 16 August, leading to the grave of
Haci Bektas¸, founder of the Bektas¸i Dervish order which is related to
Alevism. Prior to 1925, this order was widespread, but it now mainly lives
on in Albania. The exact relationship between the more urbanised and
educated members of the Bektas¸i order and the oral traditions of the Alevis,
has long been the subject of scholarly debate.
From the above, one could conclude that the Alevis are indeed very far
removed from the mainstream of Islam, but still fall under the category
of (Shiite) Islam. This is a lot less clear in the case of other ‘ghulât
communities’, such as the Druzses and the Yezedis. Drawing a compari-
son with Christianity again, we could perhaps say that Sunnis and
Alevis are all Muslims, just as Roman Catholics and Quakers are all
Christians.
2.3.4 alevis and kemalism
Various modern Alevi authors claim a central role for their community in
the birth of the independence movement (S¸ener 1991: 12), but this is a gross
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exaggeration. It is true that most Alevis in Anatolia aligned themselves
with Mustafa Kemal Pasja and his national movement during the Turkish
war of independence (1919-1922). Event though this movement fought
emphatically in the name of the sultan-caliph (Zürcher in Karpat (ed.)
2000: 150-79), Mustafa Kemal expressly sought their support. Even so,
there were tribes, mainly Kurdish and Alevi, who resisted the authority of
Ankara. Their resistance was largely inspired by their aversion to the
central state’s attempts to establish actual control over the tribes in the
mountainous regions of East Anatolia, which until then had been practi-
cally autonomous.
Their memories of suppression by the Ottoman state, and their position as
a mistrusted marginal group within the Sunni caliphate (which had been in
the hands of Ottoman sultans for centuries), made the Alevis natural allies
of the Kemalist reformers. These reformers, after all, deprived Sunni Islam
of its dominant role in public life (Aydın 2000: 16-26). While state and
society under the Republic remained dominated by Sunni Muslims, the
radical secularism and anticlericalism of the Kemalist regime to some
extent rid the state of its hostile image among the Alevi’s. They were
prepared to accept that the Republic did not recognise them as a religious
community, as long as that same Republic would deny all forms of religion
a place in the public sphere. In the Republic, takiye remained a way of life
for the Alevis, but they obtained better opportunities for social mobility
(Kehl-Bodrogi 1997: XII-XIII).
The love affair between the state and the Alevis was, to some extent, recip-
rocal. Much to their disappointment, the order of the Bektas¸i, who were
related by faith to the Alevi, was not exempted from the ban on Dervish
orders, yet its legacy was judged in a positive light. The Ministry of Educa-
tion even published an anthology of Bektas¸i poets, and their poems were
praised as examples of ‘real’ Turkish culture (Birge 1937: 17). During the
process of nation-building based on a Turkish national identity, the Alevis
were also identified as a people who, during the Ottoman era, when elite
culture was completely dominated by Arabic and Persian languages and
cultures, had held on to the Turkish language and had thus preserved Turk-
ish culture from demise (Shankland 1993: 175; Poulton 1997: 126). The
equal status of women in Alevi and Bektas¸i culture was also singled out
and interpreted as a continuation of old Turkish traditions, to which the
modern Republic now reconnected (Poulton 1997: 126-7).
At the same time, some of the worst armed conflicts of the 1930s were
fought between the Kemalist Republic’s troops and Alevi groups. When
the state wanted to impose its authority upon the vast and highly isolated
mountain region of Dersim, Alevi Kurdish tribes rebelled and were
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brutally suppressed. In the aftermath of this rebellion, large numbers of
Dersim’s inhabitants were deported to the West and Middle of Anatolia,
where their descendents still live.
2.3.5 urban migr ation
For centuries, the Alevis essentially formed a rural community that had
managed to continue its existence in physical and social isolation by limit-
ing contacts with the outside world as much as possible. In such an envi-
ronment, oral traditions, supported by the authority of the dedes, provided
the community with structure and a sense of purpose. Since the mid-
1950s, however, Turkey experienced the twin processes of agricultural
mechanisation and industrialisation. This meant that rural workers made
redundant began to move from the countryside to the cities. Still in 1950,
eighty per cent of the population lived in the countryside, while in 2000
this figure had dropped to fifty per cent. In this urban, industrialised and
anonymous environment, traditional forms of Alevi faith were hard to up-
hold, as these were based on personal contact (Kehl-Bodrogi 1997: 119-20).
In this new, impersonal environment of the big city, with its daily contacts
with the Sunni majority, Alevi newcomers looked for a new base from
which to build up their solidarity networks. As with other migrant groups
in Turkey, the first generation found this mainly in their hems¸erilik, their
shared local origins. A typical migration organisation, for instance, could
be that of the ‘Society of People from Sivas’. It would have its own
teahouse, centrally located in the district that housed a lot of migrants from
Sivas, as well as its own elected board. In the multi-party democracy of the
postwar period, this board could effectively use the community’s political
support to obtain concessions from the city’s administrators.
In the late 1960s, Alevism as a religious identity seemed to disappear like
snow in summer. Instead, a growing number of mainly younger Alevis
interpreted their heritage in political terms. Traditionally, most Alevis
were supporters of the Republican People’s Party founded by Atatürk,
because of its emphasis, in policies and manifestos, on secularism. In the
1960s and 1970s, however, large numbers of Alevi’s began opting for radi-
cal forms of socialism, with many eventually ending up among the ranks of
the extra-parliamentary opposition or even urban guerrilla movements.
Alevis were heavily over-represented in all the ultra-left-wing combat
groups of the time, whose concept of collective identity considered
Alevism as synonymous with communism. They reinterpreted their
history as a tale of struggle for justice and against oppression, with leading
roles for Ali, Husayn and the Alevi saints. Some explicitly saw Alevism as a
form of proto-communism (Van Bruinessen 1996: 8).
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Redefining Alevism as a political ideology rather than an ethno-religious
identity also led to the failure in the 1960s to transform a separate Alevi
political party into the mouthpiece of the Alevi religious community.
There were several attempts, though. In 1966, a group of Alevi entrepre-
neurs founded the Birlik Partisi, the Unity Party. This projected itself
explicitly as Alevi, but still failed to muster more than a few per cent of the
vote in successive elections. For the secularised Alevis, the attractions of
left-wing politics were much larger (Yavuz 2003: 67; Kehl-Bodrogi 1997:
XIII).
The Alevis’ prominent role in ultra-left-wing movements ensured that
their opponents (in particular the Sunni ultra-nationalists of the National-
ist Action Party – the so-called ‘Idealists’ (Ülkücüler or ‘Grey Wolves’)) also
adopted the slogan of ‘Alevism is communism’. In mobilising their own
supporters, such groups thus seized the opportunity to exploit all the
existing prejudices about Alevis. During the second half of the 1970s, when
Turkey witnessed large social and political tensions, this led to pogroms
against Alevis in a whole series of Anatolian towns, such as Tokat, Çankırı,
Çorum, Sivas, and Kahramanmaras¸. The clashes in Kahramanmaras¸ in
December 1978, were particularly violent, resulting in 106 (mostly Alevi)
deaths, and the declaration of the state of emergency in eleven provinces.
In July 1980, Sunni extremists again attacked Alevi targets in Çorum,
killing 26 people (Yavuz 2003: 68; Poulton 1997: 162).
2.3.6 the rediscovery of religious alevism
The military coup of September 1980 not merely effectively ended political
street-fighting, but also suppressed the ultra-left and socialist movements
in which the Alevis had played such a prominent role.
In the 1980s and 1990s, two factors led to a thorough reorientation of the
Alevi community. The first was the use of Sunni Islam as an instrument
serving state ideology. The introduction of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis
as a semi-official state ideology, and the use (first by the military junta and
later by prime minister/president Turgut Özal) of a state-friendly, ‘Turk-
ish’ Islam to promote social cohesion, alienated Alevis from the state. They
felt no longer able to rely on the secular character of the state. Their feelings
were bolstered in October 1987, with the return to politics of the ‘old’
politicians, including the Islamist Erbakan and the ultra-nationalist Türkes¸.
The victories in 1994-1995 of Erbakan’s Welfare Party’s and the victory in
1999 of the Nationalist Action Party, seemed to confirm their worst suspi-
cions. In the 1990s, then, the Alevi were among the groups in Turkey who
reacted most sharply to the process of Islamisation.
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In July 1993, the pressure cooker finally blew. During an Alevi festival in
Sivas, an ethnically and religiously very mixed region, a furious crowd of
Sunnis attacked a hotel where Alevi poets and singers were staying. The
hotel was set alight, resulting in the death of 36 Alevi intellectuals and one
Dutch student. What sparked off the violence was a speech by the writer
Aziz Nesin (who had also translated Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses), in
which he declared that he personally did not believe in the Koran. The
Alevis’ mistrust of the state increased when it became clear from film
footage that the mayor of Sivas had taken part in the demonstration and
that the police had hardly intervened. Moreover, the perpetrators,
although sentenced by the State Security Court, received reduced
sentences for ‘having been provoked’ (Poulton 1997: 262-3). After the fire
in Sivas, several other incidents occurred that were directed against Alevi.
In 1994, the Istanbul metropolitan council, then run by the Welfare Party,
had an Alevi holy site demolished, and in March 1995, Sunni radicals
opened fire on several coffee houses in the Alevi district of Gazi in Istan-
bul. This led to massive protests throughout the country, in which some
thirty people died. Peace was only restored when the Gazi police, who
were heavily infiltrated by Grey Wolves, were replaced by military units.
The collapse of the Soviet Union by the end of 1991, and the subsequent
crisis this brought upon left-wing movements, was the second factor that
prompted Alevis to redefine their identity in ethno-religious rather than
political terms. While Turkey’s radical movements were generally not 
loyal to Moscow, and looked for inspiration rather more to Maoism or to
the (urban) guerrilla forces of Latin America, the apparent triumph of 
capitalism and the American victory in the Cold War dealt them a moral
blow.
While Alevi reactions to these developments varied, they all reflected a
new self-confidence and a deliberate search for publicity – something
previously shunned at almost all costs. Already in 1990, several leading
Alevi activists had published a manifesto in one of the large, national daily
newspapers, asking for the recognition of their community and for free-
dom of religion. They also increasingly openly voiced their dissatisfaction
with the fact that their role as taxpayers meant they automatically
contributed to the gigantic bureaucracy of the Directorate of Religious
Affairs, which exclusively concerned itself with the Sunni section of the
population (Shindeldecker 2000).
The upshot of this Alevi ‘coming out’ has been a flood of publications,
largely from the Alevi side, and also a spectacular rise in the number of
Alevi associations. The result is a more visible role for Alevism, both
within Turkey and elsewhere Europe. However, this has also revealed the
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community’s fragmentation. This is partly due to the worldwide loss of
appeal of various forms of socialism. On a deeper level, it also reflects the
problems that Alevis have encountered in their quest for a new sense of
purpose in an industrialised, individualised and anonymous urban envi-
ronment, in which oral traditions and direct contact no longer serve as the
main unifying forces of their religious community.
In the current reinterpretation of Alevism, different views coexist. On the
one hand, there are some groups who hold on to the interpretation of
Alevism as an ethno-religious community, but want to modernise their
faith and cleanse it from ‘superstition’. For several among these, Alevism is
not really a faith at all, but rather a secular value system. Other groups
actually make overtures to scriptural, orthodox Islam. A majority of these
mirror Turkish Sunni Islam, while a minority take Shii Islam of the Islamic
Republic of Iran as their model. Such advances to orthodox strands of Islam
also create a need for Alevi theological and sacred texts. It thus seems natu-
ral for Alevis to drawn on the writings of the Bektas¸i Dervish. For the time
being, attempts to model Alevism on the Sunna are very problematical. On
the other hand, there are also groups who attempt to preserve the authen-
ticity and unique character of the syncretic Alevi faith, but it is precisely
these groups that face extra difficulties in an urban environment
(Çamurogˇlu in Kehl-Bodrogi (ed.) 1997: 28-9).
More importantly, the bitter struggle in the 1990s between the Turkish
army and the Kurdish independence movement (pkk), which took place in
a climate of rising ethnic nationalism, put the Alevis in a difficult situation.
For a community traditionally made up of both Kurdish and Turkish-
speaking members, choosing sides was extremely difficult. However, the
brand of nationalism that was propagated, proved so strong that sizeable
groups of Kurdish and Turkish Alevis began identifying themselves first
and foremost with, respectively, the Kurdish resistance and the Turkish
state. Each of these groups also took the political consequences of their
respective choices (Çamurogˇlu in Kehl-Bodrogi (ed.) 1997: 32).
The rapprochement between Turkish nationalists and Alevis was facilitated
when the state, in the face of political Islam’s breakthrough by the mid-
1990s, broke with its Islamic policies of the 1980s. Launched by the mili-
tary in 1997, this new struggle against political (Sunni) Islam has prompted
yet another discourse, this time in secularist circles. This depicts Alevi
Islam as ‘typically Turkish Islam’, and contrasts it with Arab Islam. This
implies that Turkish Islam has embraced traditional humanist and emanci-
patory values, while Arab Islam represents rigidity, narrow-mindedness
and fundamentalism (Yavuz 2003: 253). The large, annual Alevi festival
around the grave of Haci Bektas¸ is now recognised by the state, and the
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state budget now also includes allocations for supporting Alevi associa-
tions and for research into Alevism.
2.4 isl am , fundamentalism and terrorism
2.4.1 terrorist attack s
In November 2003, Istanbul was shaken by four suicide attacks, in which
62 people were killed. Two synagogues were attacked, followed five days
later by attacks on the British consulate general and a British bank. At first,
both Turkish political and public opinion maintained that the culprits were
Arabs. This seemed to be confirmed by an e-mail from al-Qaeda claiming
responsibility. However, an investigation by the police and the security
forces quickly revealed the truth: the culprits were Turkish Kurds from the
province of Bingöl, and while they presumably had links to al-Qaeda, they
were first and foremost members of their own, Turkey-based organisa-
tions.
This event drew both the domestic and international media’s attention to
the fact that Turkey also has illegal networks of Islamic extremists, and that
their presence is not restricted to Arab countries, Pakistan or Indonesia.
Islamic extremism, or fundamentalism, is thus part of the landscape of
Turkish Islam. But what exactly is Islamic fundamentalism, and how does
it differ from other movements within Islam?
2.4.2 modernism , fundamentalism and tr aditionalism
At the end of the day, Islam is a text-based community. Like other similar
communities such as Christianity or Judaism, it has been confronted
throughout the centuries with the dilemma of, on the one hand, the
absoluteness of God’s will (which, according to Islam, was last revealed to
the prophet Mohammed), and on the other hand, the need for continuous
reinterpretation. In both classical and modern eras, debates on this dilemma
have generally produced three ideal-type positions, often referred to as
modernism, fundamentalism and traditionalism.
Modernists, or reformers, advocate a continuous reinterpretation of the
moral ideal. Modernists are often motivated by a need to adapt the moral
ideal to changing circumstances. Equally often, however, they are driven
by the needs of political rulers or opposition groups to manipulate the
moral ideal. In this endeavour, modernists emphasise man’s moral inde-
pendence and his freedom and ability to acquire moral knowledge through
his own mental abilities. Fundamentalists object to this interpretation of
the moral ideal. Their resistance is usually motivated by the desire to
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protect it from manipulation and corruption by rulers or other politicians
intent on using it to justify their political aspirations. Thus, fundamental-
ists frequently stress the inadequacy and subjectivity of man’s moral judg-
ment, which they see as both inevitable and as inevitably reflecting self-
interest.
The third position, that of traditionalism, allows for the interpretation of
the moral ideal, but once a specific interpretation is provided and subse-
quently confirmed by agreement among the faithful, it can never be
revised. As a result, the authoritative texts of Islam continuously expands
with the interpretations of previous generations. Traditionalism is thus a
kind of compromise between the two extremes of modernism and funda-
mentalism. By allowing for interpretation of new cases, and outlawing
reinterpretation of old cases, it provides flexibility as well as consistency
(Hoebink in Driessen (ed.) 1997: 200-1).
These three positions are easily translated into the reality of the Turkish
Islamic landscape. The Young Turkish and Kemalist interpreters of Islam
can be seen as modernists. They thought that ‘true’ Islam was a personal
conviction based on reason and open to science. This is why they wanted
to making the sources of Islam (through translations in Turkish of the
Koran and of sermons) directly accessible to the ordinary faithful. While
the main branches of the Nurcu movement can also be seen as modernist,
its broad character means that there are some groups, such as the
Aczmendi movement, which have drastically shifted towards a funda-
mentalist view, and which seek to model society on the Community of
Mohammed.
The orthodox Naks¸ibendi Dervishes and the National Vision movement
that developed from these, are perhaps best classified as traditionalist. This
was precisely its appeal to the small businessmen (esnaf) who formed the
original support base for Erbakan’s party. The National Vision movement
has obtained a lot of political and social power since the 1970s, but its intel-
lectual contribution to a renewed Islamic élan has ultimately been very
small. Traditionalism, though, is not a monolith. In the Netherlands, for
instance, the Amsterdam branch of National Vision, under the leadership
of Haci Karacaer, has turned itself into a forum for progressive ideas on the
male role within the family and on homosexuality. Ideologically, this
branch has thus drifted off from the mainstream of Milli Görüs¸ in Europe
and Turkey.
The mammoth organisation of the Directorate of Religious Affairs accom-
modates both (moderate) modernists and traditionalists. In Turkey, real
fundamentalists can be found in several relatively small but tightly-knit
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and active movements. These are people who reject reinterpretation and
adaptation of the moral ideal, and who consider the source texts of Islam
(the Koran and traditions of the life of the prophet Mohammed) as
absolutely valid and literally true. While the latter is also endorsed by
many ‘ordinary’ Muslims, fundamentalists conclude from this that life in
Islamic society must be lived according to the letter of God’s revelation.
Characteristic of such groups is their demand that Islamic holy law, the
s¸eriat, should serve as the only basis for the country’s political and legal
system. In their view, the holy law must be enforced at all costs, by force if
necessary (Jansen 1998: 23-5).
Clearly, their views directly go against the political order and legal system
of the Turkish Republic. It will also be obvious from the previous para-
graphs that their ideas completely break with Ottoman tradition, which
had indeed never assigned a de facto central role to the holy law. It goes
without saying that agitation for fundamentalist concepts is strictly forbid-
den in Turkey. Each of the movements discussed below are thus illegal.
2.4.3 ibda- c
I˙slami Büyük Dogˇu Akıncıları – Cephe (Commandoes of the Islamic Great
Eastern Front, or ibda-c) has its roots in the mid-1970s, when a radical
faction broke away from the youth movement of Necmettin Erbakan’s
National Salvation Party. At the time, his party had carried responsibilities
of government in several coalition government. In the eyes of these radi-
cals, he had thus betrayed his ideals by being part of a ‘corrupt’ Turkish
regime.
ibda members derive many of their ideas from the writings of the Turkish
author and poet Necip Fazıl Kısakürek (1905-1983). Necip Fazıl was one of
the few Islamic thinkers who, during the Kemalist Republic days, clearly
voiced their opposition to the development model of Atatürk and his
supporters. Against kemalist notions of embracing contemporary Western
civilisation, he argues that Islam was not merely a religion but a complete,
separate, civilisation with its own cultural codes and morality, capable of
providing a viable alternative to Western civilisation. In his view, adopting
European civilisation would lead to a schizophrenic society. Thus, Turkey
could only progress if its development was based on authentic Turkish-
Islamic culture. Necip Fazıl and his followers emphatically looked for
continuities with the Ottoman past, a period always rejected by the Kemal-
ist elite. Necip Fazıl formulated his ideas on cultural policy in the maga-
zines of the 1930s and 1940s. One of these (dating from 1943), already bore
the name of ‘The Great East’ (Büyük Dogˇu) (Yavuz 2003: 114-6).
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ibda-c is a very radical organisation, related to some movements in the
Arab world that fall under the umbrella name of Salafiyya, and whose goal
it is to create a pure Islamic state in the image of the community of their
‘pious forefathers’ (al-salaf al-sâlih, from which the name of Salafiyya is
derived) (Shinar in EI2, vol. VIII: 900b). The movement does not recognise
the Turkish Republic, but it also rejects the Iranian Shiite regime. Its ideal is
a federal Islamic state which, by replacing nation-states, removes differ-
ences within the Islamic world. ibda-c had a charismatic leader in its
founder, Salih I˙zzet Erdis¸, better known under his pseudonym of Salih
Mirzabeyogˇlu, who has been in a Turkish prison since 1998. He is the
author of many texts on theoretical and tactical issues.
ibda-c’s organisation is opaque. One branch operates through overt activ-
ities, such as holding demonstrations, publishing magazines and maintain-
ing websites. However, there is also a covert cell-based organisation,
involved in ‘struggle’, which boils down to attacks and hijacks. It is a hori-
zontal organisation in which the cells are kept strictly separated and
frequently operate independently. The operations these cells undertake, fit
the concept of ‘armed propaganda’, a tactic also frequently employed by
left-wing urban guerrillas in Turkey during the 1970s. It entails attacks on
high-publicity targets of low military risk, such as secularist newspapers
and journalists, synagogues, a prominent Jewish businessman and a Greek
Orthodox Church (www.ict.org.il, 4-12-2003). It is highly probable that
ibda-c members, either with or without al-Qaeda assistance, were also
behind the suicide bombings in Istanbul in November 2003.
2.4.4 hizbull ah
A younger, but significantly larger extremist Islamic organisation is Hizbul-
lah (Party of God, the name refers to a quotation from the Koran). This
organisation, which is unrelated to the Shiite Hizbullah in Lebanon, grew
up in the late 1980s in Kurdish southeast of Turkey. Its main centres were
the provinces of Batman and Diyarbakır, the ‘capital’ of the southeast. This
period witnessed a rapid escalation of the war between the Turkish army
and pkk guerrillas. In principle, Hizbullah was opposed to both sides in
the conflict, since its ideal was the establishment of an independent Islamic
state. In practice, Hizbullah’s terror campaign was mainly aimed against
the ‘godless’ pkk and against progressive Turks, and in particular against
Kurdish businessmen and journalists suspected of supporting the pkk. In
the early 1990s, the organisation split into two branches, both named after
the bookshop where their respective supporters assembled: the I˙lim
(Knowlegde) branch and the Menzil (Stage) branch. The violence of the
1980s was mainly committed by the I˙lim branch (www.terrorism.com, 
3-12-2003).
turkey’s current islamic landscape
135
WRR-69 / English  26-08-2004  00:08  Pagina 135
By the late 1990s, there were growing rumours that Turkish security serv-
ices had infiltrated the I˙lim faction to such a degree that it had actually
become an instrument of the Turkish state in its struggle against the pkk
(Zürcher 1995: 381-2). These rumours seemed to be confirmed when the
Turkish media, perhaps informed by rivalling intelligence services,
produced evidence indicating that the governor of Batman had been
engaged in large-scale illegal weapons smuggle. After the capture of pkk
leader Abdullah Öcalan in early 1999, which actually ushered in the end of
the war, the Turkish state no longer needed Hizbullah. The military
campaign against fundamentalism, which was been launched in February
1997, could now also be used against Hizbullah militants. Hüseyin
Veliogˇlu, the leader of the I˙lim faction, was killed in Istanbul by the secu-
rity services. In a subsequent year-long campaign, another two thousand of
its members were arrested and hundreds charged. The real dimensions of
Hizbullah’s gruesome legacy only emerged when the police at various sites
uncovered about seventy bodies of murdered Turkish and Kurdish busi-
ness figures and intellectuals, which clearly bore signs of torture.
In 2001-2001, Hizbullah murdered several Turkish civil servants, including
the commissioner of Diyarbakır. This showed that the security services had
not fully succeeded in rounding up the organisation. Its current active
members are estimated at around one hundred.
2.4.5 the caliphate of cologne
The third known organisation with a clearly fundamentalist manifesto is
the so-called ‘Caliphate State’, founded by Cemalettin Kaplan. Born in 1926
in a village in the province of Erzurum, Kaplan completed his studies at a
theological college in Ankara in 1966. Until 1971, he worked as a mufti in
the service of the Directorate of Religious Affairs in Adana. In the 1970s, he
joined Necmettin Erbakan’s National Vision movement. Like many Milli
Görüs¸ supporters, he left Turkey after the military coup in September 1980
and the banning of the then Islamic National Salvation Party, establishing
himself in the German city of Cologne. He broke away from the National
Vision movement in 1983, after having become convinced that participa-
tion in the democratic political system was not compatible with Islam. In
Cologne he founded the I˙sslamî Cemiyetler ve Cemaatler Birlig˘i (Union of
Islamic Associations and Municipalities), which at its peak attracted around
seven thousand supporters, including also Dutch Turks.
Kaplan’s message was extraordinarily radical. He modelled himself on the
Ayatollah Khomeini and called on his followers to overthrow the Turkish
secular order and proclaim an Islamic state. Like Khomeini, who had sent
tapes to Iran in the 1970s, he sent cassette tapes to Turkey, earning him the
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nickname Kara Ses (Black Voice). He saw this as a step towards establishing
a worldwide Islamic state, with the Koran functioning as constitution. At
the end of 1991, he even called for a cihat (holy war) on the Republic of
Turkey.
At a conference in Cologne in April 1992, Kaplan’s movement was renamed
the ‘Federal Islamic State of Anatolia’ (Anadolu Federal I·slamî Devleti), and
in 1994 once again renamed ‘Caliphate State’ (Hilafet Devleti). Kaplan
himself was appointed caliph. Not all his followers agreed to these changes.
To maintain control over his movement, Kaplan transferred all its material
possessions to an independent foundation in Dordrecht, the Netherlands,
known as the ‘Servant of Islam Foundation’.
Cemalettin Kaplan died in May 1995, whereupon his son Metin assumed
the duties of caliph. Under his leadership, the movement declined. Against
a rival contender for the caliphate in Berlin, who refused to recognise him,
Metin pronounced a fetva (religious advice). When his followers
responded by murdering the contender, Metin received a four-year prison
sentence. After repeated requests by Turkey, the Caliphate State was finally
outlawed by a German judge in 2001, on the grounds of calling for the
overthrow of the constitutional order and inciting hatred. Nevertheless,
the organisation’s activities continue, both in Germany and abroad. The
best-known propaganda organs are the magazine Ümmet-i Muhammed
(Community of Mohammed) and the newspaper Beklenen Asr-i Saadet
(The Expected Time of Exaltation). In the Netherlands, too, this paper has a
small but loyal readership (www.im.nrw.de, 4-12-2003).
2.5 christians and jews in turkey
2.5.1 non -muslims in the muslim communit y
According to national population statistics, some 99 per cent of Turkey’s
population of around 70 million is Muslim, including Alevis. The various
Christian groups make up about 0.3 per cent of the population and the
Jewish community about 0.04 per cent. Apart from very small groups of
Catholics and Protestants, Turkish Christians consist of four main groups:
Greek Orthodox, Armenians, Nestorians and Syrian Orthodox. Members
of the first two groups almost all live in Istanbul, whereas members of the
latter two can be found both in Istanbul and the southeast of Turkey. The
Jewish community is concentrated in Istanbul (Sunier 1998: 47-8, 76).
The Christian and Jewish communities in Turkey are thus many times
smaller than the Islamic population groups of, for example, the Nether-
lands. One could wonder, then, whether these miniscule groups deserve a
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place in this survey of the Turkish religious landscape. At the same time,
events from a fairly recent past have shown that the position of Christians
in Turkey is a politically and socially sensitive issue, capable of arousing
strong emotions. Motions on the Turkish treatment of Armenian Chris-
tians have frequently been debated in the past, even within the American
congress and the French parliament. Since the 1970s, Jewish organisations
and prominent members of the Jewish community in Turkey have been the
targets of attacks.
The Netherlands has also been confronted with the tensions and emotions
sparked by the problem of ‘dissident thinkers’ in Turkey. About 25 years
ago, Dutch newspapers were full of stories about church occupations in
Twente. This was the work of Syrian Orthodox immigrants from Midyat in
southeast Turkey, who were seeking political asylum in the Netherlands
because they feared persecution in Turkey. These events suddenly drew
attention to the fact that the small town Glanerbrug in Twente had become
the religious centre of Syrian Orthodox people in Europe. And just a few
years ago, the municipality of Assen in the Netherlands faced serious prob-
lems after granting permission to its Armenian community to erect an
Armenian cross, which included an inscription commemorating the
victims of Turkish violence. This led to fierce Turkish protests.
To understand the apparent contrast between the numerical insignificance
and the charged emotions surrounding the theme of ‘Christians and Jews
in Turkey’, a historical retrospect is needed.
2.5.2 the ‘people of the book’
From the start of the Arab conquests of the 7th century ad, Islamic rulers
had to find a way of accommodating large groups of non-muslims. After
all, the majority of the population in areas such as Syria or Egypt were
Christians. The conversion to Islam of large parts of these peoples was a
very gradual process.
The religious and legal basis for association with non-Muslims was
provided by the concept of the ‘people of the Book.’ Jews and Christians
were acknowledged as having received the same divine revelations as
Muslims, albeit that the account of this revelation in their scriptures was
corrupted, and they themselves had strayed from the true path. In Muslim
eyes, both groups had a fundamentally different status from, for instance,
Hindus, Buddhists, animists or fire-worshippers, who were seen as real
‘heathens’. As a rule, the ‘people of the Book’ were offered the status of
dhimmi (protégé). In exchange for the payment of a specific poll tax, their
presence was tolerated. They maintained a large degree of autonomy in
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their community’s internal affairs, under supervision of their own
churches or rabbinical authority.
Until the middle of the 19th century, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman
Empire did not enjoy the same rights as Muslims. Their second-class status
was visible through building and clothing regulations, a ban on church
bells and the building of new churches, etc. However, this system
produced a degree of religious tolerance that most other European coun-
tries attained only after the French Revolution. For the Ottomans, estab-
lishing a workable system for associating with Christian minorities was all
the more important, since their conquests on the European continent had
brought large areas with Christian populations under their control. By the
mid-19th century, around forty per cent of the Ottoman Empire’s popula-
tion was Christian. Just before the start of the First World War, their share
was still around twenty per cent. The Ottoman administration displayed
the same love for regulations and bureaucracy towards the dhimmis as it
did towards Islam, which it tried to incorporate into its own state appara-
tus.
In the Ottoman Empire, the dhimmis of a specific faith were collectively
referred to as tayfa (community) or millet (nation). The latter word did not
carry the political baggage of its modern-day equivalent. The three millets
whose existence was officially recognised by the Ottomans were the Greek
Orthodox, the Armenian-Jacobite and the Jewish ones. Although in theory
the term covered the entire collectivity of a specific faith, the self-govern-
ment of religious minorities had in fact a local character, allowing local reli-
gious leaders to act as intermediaries between the local representatives of
the Ottoman Empire on the one hand, and their own local community on
the other. The authorities held religious leaders responsible for the loyalty
and good behaviour of their followers (Braude and Lewis 1982; Lewis 1996:
315-8).
2.5.3 foreigner s and protégés
Apart from indigenous Christian populations, small groups of subjects of
European states were also present in the Ottoman Empire, primarily for
trading purposes. They were concentrated in the important trading
centres: Istanbul, of course, but also towns like Aleppo, Salonica, Izmir,
Akko and Beirut. These Europeans were not subjects of the sultan, and
their stay in the Ottoman Empire was protected by a letter of safe-conduct
(aman, literally, mercy). This was essential, since under Islamic law there
formally existed a state of war between the areas under Islamic control (dar
ul-islam, or ‘house of Islam) and the areas not (yet) under Islamic control
(dar ul-harb, or ‘house of war’). In theory, these letters of safe-conduct for
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people originating from the ‘house of war’ were only valid for one year. In
practice, however, Europeans often stayed within the Ottoman Empire for
years on end, even for generations. The conditions under which they were
allowed to reside and trade, were laid down in so-called ahdnames (‘letters
of promise’), in the West called ‘capitulations’ (because they were divided
into chapters). The Ottoman government granted these as a favour to
friendly European states (De Groot 1986: 7-9).
Apart from tax perks, the privileges extended by the sultans included a
certain degree of extraterritoriality. The leaders of foreign communities 
– consuls or, in Istanbul, ambassadors – were empowered to conduct all
those affairs which exclusively concerned the members of their own
nation, both independently and according to their own, say, French,
English or Dutch, laws. To maintain contact with the Ottoman authorities,
these representatives of the European states employed interpreters, or
dragomans, who nearly always belonged to one of the indigenous Christian
groups. Since these were positions involving confidentiality, the Ottoman
government allowed these local Christians to enjoy the protection of their
European ambassador or consul, and to enjoy the status of subject of their
employer’s nation. Dragomans and their families received this status
though a so-called ‘diploma’ (berat).
From the late 18th century onwards, the military and political position of
the Ottoman Empire weakened in relation to its Christian neighbours. At
the same time, trade with Europe expanded rapidly. This economic climate
led to the merger of the capitulations system and the millet system. The
more a great European state managed to increase its power towards the
Ottoman Empire, the more valuable became its protection. For indigenous
Christian traders who were or became involved in trade with Europe, espe-
cially for the Greeks, the honorary citizenship of a European power
provided both security and tax advantages. Conversely, for European states
these protégés were an appealing group of clients who enabled them to
strengthen their power base in the Levant. Since the Ottoman authorities
could charge a great deal of money for the berats, their issuing proved very
tempting. Between 1770 and 1850, the number of Ottoman Christians and
Jews in the possession of a berat increased explosively, from a few thou-
sand at the most, to hundreds of thousands.
In the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire witnessed the growth of a size-
able, modern commercial and industrial sector, mainly located in the
coastal areas. This sector was completely dominated by Christian, and
sometimes Jewish, protégés of European powers. They formed a bour-
geoisie who modelled their lifestyles on the examples of London and
Paris. From the 1830s onward, however, successive Ottoman govern-
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ments began reforming the state apparatus and the army, to counter
Europe’s growing power. Their model was that of a centralised bureau-
cratic state with a large army of conscripts. In the course of the 19th
century, then, Ottoman society became polarised, between a growing
Christian, and partly Jewish, bourgeoisie on the one hand, and a state
apparatus dominated by Muslims on the other.
The Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire of the 19th century
pursued three different and completely incompatible goals. The first was
equal citizenship within the Ottoman state – in the sense of obtaining the
same rights as the Muslim majority. The European powers strongly urged
the Turks to introduce equality of civil rights irrespective of religion, even
though this sometimes flagrantly contradicted the state of affairs in their
own territories. In 1856, the Ottoman government granted equal justice to
all subjects. In the 1860s, the mainly younger members of the Ottoman
bureaucracy tried to create a feeling of national identity in the form of
Ottoman patriotism which could be shared equally by all communities, but
these attempts failed. The combination of autonomy, foreign protection
and growing prosperity gave Christians the opportunity to develop their
own sense of community, with their own media, public spaces and associa-
tions. A variety of nationalisms developed from this, creating an increas-
ingly powerful force.
Independence, or at least autonomy within their own national borders, was
the second goal that ever more Ottoman Christians pursued increasingly
energetically. During the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century,
first the Serbs and the Greeks, and subsequently the Romanians, Bulgari-
ans, Monte-Negrians and Albanians all managed to establish sovereign
independent states in what they considered to be part of their national
territory. From about 1880, Armenians residing in Anatolia also started a
nationalist movement. Apart from equal rights and nationalist aspirations,
the third Christian goal was the preservation of the privileges and auton-
omy enjoyed by the millets under the old order. This included the right to
maintain and implement ones own religious laws, the right to own educa-
tion systems in one’s own languages and, in general, the right to preserve
ones own culture (Lewis 1996: 316-8).
2.5.4 ethno - religious conflicts
Facing, what he considered, a doubtful loyalty of his Christian subjects,
which had already come to light in the disastrous 1877-8 war against
Russia, Sultan Abdülhamit II tried to create a more solid foundation for his
regime by explicitly profiling it as Islamic. He more or less successfully
appealed to the Islamic population, which by 1878 made up around eighty
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per cent of the population. Obviously, though, this still further alienated
non-Muslim minorities from the state.
The opposition to the regime which developed towards the end of the
1890s, was actually a monstrous alliance. It was made up of, on the one
hand, members of minority groups demanding decentralisation and more
autonomy, and on the other of young Muslim bureaucrats and soldiers who
actually tried to stop the undermining of state powers. Their opposing
goals clearly emerged when in 1908-1909 a group of young bureaucrats and
soldiers, the Young Turks, ended the autocratic regime of Sultan Abdül-
hamit. Once the euphoria had passed, the differences between these two
groups quickly flared up again.
The Balkan war of 1912-1913 eventually proved to be the breaking point.
The Ottoman Empire lost almost all of its European territories. Moreover,
these were territories from which a disproportionately large number of
political and military leaders originated, such as Mustafa Kemal Pasja.
Greece had been an opponent during the war, and many Ottoman Greeks
had hoped for an Ottoman defeat. When this did indeed happen, hundreds
of thousands of Muslims were expelled from the Balkan region. Subse-
quent reprisals by the Ottomans meant that in 1914 about 130,000 Greeks
on the Anatolian west coast were expelled from the Empire.
During the First World War, there were further repercussions. As a result
of the Ottoman Empire’s war with England, France and Russia, these states
lost the possibility to safeguard their protégés residing within the Empire.
This allowed the regime under the Young Turks to take charge. Economi-
cally, this meant the logical application of a new policy, which aimed at
ridding modern sectors of all quasi-monopoly positions held by minori-
ties, and at creating a new class of Muslim entrepreneurs.
Apart from discrimination, the regime also actively engaged in deportations
and persecutions. Determined to avoid in Anatolia what had happened earli-
er on the Balkan, the Young Turks deported almost the entire Armenian pop-
ulation to the Syrian desert, because some Armenian groups had chosen to
side with Russia and had attacked the Ottoman army. These deportations,
which took place under terrible conditions, were also used to conduct mass-
scale slaughter among the Armenians. In total, probably between 600,000
and 800,000 Armenians were killed. In turn, Armenian resistance groups
who accompanied the Russian army also kept their end up.
The all-encompassing dividing-line between Ottoman Muslims and
Ottoman Christians remained in place after the First World War. The
resistance movement created in Anatolia under the leadership of Mustafa
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Kemal Pasja, opposed the division of the Ottoman Empire that was stipu-
lated by the Paris Peace Conference. As a result, it came into conflict with
Great Britain and France, even though the actual armed struggle was
conducted against the Armenians and the Greeks, who claimed large parts
of Anatolia. Both sides in the conflict acted ruthlessly against the civil
population. When Turkish nationalists won the wars against the Armeni-
ans ( in 1929) and the Greeks (in 1922), all parties in the conflict recognised
that relationships between Muslims and Christians had deteriorated to
such an extent that their co-existence in one state was no longer possible.
The Greek population in the west of Anatolia fled en masse. During the
peace negotiations in Lausanne in 1923, where present-day Turkey was
mapped out, Greece and Turkey reached an agreement, under the auspices
of the League of Nations, to swap the remaining Muslims in Greece for the
remaining Greek Orthodox population in Turkey. Since these population
exchanges were enforced, the ‘Greeks’ of Middle Anatolia, who were
mostly Turkish-speaking, as well as the Greek community of the Black Sea
coast all left. All in all, large numbers of people were involved: in the 1922-
1924 period some 1.2 million Greeks left the country, whilst some 400,000
Muslims returned.The only non-Islamic groups of any significance which
stayed behind were those Greeks who could prove that they had lived in
Istanbul before 1912, the Armenian community of Istanbul, the Jews of
Istanbul (both Sephardic and Ashkenazic) and the Catholic and Protestant
communities, most of whom carried foreign passports. By far the largest of
these remaining groups was the Greek community of Istanbul, with more
than 100,000 members in 1924.
2.5.5 non -muslims in the republic
In articles 38-44 of the Treaty of Lausanne, non-Muslims (gayrimüslim)
were officially recognised as minorities and their rights in the new Republic
were laid down and declared internationally binding. They were the only
population group in Turkey who could (and still can) claim these rights.
Apart from outlawing discrimination and guaranteeing the freedom of reli-
gion, these articles also provided minorities with the right to use their own
languages and to have their own educational institutions (Parla 1985: 8-10).
The secularisation policy of the Republic, which was of course primarily
aimed at Islam, was welcomed in principle by the Christian and Jewish
minorities. The Muslim population, however, was deeply traumatized.
The Republic’s nationalist regime originated from a movement that had
defended the rights of Muslims against local and foreign Christians. The
semi-colonial situation was still fresh in their memories. It had meant
that the entire modern sector of the economy was run by Christian
protégés of European states, and that Muslims working in, say, the
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Ottoman Bank, could not attain positions beyond those of cleaners or
doormen. Furthermore, this dependence on minorities was not just
something of the (recent) past. The teaching of modern skills to ensure
that Muslims could replace Christians and Jews, took over a generation. In
Anatolia this meant that in many areas there was a lack of qualified engi-
neers, waiters, managers, welders, electricians, etc. In Istanbul, where
minority groups had for the most part been allowed to stay, they contin-
ued to dominate these occupations. In addition, these groups dominated
the classes of the self-employed well until the 1950s. Already in the 1920s,
dissatisfaction with this situation had prompted the authorities to impose
discriminatory measures. When foreign enterprises, such as the railways,
were taken over by the Turkish state, this change was often also used to
replace as many Christian and Jewish employees as possible with
Muslims (Bali 1999: 206 ff).
It should come as no surprise that such measures left a reasonable doubt
among minorities about the truly neutral and secular character of the
Republic. Their worst suspicions were confirmed during the Second World
War. This brought large economic problems and widespread impoverish-
ment upon neutral Turkey, for which the government party and its allies in
the media blamed the Greek, Armenian and Jewish business communities.
The result was the introduction in 1942 of a wealth tax (Varlık Vergisi), the
imposition of which was left to local committees. These made sure that the
tax was shifted onto minorities, who often had to pay up to ten times as
much as Muslims. Moreover, they were not allowed to pay in instalments,
which meant that many were forced to sell their businesses under very
unfavourable conditions. Those that were unable to pay, were deported to
labour camps in East Anatolia. The law was revoked in 1944, but by then it
had already severely damaged minorities’ trust in the Turkish state. After
the war, a process of steady emigration got underway.
The Jews were the first group to emigrate en masse. It is true that Turkey
had allowed many European Jews unobstructed passage to Palestine, and
had also offered shelter to several tens of thousands during the Second
World War. However, like other minorities, the Jews had suffered under
the Varlık Vergisi. Moreover, the climate had worsened even before the war;
soon after Hitler’s rise to power in 1934, Jews in European Turkey had suf-
fered persecutions instigated by Nazi-sympathisers (Bali 1999: 243). The
creation of the state of Israel in 1948 thus prompted many Turkish Jews to
leave the country. The Jewish community in Turkey shrank from approxi-
mately 80,000 after the war, to less than 50,000 in 1955. Its numbers
steadily declined until the Israeli victory in the Six Day’s War of 1967, when
a second wave of emigrants again halved the community’s numbers.
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Today there are about 18,000 Jews in Turkey, the vast majority living in
Istanbul. They still play a relatively important role in the business world,
but do not emphasise their Jewish identity. Attacks on Jewish targets by
ultra-left or fundamentalist groups (especially the assault on Istanbul’s
main synagogue, which has been attacked three times since 1989), have
increased fears among Jews of exposing their identity. The rise of the
Welfare Party in the early 1990s was also intimidating for Jews, since the
party harboured a clearly recognisable anti-Semitic undercurrent,
connecting anti-Israeli rhetoric with praise for Hitler and references to a
Jewish conspiracy controlling us and eu policies (Erbakan 1975: 235-64;
Poulton 1997: 279-81).
The only exception to this ‘low profile’ of the Jewish community is the
resurgent interest in the Spanish-language (Ladino) culture of the
Sephardic Jews, who had found refuge in Turkey at the end of the 15th
century. While this culture was threatened with extinction only some
ten years ago, the 1992 celebration of the 500th anniversary of Jewish
immigration signalled its revival. Since it accentuates traditions of toler-
ance and freedom of religion in Turkey, it was also welcomed by the state.
By now, Sephardic music in particular attracts a wide audience.
The Greek minority recovered after the Second World War, when rela-
tions between Greece and Turkey were warm. However, this ended
abruptly after the outbreak in the mid-1950s of a crisis over the future of
Cyprus. To increase diplomatic pressure upon the Greeks, the Turkish
Menderes administration had demonstrations organised against the
oppression of the Turkish minority on Cyprus. On 6 and 7 September
1955, these ended in an anti-Greek pogrom, in which several people died
and countless houses and shops were plundered and set alight. Schools,
churches and cemeteries also fell victim to popular anger. At that point,
the Greeks lost their faith in the Republic for good, and they have been
emigrating ever since. Istanbul’s Greek community of 100,000 to
150,000 people in 1923, has now shrunk to three or four thousand people.
Ironically, of all the religious minorities in today’s Turkey, the Armeni-
ans are both the largest in number and the ones to have suffered most 
in the past. Like the Greek Orthodox community, they suffered from
(sometimes state-fuelled) resentment from the Muslim population. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, they sometimes became the victims of reprisals
for the worldwide campaign of attacks on Turkish targets committed 
by the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (asala).
Still, Istanbul’s Armenian community today consists of 30,000 to
35,000 people.
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The small Christian communities in the southeast, the Nestorians and
Syrian Orthodox, have had a very tough time since the 1970s, caught
between the Turkish army, radical Muslims of Hizbullah and Kurdish
guerrillas. Economically, matters did not improve in what was already
the poorest region of Turkey. Almost all of these communities have
therefore left for the relative safety of Istanbul or have emigrated to
Europe. The Syrian community in Twente, the Netherlands, serves as an
example (Poulton 1997: 272-8).
2.5.6 is a turk a muslim?
The above description of the fate of non-Islamic minorities clearly raises
the question as to what extent Christians and Jews are really seen as fully-
fledged Turkish citizens, and to what extent they see themselves as such.
Formally, the situation is crystal clear. The Turkish state and Turkish legis-
lation do not discriminate on the basis of religion. Turkish nationality is
essentially still defined on the basis of Atatürk’s principles of the 1930s:
“Every person within the Republic of Turkey, irrespective of his religion, is
a Turk if he speaks Turkish, grows up in the Turkish culture, and embraces
the Turkish ideal” (Zürcher in Georgeon (ed.) 2000: 60). At the same time,
Turkey’s late 19th and early 20th century history has produced a certain
‘siege mentality’; a notion that foreign powers are intent on weakening or
even splitting up the country, by using fifth columns. People quickly feel
threatened, and the war against the pkk during the last two decades has
strengthened this feeling. There is always a tendency to see minorities as
accomplices of foreign enemies.
In addition, it has not always been easy for members of minority groups to
consider themselves as fully-fledged Turkish citizens. The embrace of
Sunni Islam by the nationalist state ideology which began in 1980, has
severely damaged their integration. By far the larger majority of Christians
and Jews have voted with their feet and have emigrated. This has further
weakened the position of those staying behind.
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3 turkish isl am and the eu: a cl ash of
civilisations?
In the previous part of this survey, we have made acquaintance with several
important characteristics of Turkish Islam, and also with the large variety
of Turkey’s religious landscape. In this chapter, we wish to answer the
question to what extent the fact that Turkey is an Islamic country will turn
out to be an insurmountable impediment to its membership of the eu. In
other words: does Islam block Turkey’s accession to the eu? The discus-
sion takes place against the wider backdrop of yet another debate, i.e. on the
place in this landscape of Samuel Huntington’s notion of the ‘clash of civil-
isations’. Implicitly, therefore, this leads us to an assessment of the validity
of his paradigm, which has been widely used since its launch in 1993, espe-
cially in politics and journalism.
3.1 modern versus western
Characteristic of Huntington’s approach (apart from his dividing of the
world into ‘civilisations’), is his distinction between the West and moder-
nity, or put differently: between Westernisation and modernisation. Since
the 18th century, all modernisation processes (which include elements such
as industrialisation, urbanisation, literacy, education, prosperity, labour
specialisation and social mobilisation), have their roots in European civili-
sation, which was the first to modernise. In principle, modernisation is a
revolutionary process that is universal. Nations such as Japan and China
prove that countries from different civilisations can also undergo a success-
ful modernisation process. According to Huntington, this does not mean
that Western culture will therefore also becomes a universal culture. He
emphatically discards the notion that ‘modern’ and ‘Western’ are identical.
With the ‘clash of civilisations’ he no longer believes (as he once did) that
advancing modernisation will allow values that are characteristic of West-
ern civilisation to become universal. His explanation for this is that West-
ern civilisation was formed in the era preceding the start of the process of
modernisation of the 17th and 18th centuries. The West was already the
West before it became modern. Other areas of the world take part in this
modernisation process, without possessing the cultural legacy of the pre-
modern West (Huntington 2002: 68-72).
According to Huntington, the historical elements which combine to give
Western civilisation its characteristic properties, are the legacy of classical
antiquity, Catholicism and Protestantism, the wealth of languages, the
separation of spiritual and worldly powers, the development of law, social
plurality (a class-based society), representative bodies and individualism.
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All these ingredients are connected: social plurality has stimulated the rise
of representative bodies, while many of these characteristics have ulti-
mately contributed to the importance that the West attaches to the indi-
vidual (Huntington 2002: 68-72).
Unlike the process of modernisation, Western civilisation thus has clear
borders, i.e. the borders defining the area within which the above-
mentioned historical factors have operated. As Huntington puts it:
“Europe ends where Western Christianity ends and Islam and Orthodox
begin” (2002: 158). It is this reasoning which found its political translation
in statements of people like Bolkestein, Giscard d’Estaing, Kohl and
Martens, who have all argued that Turkey should not accede to the eu,
because it is not a part of Western nor of European civilisation.
There is a problem with the notion that Europe is an historically-grown
civilisation. Therefore, there is also a problem with the political conclu-
sion that the eu’s external borders should not move beyond the borders
of European civilisation. To start with, neither the current nor the candi-
date eu member states fulfil Huntington’s criteria. After all, the influence
of Catholicism and Protestantism remains negligible in Greece. And what
influence did classical civilisation have on (pre-modern) Finland? At the
same time, countries which Huntington has slotted into the Islamic bloc,
such as Turkey and Syria, did share in classical culture, among other
things. That these areas later came under Arab or Turkish administration
does not alter this, unless one would assert – historically incorrectly –
that their original inhabitants departed en masse after the Arab and Turk-
ish conquests.
Worse still is the fact that Huntington applies criteria which display his
ignorance of other civilisations, and of Islam in particular (which Hunting-
ton sees as ‘the West’s’ main opponent). It is an affront to assert that the
classical legacy played a lesser role in the Islamic world than in the Western
world, when that legacy was actually passed on to medieval Europe by
Arab translations of, and annotations to the classics. The diversity of
languages, which is supposed to be an exclusive characteristic of Europe, is
not exactly a convincing argument for those studying the Caucasus or
Indonesia. The statement that in other civilisations, including in Islam, law
was less of a deciding factor in shaping philosophy and behaviour is,
frankly, bizarre to anyone who is a little familiar with Islamic societies’
fixation with the rules of the holy law. It is belied by the crucial role across
the entire Islamic world, and for over a thousand years, of the institute of
legal adviser, the mufti. 
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Naturally, this is all general criticism of Huntington’s empirical basis and
of his theoretical assumptions. On closer examination, the borders
between civilisations turned out to be grey and porous. But can some-
thing be said on Turkey’s specific position in the light of the ‘clash of
civilisations’?
3.2 the position of turkey
Huntington ranks Turkey among the ‘torn countries’. These are countries
where the elite aspires to cross from one civilisation to another. In his
view, this will only succeed if three conditions are fulfilled: the elite must
be enthusiastic, the population must be willing to accept the cross-over
and the ‘receiving civilisation’ must be prepared to accept the country.
Huntington observes that such a reshaping of identity is a long, step-by-
step and painful process, which has never succeeded so far (Huntington
2002: 139). He does suggest, though, that Islam’s wide area means there
are many distinct cultures or subcivilisations within Islam, including
Arab, Turkish, Persian and Malay civilisations (Huntington 2002: 44-5).
In other words, due to certain factors, variants emerge within a so-called
‘major civilisation’.
In section 2.1.2, we typified the Republic of Turkey’s Ottoman-Islamic
inheritance as a tradition which, in turn, draws from two rather different
and, in part, even conflicting sources. Firstly, the Islamic roots of society
and, secondly, the Turkish tradition of state formation and state constitu-
tion which had taken shape in Central Asia by the 6th century and in the
Middle East by the 10th century. In addition, in the border regions between
the Middle East and Central Asia, the military and political traditions
developed by the Turks blended with the ancient Persian monarchical
tradition, which strongly emphasised the independent authority of the
sovereign.
We subsequently stressed that the Ottomans succeeded in uniting the Islam-
ic and the Turkish-Persian traditions into a single administrative system. 
Officially, the Ottoman Empire was an Islamic state formally based on the
s¸eriat, the holy law. In practice, sultans could proclaim complex regulations,
known as kanun, for administering the affairs of a province, of a department,
or of the monarchy and the central government itself. A kanun could in no
way nullify or abolish the s¸eriat, but it could supplement and modernise this
by using local customs and by-laws of the rulers (Lewis 1996: 223-4). 
One could say that even before the period of modernisation, Ottoman
legacy was characterised by a combination of different systems and tradi-
tions in various areas, adapted to the practical circumstances confronting
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the Ottomans. In Huntington’s terminology, this would mean that there
would be no ‘clash of civilisations’, but rather a pragmatic ‘composition of
civilisations’ within the political realm of the Ottoman Empire. The
Ottoman attitudes toward heterodox minorities, and also their treatment
of Christians and Jews, displayed the same pragmatic mentality.
Cemal Kafadar (1995) had this to say about the issue of Ottoman identity:
“The Ottoman state/identity was not a lid that closed upon already formed national iden-
tities (of Arabs, Bulgarians, Turks, etc.) only to be toppled after a few centuries when those
identities reasserted themselves. Some of these identities were formed to some extent, but
they were reshaped (some might say, de-formed) under the aegis of, through the structures
of, in response or reaction to, the Ottoman Empire. This is not a question of Ottoman
influence but of a long and formative historical experience that shaped various communi-
ties and peoples under Ottoman rule through their interaction with each other as well as
with peoples and ideas from neighbouring civilizations. So the establishment of Ottoman
rule in southwestern Asia and southeastern Europe, even if one sees it in black-and-white
terms – namely, as either a yoke or a blessing – did mean much more than a lapse in what
would otherwise have been the natural flow of the history of a given set of nations.
Ottoman rule is part of the history of various communities, some of whom were able (and
some unable) to shape and imagine themselves into a nation in the modern era thanks to a
‘historical consciousness’ of their own (real or imagined) pre-Ottoman identity on the one
hand and to the long and formative historical experience mentioned above on the other.
(…) Historians tend to overlook the fact that (America is not the only case where) one is
not necessarily born into a people; one may also become of a people, within a socially
constructed dialectic of inclusions and exclusions” (Kafadar 1995: 22-7).
Further on, he presents us with one of those hot potatoes which have
produced different interpretations of Ottoman state building.
“(…) The creation of the Ottoman administrative apparatus has been particularly contro-
versial, with some historians arguing that it was all based on Byzantine models and others
that the Ottomans could find all they needed in the Turko-Muslim heritage. In terms of
broader cultural exchange or ‘lifestyles’ too, various sides of nationalist polemics have
tended to see the influence of their side in, say, shared musical or culinary practices. The
problem with both sides of this debate stems partly from their adherence to a static notion
of cultural ‘goods’, whether one conceives of them in the realm of state building or cook-
ing. In other words, ‘influence’ is understood as a creative party giving one of its own
‘goods’ to an imitating, uncreative other – a notion that needs to be recast now that histori-
ans realize influence is not possible without interaction, without a choice by the allegedly
passive receiver. And even then, common cultural traits are not necessarily reducible to
influence” (Kafadar 1995: 24).
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Kafadar’s observations, though mainly concerned with the creation of 
the Ottoman Empire in Anatolia, are just as applicable to the five centuries
of Ottoman presence in southeastern Europe. Among the opponents of
Turkey’s eu accession, it has become customary to discount Ottoman pres-
ence as foreign oppression, a typical example of non-European yoke under
which Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs, Hungarians, Romanians and Albanians
suffered for hundreds of years. This idea, which is equally wrong, has its
roots both in the centuries-old European fear of ‘the Turk’ (the so-called
Turca Terribilis (De Groot 1986: 1), the only strong opponent of the Euro-
pean states during the early modern period), and in the nationalist rewrit-
ing of Balkan history since the 19th century. Ottoman history shares in the
cultural heritage of that region, just as Ottoman culture itself was, in turn,
also shaped by that region’s influences.
With this we return to Huntington’s thesis that Turkey is a ‘torn country’,
willing to cross from one civilisation to another, from Islamic to Western
civilisation. Following his own notion of the three pre-conditions for
success, the bottleneck would lie in the reluctance on the part of the receiv-
ing civilisation (in this case, the eu) to accept Turkey. This would mean
that the West is actually responsible for Turkey’s ‘tornness’, and not the
Turkish elite or the Turkish people who, according to successive ‘Euro-
barometer’ opinion polls, are overwhelmingly (seventy per cent or more)
in favour of joining the Union.
If Huntington’s civilisation blocs exist, this means that Muslim Turkey is
not only prepared knowingly to cross from ‘the house of Islam’ to the
Western ‘house of war’, but is even willing to do its utmost to achieve this.
This is not at all logical. Might it not simply be that secular Turkey has acted
rationally and pragmatically, in line with historical, social and economic
developments under the Ottoman Empire and the Republic? Should not
we also say that the West, the eu in this case, has indeed created the
Copenhagen criteria as a ‘secular yardstick’ to test the progress of candidate
members, but that the many statements on the clash of civilisations indi-
cate that Islam is seen as the real the problem? In short, is it not true that
the West, with its so-called crucial legacy of the ‘separation of powers’, is
really the party failing to separate politics from religion?
3.3 values as cultur al legac y
Hopefully, it is clear from the above how very hard it really is to think in
terms of separate civilisations, and thus also in terms of a ‘European civili-
sation’. It is a paradigm with large practical consequences, because Hunt-
ington considers the value systems of humanism, individualism, democ-
racy and human rights as historical acquisitions of the ‘Western world’,
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and not as an inseparable part of the modernisation process. This is why he
thinks they are culturally-linked, and not universal. Western values should
be defended forcefully and self-confidently (which is why Huntington
rejects the concept of multiculturalism), but it is doubtful whether other
great civilising blocs, such as China or ‘Islam’, will be open to developing a
similar kind of modernity, based on the same underlying values. In this
view then, Islam, in particular, is seen as an ideological system that ulti-
mately does not tolerate democratic and humanist values (a conclusion
drawn earlier by fundamentalists such as Cemalettin Kaplan, the caliph of
Cologne).
From Turkey’s perspective, this approach can be criticised in one general
and one specific way. Firstly, the fact that a philosophical system is rooted
in an historically-grown civilisation of one region, does not prevent that
system from being adopted by another civilisation, or even from becoming
universal. If that were untrue, then modern mathematics, for example,
would not exist. More specifically, one can say that precisely in the case of
the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, the modernisation process of the last
century and a half was paralleled by the adoption and gradual internalisa-
tion of a system of values that has its origins in Renaissance, Humanism
and Enlightenment. Already in 1839, liberal principles such as the inviola-
bility of the individual and his possessions, were officially proclaimed by
the sultan. Equality in the eyes of the law for all Ottoman citizens was offi-
cial policy by 1856. A constitution was drawn up in 1876, a mere 28 years
after the reform of the Dutch constitution by Thorbecke, who turned the
Netherlands into a parliamentary democracy. The development of a demo-
cratic constitutional state in Turkey has been a long and arduous process
with many setbacks, but it is nonsense to claim that ‘Western’ values of
democracy and human rights are essentially foreign to Turkey.
3.4 turkish isl am , democr ac y and human rights
The question of whether Islam, democracy and human rights can be
combined, has important practical consequences for Turkey, an Islamic
country aspiring eu membership. Indeed, the eu’s political leaders have
defined the Union as a community of values. The values upon which the
community is based, are reflected and formalised in the Copenhagen crite-
ria of 1993, which are applied to judge the candidacy of potential member
states. Their core elements are democracy and human rights, but neither
concept is unambiguously described or defined in eu documentation. As
far as the criterion of ‘democracy’ is concerned, this implies that the Union
does not apply an absolute standard for democratic rule. Most definitions
cover multiple manifestations. Hence, the Union does not restrict itself to
one model, and the so-called annual Regular Reports employ an opera-
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tional definition for monitoring purposes. eu views on the essential char-
acteristics of an acceptable democratic system can therefore only be
deduced rather implicitly, from these monitoring reports. Given the large
variety of democratic systems across Europe, it comes as no surprise that
these reports are highly subjective on this issue. There is no such thing as a
standard ‘European democracy’. This becomes apparent with a closer
examination of the actual practices within the different member states. In
the eyes of its citizens, the Netherlands is a democracy, yet several
elements in the Dutch governance system (the monarchy, appointed rather
than elected mayors, provincial commissioners and dike wardens) are, in
the eyes of, say, Americans or French, eccentric and not in the least demo-
cratic. The fact that the Dutch judiciary lacks a constitutional court, is met
with amazement in many countries. Conversely, the French phenomenon
of a parliamentary representative who is also mayor of a large city, is diffi-
cult to reconcile with Dutch conceptions of proper public administration.
The same holds for the British monarchy’s position as the head of the
church, which many other Europeans view as difficult to reconcile with
the principles of secularism. The fact that the Federal Republic of Germany
collects taxes on behalf of the churches, is very suspect in the eyes of Turk-
ish secularists.
Even within Europe, there is clearly no yardstick available for measuring
the central criteria of Copenhagen. We can, at most, start from a number of
minimum conditions which a system must fulfil to qualify as democratic –
conditions such as free and fair elections, peaceful transfer of power, sepa-
ration of powers and the right of the parliamentary majority to form a
government. Where reports by the European Parliament provide much
more detailed information on the requirements for democracy, they find
themselves on thin ice.
The same, however, cannot be said of human rights. The definition of
human rights in the Regular Reports is based on the European Convention
on Human Rights (ecrm), laid down in Rome in 1950, and is also related
to the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948),
which in turn builds on the French Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du
citoyen of 1789, the American Constitution of 1787 and the British Bill of
Rights of 1689.
Is Islam, as it is practiced in Turkey, in conflict with these basic principles?
To begin with, it is of course undeniable that any belief system that claims
to represent a divine and therefore absolute truth, and to express this in a
set of rules of life, inevitably runs into some form of conflict with the
pluriformity that is inherent in democratic society. The three great reli-
gions of revelation, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, are potentially the
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most difficult to reconcile with democratic pluriformity, due to the central
role they attribute to their respective holy books, in which revealed truth
actually manifests itself. At the same time, we may conclude from the
historical record of the last two hundred years, that movements which
claim to be inspired by revelation, are indeed capable of playing an active
and constructive role within a democratic system. In Christianity, this is
demonstrated on a daily basis by the Christian democratic parties in
Europe, whilst in Judaism it is evident from the roles that religious Jews
have played in European and American politics, and from the history of the
state of Israel. Whatever objections one might have against Israel’s occupa-
tion policy, it is still undeniably a democracy.
Within the Christian and Jewish world, there are of course minorities who
function within the democratic system, but who are so focused on their
own revelation and divine law that their ideological principles, and some-
times also their actual practices, are in conflict with democratic pluralism
and human rights. An example is the Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij in
the Netherlands, which de facto favours a theocracy and tramples on the
constitutionally entrenched principle of equal rights for women. Other
examples are the radical religious parties that emerged from the Aguddat
Israel in Israel. Such movements, despite their dubious constitutional legit-
imacy, are generally tolerated as long as, in practice, they accept the rules of
the democratic game. A greater problem is presented by those groups that
base themselves on an interpretation of the revelation so radical and exclu-
sive that they shun participation in the democratic system. Examples of
these are the radical sects in the United States who reject the federal
authority and the Jewish groups in Jerusalem who do not recognize the
state of Israel. These fringe phenomena, however, have no bearing upon
the fact that the vast majority of believers have found their place inside the
democratic and largely secular system.
On the face of it, things are very different when it comes to Islam. It is
undeniably true that the Islamic world, from Morocco to Indonesia, has a
democratic deficit. In the post-colonial era, democratic political move-
ments with an Islamic character had difficulties in developing, and since
the 1970s it has mainly been radical extra-parliamentary groups who have
become mouthpieces of social agitation against impoverishment, corrup-
tion and foreign policy failures. This picture seems to confirm Hunting-
ton’s thesis that Islam and democracy are incompatible. But if that were the
case, we would have to ignore the fact that the causes of this democratic
deficit are not, as a matter of course, inherent in Islam. The military elites
in North Africa and the Middle East, for example, who took power once
the colonial powers had left after the Second World War, refused to
involve local political and social forces into their administrations. Instead,
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they looked to Washington or Moscow for support. Thus, by suppressing
local political activity, the opposition was wiped out, leaving a vacuum for
fundamentalism to fill. According to Jansen (1998), Islamic fundamental-
ism can be understood as an attempt to reverse this exclusion from politi-
cal and public life. He points out that, “Extreme-nationalist leaders like
Qaddafi in Libya and Saddam Hussein in Iraq are [and were] dangerous,
perhaps, but they are not fundamentalist” (Jansen 1998: 24). In other
words, the lack of democracy in many Islamic states has more to do with
the authoritarian nature of these regimes. For opportunistic reasons, they
may well appeal to existing Islamic sentiments, but they are generally not
fundamentalist or strongly Islamic themselves. It would therefore be
wrong to conclude from the situation under such regimes that Islam
excludes democracy. It would be more accurate to draw the reverse conclu-
sion, i.e. that a lack of democracy excludes pluriformity in the religious
landscape.
As yet, Turkey is the exception in the Islamic world. For over half a century,
its overwhelmingly Muslim population has enjoyed a pluriform demo-
cratic system. During that period, the military have openly intervened in
the political system four times, but there have also been fifteen general
elections, twelve of which were truly free and fair. The country has a vocal
middle class and a varied media landscape. Is Turkey then the one case
which proves that Islam and democracy are indeed compatible? Or is it a
front-line state in the clash between the West and Islam, in which the
forces of democracy and Islam keep each other in a shaky balance? In other
words, are we talking about synthesis or deadlock? As discussed exten-
sively in section 2.1, many Kemalist secularists in Turkey perceive the latter
to be the case. 
Kemalists see themselves as the shock troops of secularism and ‘Western’
values, who are responsible for controlling the rising tide of Islam. Para-
doxically, they are often prepared to make concessions on issues of democ-
racy and human rights, to avoid the greater evil of an undemocratic social
order based on religious law. Kemalists thus fail to appreciate both a set of
basic characteristics of Turkish Islam, and the degree to which the seculari-
sation process has taken root over the last 150 years. In section 2.1, we
showed how Turkish-Islamic empires incorporated religious authorities
into their administrative systems, thus creating a modus vivendi in which
state (devlet) and religion (din) developed a complex relationship of mutual
dependence. We have also seen how this system was refined and perfected
over 600 years of Ottoman rule. Turkish ulema (Islamic religious scholars),
in particular those in the higher ranks, were therefore always forced to
anticipate the changing political and social circumstances facing govern-
ment policies, and to find solutions which at least did not contradict
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Islamic law. It is plausible that this has developed into a habit of flexibility
and openness among professional practitioners of Turkish Islam – a thesis
already advanced in the 1950s by Islam scholar Cantwell-Smith.
From the 1830s onwards, the symbiotic relationship between the state and
Ottoman religious scholars changed as a result of a gradual but ultimately
profound secularisation process. It met hardly any resistance on the part of
the higher-ranking ulema. On the contrary, they sanctioned this reform
process, and notable reformers, such as Ahmed Cevdet Pasja, who
designed the Ottoman civil code, themselves had background as religious
scholars. 
This tradition was continued in the Republic. The first generations of reli-
gious scholars, now united under the banner of the Directorate of Religious
Affairs, or Diyanet, supported the religious policies of the Kemalists. These
aimed at driving back Islam’s public role as much as possible, and rendering
faith an issue of personal conviction and morality. While the postwar
period produced a far more tolerant attitude towards public manifestations
of religion, this did not undermine the secular order nor the secular legal
system. Nor did it change the main message of state-Islam, as preached by
the Diyanet. To see what this message currently is, we can take a look at
one of the Diyanet’s most widespread publications, the Cep I˙slmihali
(pocket catechism).
3.5 the position of official isl am
What follows is based on the Cep I˙slmihali of 2000. This pocket catechism
consists of three chapters. The first deals with Islamic doctrine and the
second with the code of conduct. The third and, for our purposes most
interesting chapter is titled I˙sslam’da Ahlâk (‘Islam and Ethics’). It is subdi-
vided into five parts: the obligations of the faithful towards, respectively,
God and his prophet, himself, his relatives and neighbours, his country,
and humanity (Soymen 2000: 95-123). To assess to what degree this
preaching of official Turkish Islam is in line with Western concepts of
democracy and human rights, these last three parts are of special relevance.
In Islamic ethics on relatives and neighbours, marriage and family occupy 
a central position. These ‘institutions’ are defined in traditional terms.
Marriage is recommended. Those who do not marry, despite being able to,
neglect their duties. A man must teach and honour his wife and treat 
her gently and with respect, but he is still in charge: “At home the man is
the head of the family” (Soymen 2000: 108-10). The phrase about the man
as head of the family has been removed from Turkey’s new civil code of
2001 and replaced by the statement that husband and wife together head
the family (Cumhuriyet, 22-6-2001). At the time of writing, it is still
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unclear to what extent this new statement is also reflected in Diyanet
publications.
The chapter on the obligations towards one’s country and nation strongly
stress the state-allied character of official Turkish Islam. That it is clearly
still dominated by the thinking of the Turkish-Islamist Synthesis (see sect.
2.1.6), is evident from statements such as: “The Islamic Turkish nation is
one of the oldest, most famous, honourable and exalted nations in the
history of mankind. Turkish history is full of sublime heroic deeds, which
are rooted in faith.” And: “Patriotism is derived from faith” (Soymen
2000: 115-17). Patriotism and national pride are not merely abstract
concepts. They are translated into obedience: “Bowing before the laws and
regulations of the government is a duty. Our book, the Noble Koran, orders
it thus.” The catechism specifies this still further in its references to the
obligation to pay taxes and serve in the army: “National service ... is
prescribed by the faith.” National service is also appealing from a religious
point of view, since: “In our faith, the position of a soldier is highly exalted.
If a soldier dies, he achieves martyrdom. In the hereafter, the degree of
martyrdom directly follows that of prophethood.” And: “Evading national
service under a pretext, or deserting the army constitutes treason, a foul act
and a great sin” (Soymen 2000: 115-17).
In the chapter on the obligations towards humanity, by contrast, we find a
discourse that closely fits current European notions of human rights,
which are rooted in liberalism. It emphasises that God created man free,
and that man is free insofar as he does not endanger the freedom of others.
Islam is clearly presented as a religion more outspoken in its teachings of
the natural rights of man that any other community, philosophy or science.
The natural rights to which man can lay claim, are defined as: “The right 
to life (...), the right to freedom (...), the right to [freedom of] thought (...),
and the right to ownership” (Soymen 2000: 119-20).
Summing up, the dominant current within Turkish Sunni Islam, the
Diyanet’s state-allied Islam, reproduces an Islam that can be characterised
as adopting a middle course. Personal faith and individual morality are
linked to fairly traditional social values, emphasising solidarity and hierar-
chy. In this respect, the message of official Islam resembles that of Chris-
tian democracy in Europe – the family as the cornerstone of society and
respect for (traditional) standards and values. Ties to politics are out of the
question, but religion is mobilised to promote loyalty to the state. Thus, to
suggest that the Islam of the Diyanet is a liberal Islam, as is often done, is
rather far-fetched. In line with Ottoman-Turkish tradition, the Directorate
of Religious Affairs exudes realism and flexibility, but certainly not
renewal. Daring theological interpretations are hard to find. Turkey does
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have its Islamic reformers, people who apply concepts from modern
(Western) philosophy and sociology to arrive at a new understanding of
religion, but they move outside the circles of the Diyanet and state-Islam.
Among them are liberal theologian Mehmet Aydın, or publicists such as 
Ali Bulaç and Abdürrahman Dilipak, who call themselves ‘Muslim intellec-
tuals’.
In debates on Turkish eu membership, the existence of the Directorate of
Religious Affairs and the de facto state control of (Sunni) Islam that this im-
plies, is often presented as problematic. After all, this situation seems be
completely at odds with accepted European views on the separation of
church and state. However, by looking at the Diyanet’s position from this
angle, we tend to forget that in the Islamic world there are no institutions
such as churches. As we have seen in chapter 2, protecting the faith has large-
ly been a state concern throughout the history of the Islamic world. There 
is thus no body to which the state could transfer these duties. Calls for the
state’s withdrawal from the religious domain, are therefore hardly realistic. 
However, if Turkey aspires participation in a European community of val-
ues, the Diyanet’s message must be in line with those values. This means it
should pay less attention to the importance of the state, and more to the role
of the individual. Such a reorientation may well be possible precisely
because there is this connection between religious establishment and state.
This would allow the (democratising) state to insist on presenting different,
more liberal interpretations of the faith. Besides, the Alevi population
groups in Turkey are more than justified to claim their fair share of religious
care (paid from general tax revenues).
3.6 the voice of the opposition
Since all official authorities of Islam are incorporated in the state apparatus,
irrespective of their rank, it is quite logical that occasional resistance to the
secularisation policies of the late Ottoman Empire and the Republic came
from the leaders of the mystical brotherhoods, who were much less caught
up in the state’s web (see sect. 2.2). This was indeed the case during the
uprisings of 1909 and 1925, as well as the more local incidents during the
1920s and 1930s. For this reason, also, the Kemalist Republic banned the
orders, and the Kemalist elite still nourishes a distrust of the brotherhoods.
At the same time, though, neither the political parties which emanated from
the Naks¸ibendi brotherhood, nor the Nurcu movement and its branches
actually risked violating the secular order. The National Order Party, the
National Salvation Party, the Welfare party, the Virtue Party, and the Felic-
ity Party have all tried to gain influence through the ballot box, via normal
local and national elections. While their election programmes and campaign
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propaganda contain many references to Islamic and traditional standards
and values, explicit reference to a reintroduction of Islamic law are nowhere
to be found. That may well be for tactical reasons (since this would consti-
tute a punishable offence in Turkey), but the fact remains that in those
places where the Welfare Party actually obtained power over a longer
period, such as in Istanbul and Ankara after 1994, there were very few signs
of actual Islamisation policies.
However, there are many signs that the ‘Islamic’ opposition also employs
concepts such as democracy and human rights as its frame of reference,
precisely because they can be used as defence mechanisms in large conflicts
with the secular state apparatus. The countless female supporters of the
Welfare Party who engaged in protests against the ban on headscarves in
Turkish higher education, used the argument that their human rights were
being violated. They demanded recognition of their rights to display their
religious persuasion and accused the authorities of discrimination. In
short, their arguments were not very different from those employed by
Islamic women in the French debate on headscarves.
Erbakan’s political movement has appeared under so many different
banners because it has been banned time and again. In 1998, the Welfare
Party obtained the support of around one-fifth of the Turkish electorate,
was subsequently banned and its leader, Erbakan, banished from politics.
However, Erbakan did not react by calling on his supporters to start a revo-
lution and spill blood in the streets in the name of God. He took the case to
the European Court (which, incidentally, decided against him), while his
supporters established a new party that conformed to the Turkish law on
political parties.
Apart from using the ballot box, Islamic movements also use other ways to
gain influence. One way is by appointing their supporters to strategic posi-
tions in the state apparatus (the so-called kadrolas¸ma, of which secular
Turkish parties are also guilty). Another is by educating and indoctrinating
new generations of mostly underprivileged youngsters, who subsequently
enter the state apparatus at the lowest rung, to become champions of
Islamic standards and values. In Kemalist and European eyes, both ways are
menacing, but it is difficult to maintain that they are undemocratic or in
violation of human rights. In the United States, the world’s democratic
superpower, it is the order of the day in politics. One only has to think of
the appointments to the American Supreme Court or the activities of the
Christian Coalition.
To know more about the ideological principles of the most important Turk-
ish Islamic movement, we can use Necmettin Erbakan’s 1975 publication,
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Milli Görüs¸ (National Vision), as a starting point. ‘National Vision’ is the
name of the ideological movement which has produced all of Erbakan’s
parties, from the National Order Party to the Felicity Party, and which also
includes a broad network of mosques and associations in the Netherlands
and Germany.
In his book, Erbakan emphasises that this movement is loyal to all the rights
and freedoms described in the constitution. He specifically mentions the
inviolability of possessions and the home, the equality of all persons before
the law, and the right to trade, travel, exchange information, assemble and
demonstrate (Erbakan 1975: 31-3). Like the Diyanet’s catechism, its sections
on the position of women emphasise their role as wives and mothers. Work-
ing women must be given the opportunity to fulfil their maternal obliga-
tions. At the same time, the movement defends the principle of equal access
to education for men and women (Erbakan 1975: 38-9). National Vision pays
a lot of attention to the issue of secularism. It argues that secularism in the
true sense of the word (laiklik, from the French laïcité) allows everyone the
freedom of thought, conscience, and religious practice. This is why it quali-
fies the Turkish system as artificial secularism, and as a system enabling
non-religious people to deny religious people their human rights. Erbakan
insists on dropping article 163 of the penal code, which states that political
use of religion is a punishable offence. Instead, he wants a ‘Law for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights’ (Erbakan 1975: 51-6).
Erbakan is notably sharp in his judgement on the European Community
(and later the Union), which he portrays as a neo-imperialist conspiracy by
Jews and/or the Catholic Church (Erbakan 1975: 235-264). Forced by the
circumstances, and especially by bearing responsibilities of government,
he and his party subsequently toned down their judgement, but Milli
Görüs¸ has always remained ambivalent in its views on Europe.
In this respect, the ak Party’s attitude is essentially different. In domestic
policy, since 2001 the leaders of the ak Party have moved from a strongly
religiously-coloured conservatism to a much more hybrid form of ethical
conservatism, nationalism, free-market thinking and technologically
modernisation. Moreover, their foreign policy orientation has also changed
quite fundamentally. The ak Party now embraces Europe to guarantee that
its strategy of bottom-up modernisation will be given a chance in
confrontations with the highly restrictive and authoritarian modernisation
school of the Kemalist state elite. To obtain a fuller picture of the ak
Party’s ideas, it is useful to look at the a k Parti Seçim Beyannamesi, its
election manifesto, as well as its 2003 party programme, entitled: Hers¸ey
Türkiye I˙çin (‘Everything for Turkey’).
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This first document stresses the belief in ‘true’ democracy, with an equal
right to representation for everyone: “Our party, which sees differences of
faith and culture as enriching the country, believes that people of different
languages, religions, races and social status must be able to express them-
selves freely and participate in politics, relying on equal protection by the
law” (ak Parti 2003: 7). And later: “The ak Party, which sees political
parties as essential elements of the democratic system, is against the clos-
ing down of political parties which operate within the framework of the
constitutional state” (ak Parti 2003: 7).
The programme further emphasises that while the ak Party strongly
adheres to conservative standards and values, it also stands by a process of
modernisation and further economic liberalisation, thus allowing the state
to abandon its authoritarian top-down bureaucratic approach and enabling
it to serve society. On the subject of accession to the eu, it says: “Our party
considers complete membership of the eu as a natural consequence of the
modernisation process” (ak Parti 2003: 8). In the document, the ak Party
squarely supports full membership, as well as the Union’s economic and
political criteria. It believes that this will enhance the modernisation
process, allowing society and state jointly to enhance their national and
international position. Thus, these criteria are not presented as measures
imposed from above to obtain an entry ticket, but rather as objective crite-
ria that are indispensable to Turkey’s domestic progress and international
position. In this way, domestic opponents of eu membership are implicitly
branded as opponents of their country’s progress. In this line of reasoning,
an ultra-nationalist is portrayed as someone who will actually damage the
national interest.
A separate chapter deals with international agreements on fundamental
human rights and freedoms. The ak Party fully endorses such agreements,
also partially against the background of Turkish national interests in the
global arena. It declares itself willing to do everything in its power to fulfil
its international obligations agreements in general, and the requirements of
the Copenhagen criteria in particular. These are said to go beyond mere
legislative changes: “The respect for fundamental freedoms and rights
involves more than laying down guarantees in laws and in the constitution.
Additional efforts must be made to implement these changes, thus firmly
ensuring their anchoring into our political culture” (ak Parti 2003: 12).
Equal rights for women are important to the ak Party. At the end of its
programme, these are addressed in a separate section entitled Kadın Sorun-
ları (‘Problems of Women’). This states that while women and men share
the same burdens of life, in practice women do not have the equal status to
which they are entitled. Their main problems are said to be “economic
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problems, no or only low levels of education, (financial) worries about the
future, domestic violence and lack of social security” (ak Parti 2003: 76),
depending also on whether they live in urban or rural regions. It subse-
quently states, “Our party attaches importance to eliminating problems 
for women, since these [problems] hinder a sound upbringing of offspring
and the pursuit of happiness within the family” (ak Parti 2003: 76). This 
is then followed by a list of measures needed to eliminate any forms of
inequality or discrimination. Strikingly, it also mentions the following: “In
regions where suicide amongst women and the murder of women on ethi-
cal grounds and honour killings are common, preventive and educational
measures must be taken, which are directed at women and their families”
(ak Parti 2003: 76). In this way, the ak Party argues that the unequal posi-
tion of women and serious matters such as honour killings, have nothing
to do with its interpretation of Islam, and that both practices are unaccept-
able.
This may well raise the following question: do we ascribe this apparent
moderation of this Islamic ‘opposition’ to political opportunism, or to
prudence? In other words, if the pressure imposed by the state and espe-
cially by the military would actually diminish, would these Islamists 
then also pursue a different and much more radical Islamisation of society?
In a democratic political context such as that of Turkey, where votes count,
this obviously leads to another question: could such a radical programme
succeed in obtaining support among the people?
3.7 is there a breeding ground for fundamentalism?
The term ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ was defined earlier in this study
(sect. 2.4) as a desire completely to rearrange society according to Islamic
laws, sometimes also by using (political) violence. One way of gaining
insight into this ‘desire’ is by investigating to what extent Turkish
Muslims identify with such fundamentalist concepts. At the same time,
it is also important to gauge the opinion of the Turkish Islamic popula-
tion on ‘dissident’ thinkers. After all, an Islamic fundamentalist sees ‘the
West’, its system and its philosophy as hostile to Islam.
The data presented below are based on a research report by Tesev, enti-
tled ‘Türkiye’de din, toplum ve siyaset’ (Religion, society and politics in
Turkey) (Çarkog˘lu and Toprak 2000). This investigation into the reli-
gious attitudes of the Turkish population indicates that the existence of a
breeding ground for fundamentalism in Turkey is unlikely. Approxi-
mately one-third (35.2%) of Turks identify themselves first and foremost
as Muslims. This figure differs widely between urban and rural people,
and between people with higher and lower education levels. Those with
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little education in rural areas and smaller provincial towns, most
frequently see themselves first and foremost as Muslims. Among people
with higher education, only 10 per cent support this opinion. Fifty-three
per cent of the population identify themselves first and foremost as citi-
zens of Turkey, or as ‘Turks’.
Examining how the Turks experience their faith, reveals that less than half
of all men perform the compulsory five-times-a-day prayers, while about
two-thirds participate in the Friday prayer, or at least say they do. This does
not suggest great zeal. Furthermore, Turks seem to apply a flexible defini-
tion of the concept of ‘Muslim’. Eighty-five per cent believe that someone
who does not pray can still be classified as a Muslim. And 66 per cent do not
view the consumption of alcohol (according to strict Islamic law, an offence
punishable by flogging) as a disqualification from being a Muslim, while 
85 per cent say that a woman who does not wear a headscarf can still be con-
sidered a Muslim. Thus, presentation and behaviour are not the most impor-
tant criteria by which Turkish Muslims judge their fellow faithful.
Another criterion is whether people consider it problematic if Muslims and
non-Muslims have to share the same personal or professional living envi-
ronment. Roughly half of the Turkish people indicate that they prefer an
environment in which people live according to the rules of Islam. When
house-hunting, 54 per cent consider it important that their neighbours are
religious, while 37 per cent do not. When there is a choice of two neigh-
bourhood supermarkets, 49 per cent prefer the shop with a religious
persuasion, 39 per cent have no preference for either. As far as friends are
concerned, 61 per cent feel it is important that these are religious, while 
31 per cent disagree. When it comes to professional life, 49 per cent agree
that a religious person is more trustworthy and honest than a non-religious
person, and 37 per cent disagree. (This could also be an important reason
for preferring a ‘religious’ neighbourhood supermarket.)
The large majority of Turkish Muslims are fairly tolerant towards ‘dissident
thinkers’: 89 per cent feel there are also ‘good people’ among the faithful of
other religions. Sixty-three per cent of those interviewed do not want their
son or daughter marrying a non-Muslim, so for over one-third, this is no
insurmountable problem. A Muslim man, by the way, can happily marry a
‘woman of the Book’ under Islamic law, but it is not so simple for a Muslim
women; her husband is required to convert to Islam.
It must be stressed that these questions related to non-Muslims did not 
distinguish between religions. It is thus quite possible that the so-called
‘people of the Book’ (Christians and Jews) are viewed more favourably by
Turkish Muslims than, say, Hindus.
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When it comes to the crucial issue of reintroducing the holy law into the
family law, Turkish opinion is unanimous: don’t! A mere 10 per cent of the
population favour reintroducing Islamic marriages (and with it also the
right to marry four women), while 14 per cent would like to see the return
of Islamic divorce by repudiation.
The above data are of course no more than a fairly arbitrary summary of the
figures, but the picture that emerges is that of a largely traditionally reli-
gious, but also relatively tolerant and not in the least fundamentalist,
population. If we employ as the chief characteristic of fundamentalism the
desire once again to base society on the s¸eriat (the Islamic law), then we can
say that a maximum of between 10 and 15 per cent of the Turkish popula-
tion are susceptible to fundamentalist thinking.
Other figures also seem to point in that direction. The large electoral
success of the ak Party in the 2002 elections, can be attributed to the fact
that the party emphatically distanced itself from the Islamic philosophy of
Erbakan and his followers, and profiled itself as a broad, mainstream party,
combining conservative standards and values with a belief in free markets,
modernity and technology. Of those who voted for the ak Party, one
segment had previously supported Erbakan’s party, i.e. they were islamists.
However, the Nationalist Action Party and the liberal-conservative Moth-
erland Party also lost much support to the new ak Party. It thus represents
a broad coalition. It is important that a party with such a profile even
succeeded in soundly beating the ‘real’ Muslims of Erbakan’s Felicity Party
in his own home town, Konya, which is known as a devout town (Yavuz
2003: 258).
Support for truly militant groups, then, is small (see sect. 2.4). ibda-c
almost certainly does not have more than a few hundred dedicated follow-
ers, and possibly a few thousand sympathisers. The number of Hizbullah
sympathisers has been estimated at 20,000, but this seems exaggerated. 
In Germany, home to more than three million Turks who can follow their
political and religious preferences relatively freely and without the restric-
tions imposed by the Kemalist state apparatus, the radical ‘State of the
Caliphate’ has never managed to attract more than about seven thousand
followers. Obviously, this does not make such organisations less danger-
ous. As it turns out, only a handful of fanatics are needed for terrorist
attacks. But it does indicate they do not find a breeding ground among the
majority of the Turkish population. This means that the Turkish situation
is fundamentally different from that in many Arab countries and in South
and South-East Asia.
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3.8 plur alism as a component of democr atisation
In the West, democracy is usually equated with pluralism, in all its aspects.
Here, we have mostly discussed Turkey’s Islamic landscape, but we will
end this survey with a short account of the degree of pluralism in Turkey in
a wider sense.
The Turkish political system has democratic shortcomings due to electoral
thresholds, constitutional limitations, patronage systems and corruption.
The state’s continuous pressure upon politics is indeed a problem, but
Turkey is still a country where voters can use the ballot box to bring to
power political groups other than those governing, and where the opposi-
tion can assume power peacefully. Voting is meaningful and there are clear
and viable political alternatives. Another characteristic democratic short-
coming in Turkey is censorship. The censor is still active on an almost daily
basis, when the authorities feel that newspapers or television stations have
overstepped their mark. Much like the Council for Higher Education
(yök), the Council for the Media (rtük) is one of the extensions with
which the state curbs civilian life. Publications by human rights organisa-
tions and organisations of Kurdish persuasion, in particular, are constantly
confronted with harassments. Nevertheless, Turkey has a large and richly
varied media, and its journalists and editors are continuously pushing the
bounds of possibility. Despite the censorship and self-censorship, it is
possible to find, buy and read strongly contrasting opinions on current
events from any street kiosk.
The economic sector also has its fair share of ambiguities. Over the last 
25 years, Turkey’s economic development has often been a process of all or
nothing. A very dynamic private sector, which includes tourism and
textiles, for example, functions alongside failing financial policies, such as
inefficient tax collecting and corruption. The annual growth of gross
national product has fluctuated between plus nine per cent and minus nine
per cent. Even so, all sections of Turkish society have become more pros-
perous during this period, and some spectacularly so.
This pluriformity of politics and the media is the product of a society that
has witnessed the rise of a large urban middle class whose prosperity 
and education levels have grown enormously over the last 25 years, albeit
with ups and downs. The ideas of the state apparatus, with its heavy
emphasis on sovereignty and centralisation, are falling increasingly out 
of step with a rapidly developing society. At the same time, however, that
very same state apparatus (including its ‘Islamic branch’, the Diyanet) 
is also the heir to a massive administrative tradition stretching back some
700 years.
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As far as the legitimacy of the state is concerned, it is important that Turkey
never fell victim to colonial rule. Attempts in that direction were repelled
by its population during the independence struggle of 1919-1922. In the
recent past (since 1918), the country has not suffered any military defeats.
As a result, the state never lost legitimacy in the eyes of its people. Many
Turks are highly critical of their country, but they identify strongly with it,
and are proud of its achievements.
3.9 the turkish situation: neither ‘thanks to isl am’
nor ‘in spite of isl am’
If Turkey were to lose its status of a ‘torn country’ – to use Huntington’s
words – and were to become firmly anchored within Europe, that would be
a truly hopeful message to the Islamic world; a sign that the ‘clash of civili-
sations’ is not a reality but a fantasy, and that the achievements of the West
can also find a place in an Islamic country. However, this does not mean
that the ‘Turkish model’ can simply be exported to other Islamic countries.
For that, the Turkish experience is much too determined by specific histor-
ical factors. From a psychological perspective, too, it is unlikely that the
countries in the Middle East will look to Turkey for a role model. Arab
countries still see Turkey mainly as their former colonial ruler and as an
accomplice of the imperialist West. The traditionally warm and, since the
last decade, increasingly close relations of Turkey with their archenemy
Israel, merely serve to reinforce this view. In fact, the Arab states have
traditionally had much warmer relations with European countries such as
Spain, Italy and Greece than with Turkey.
One final point: this survey is about Turkish Islam. It was undertaken to
determine to what extent the fact that Turkey is an Islamic country will hin-
der its potential accession to the eu. In other words, whether the concept of
the ‘clash of civilisations’ holds true. This concept defines ‘Islam’ as a civili-
sation confronting the West (and therefore Europe). This survey may there-
fore easily leave the impression that religion is the all-determining factor in
Turkey’s development. That is simply not true. Turkey is in many respects a
modern country, where the originally Western concepts of democracy and
human rights have taken root. True, this did not happen ‘thanks to Islam’,
nor however ‘in spite of Islam’. And when we look at other countries in the
Islamic world, we must also resist the temptation to attribute their wrongs
all too easily to religion. That is why it may be best to conclude this chapter
with a quotation from Turkey’s most prominent modern theologian,
Mehmet Aydın, from an address made on 25 April 2001.
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“In a society where individual rights are trampled on, society’s moral dimension is also
threatened, and even hindered. There are serious human rights abuses in the Islamic
world, and its ruling Muslim classes are usually authoritarian. But religion as a social fact is
only partially responsible for this situation. The roots of this problem of authoritarian
governance must first be sought in the dominant political culture, in the unbearable
economic situation, in the mazes and snares of international relations and, only then, in
modern Islamic thoughts and actions.
To put it differently: religious pluralism can only be understood in conjunction with all
other meaningful social factors. In a society where the constitutional state and social
justice are acknowledged, and the need for democratic participation in government is met,
a wide range of social roles is assigned to each citizen. Violence is systematically reduced
and, eventually, a general political culture of constructive conflict management is applied.
It is then that religion and religious life receive the opportunity to be truly religious and
spiritual, and less, say, political and ideological. However, if these societal circumstances
are lacking, then religious pluralism can never develop, not even if there are liberal tenden-
cies within religious life” (Mehmet Aydın 2001: http://www.fleuri.ugent.be/cie/CIE/
maydinnl1.htm).
turkish islam and the eu: a clash of civilisations?
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4 conclusion: turkish isl am and 
european civilisation
The reader who has read the above chapters of this survey, will not be
surprised by the conclusions that are drawn below.
We first showed in chapter 2 that Turkish Islam has a long tradition of
symbiosis with the state, and that this tradition has given ‘official’ Islam in
Turkey a strongly pragmatic and flexible character. Another important
characteristic of Islam in Turkey is its wide range of expressions. We have
examined this extensively, and have indicated the importance of Turkey’s
large Alevi minority, with its adherence to secular and humanist values.
We have seen how the large Islamic movements in Turkey that are not tied
to the state, overwhelmingly try to combine their faith in modern science
and technology with traditional standards and values. This is true for both
the classic Dervish orders and for the neo-movements. The fact that these
traditional standards and values are seen and experienced as ‘Islamic’, does
not mean those movements are fundamentalist. There are truly radical
fundamentalist groups in Turkey, but these are marginal. Admittedly, the
attitude of the Islamic majority towards Turkey’s minute Christian and
Jewish minorities is problematic. However, the fact that religious preju-
dices are diametrically opposed to the formal granting of equal treatment
to all citizens, is not unique to Turkey. The same can be said of the attitude
of Europeans to the Islamic minorities in Europe.
In chapter 3, we first tried to answer the question as to what extent Turkey
is culturally a part of Europe. We began by concluding that the concept of
identifiable civilisation blocs is not workable, and that the borders between
civilisations are diffuse and porous. At the same time we stated that
Turkey’s modernisation has in effect also amounted to a long period of
‘europeanisation’, and that the legacies of Enlightenment and liberalism
have also taken root in Turkey. From this point of departure, we answered
the question whether Turkish Islam is compatible with political democracy
and with the concept of human rights expressed in the European Conven-
tion and the United Nation’s Convention. Analysis of core texts of both
official state-Islam and of Islam-inspired political mass movements show
unambiguously that this is indeed the case. The documents of the current
governing party explicitly refer to these conventions and use European
practices as a yardstick. Where propagated values conflict with European
values, this usually involves a glorification of the state and the military, and
of authority in general, which bears no relation to Islam, even if Islam is
used by the state to sanctify such values. In an Islamic context, it is hard to
conceive of a complete separation of state and religion. However, it will
conclusion: turkish islam and european civilisation
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certainly prove necessary to readjust the message of state-Islam into a
more ‘civil’ direction.
It should come as no surprise that both state-linked and non-state linked
mainstream Islam in Turkey have a message that is moderate, flexible, and
reasonably tolerant. Sociological research into the religious attitudes of the
population confirms this picture. If we combine this research with political
data such as election results and research into illegal organisations, we can
safely conclude that a maximum of 15 per cent of the Turkish population
feel attracted to (elements of) fundamentalist thought. Support for such
(illegal) movements that also justify the use of violence, is probably very
small.
In a religious and more general cultural sense, Turkey exhibits a number of
characteristics that closely correspond to those present in some parts of
Europe. This is not only understandable from its long history of contact
with Europe and the deliberate ambition of the Turkish elite to become
European, but also from the characteristics of modern-day Turkish society,
with its large and mature urban middle class, political pluralism and strong
growth of prosperity. The fact that Turkey’s dominant religion is Islam, not
Christianity, does not change this, nor does the fact that it tends to have
more in common with countries such as Poland or Greece than with, say,
the Netherlands or Denmark. To exclude Turkey on the basis of cultural
and religious criteria, as suggested by European politicians and writers
who allow themselves to be inspired by Huntington’s ideas, is therefore
wrong. Turkey’s alleged un-European character is a construction, based on
a very shaky definition of a European or ‘Western’ civilisation, and on a
poor understanding of Turkish reality.
This is not to say that there are no objections against Turkey’s eu accession.
Arguments relating to poverty, migration and the decision-making capac-
ity of European institutions must be taken seriously. This survey does not
cover these aspects. It is merely concerned with the argument (unfounded,
in our view) that Turkey could not, or should not, become a member
because the large majority of its population is Muslim.
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